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ABSTRACT 
 
TRANSMISSION OF ISLAMIC KNOWLEDGE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF MEDIATION IN THE PRACTICES OF LEARNING 
WITHIN THE ISLAMIC HERITAGE OF TURKEY 
Ünver, Onur 
MA, Department of Cultural Studies 
Supervisor: Prof. Ferhat Kentel 
June 2016, 123 pages 
This thesis studies the learning practices and mediation forms in the transmission of 
Islamic knowledge within the cultural heritage of Turkey, with the aim of better 
understanding how the changes that occurred in these particular learning practices 
and mediation forms during the foundation of the Republic may have affected the 
Turkish society and the current approach to religion. For that, first, Islamic knowledge 
itself is analyzed theoritically, assuming the probability that mediation and practice 
are intrinsic and presupposed properties of the very knowledge. Second, learning 
practices and mediation forms are traced back to the traditional institutions within 
the Ottoman Empire, namely medrese and tekke, where transmission of Islamic 
knowledge occurred, and investigated through comparison. Third, the altered 
practices of knowledge transmission and the changing mediation forms within the 
current society are discussed in the light of the outcomes from the former 
investigations within the thesis. Consequently, the thesis claims that even though the 
tradition of seeking Islamic knowledge from a mediator persists in the society, the 
process itself has become a normative process instead of a transformative one; and 
that while previous practices of learning aimed to establish the self as a subject, 
current ones have been leading people more towards constructed identities. 
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ÖZ 
 
İSLAMİ BİLGİNİN AKTARIMI: 
TÜRKİYE’NİN İSLAMİ GELENEĞİ İÇİNDE 
 ÖĞRENME PRATİKLERİNDEKİ ARACILIĞIN ANALİZİ 
 
Ünver, Onur 
MA, Kültürel Çalışmalar Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Ferhat Kentel 
Haziran 2016, 123 sayfa 
Bu tez, Türkiye’nin kültürel mirasında İslami bilgi aktarımı içerisindeki öğrenme 
pratikleri ve aracılık formları üzerine eğilmektedir, ve bunu yaparken de 
Cumhuriyet’in kurulumunda bu öğrenme pratikleri ve aracılık formlarında oluşan 
değişikliklerin şu anki toplumu ve dine karşı yaklaşımı nasıl etkilemiş olabileceğini 
daha iyi anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bunun için de, öncelikle, İslami bilginin kendisi, 
aracılığın ve pratiğin bu bilgi anlayışının içkin ve önkabul olarak varsayılmış özellikleri 
olabileceği olasılığını da hesaba katarak, teoritik olarak analiz edilmektedir. Ardından, 
öğrenme pratikleri ve aracılık formlarının izleri Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İslami 
bilginin aktarımının gerçekleştiği geleneksel kurumlarda, yani medrese ve tekkede, 
sürülmektedir ve karşılaştırma ile incelenmektedir. Daha sonra da, şu anki toplumun 
tadil edilmiş bilgi aktarımı pratikleri ve değişen aracılık formları, tezin içerisindeki 
öncel çıkarımların ışığında tartışılmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, bu tez de iddia edilmektedir 
ki, İslami bilgiyi bir aracı üzerinden arama geleneği her ne kadar toplumda süregelse 
de, bu sürecin kendisi dönüştürücü bir süreçten çok düzgüsel bir sürece kaymıştır; ve 
geçmiş pratikler kişiyi özne haline getirmeyi amaçlarken, şimdikiler daha çok 
kurulmuş kimliklere yönlendirmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İslami Bilgi, Bilgi Aktarımı, Aracılık, Kimlik, Özne 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
      
 
This thesis aims to understand how the changes, which occurred in the Islamic 
learning practices during and after the establishment of the Turkish state, might have 
affected the current approach to religion and the perception of Islamic knowledge 
within the society. To be able to study these transformations, the changes that 
occurred within the forms of mediation are traced back through the Turkish-Islamic 
history. Thus, the focus of the thesis is on Islamic knowledge, the traditional forms of 
mediation within the transmission of this knowledge, and how these mediation forms 
are changed through centuries to potentially influence the current religious attitudes 
and understandings of the people in Turkey. 
The interest in the topic of the thesis is triggered with the realization of the 
increasing popularity of the religious TV programs. Based on observations, it seems 
like the TV has lately become a tool, a mediation form for the transmission of Islamic 
knowledge. Hence, the possible causes and effects of this phenomenon becomes very 
intriguing. While researching on these, it is realized, as it will be analyzed in the next 
section, that in Turkey, many people do observe the Islamic rituals frequently; they 
pray, they fast, and they recite the Kur’an as a form of worship. However, 
interestingly they do not read its translation or exegesis; the situation is not much 
different among high school and college graduates as well. Then, one cannot help but 
wonder, from a very “modernist” perspective, why people do not study what they 
practice from the books. Can it be that the religion is not a divine/spiritual reference 
in Turkey anymore, but a bare element of the culture?  
One should be careful dealing with questions like the ones above, because 
there is a possibility to fall in to a reductionist approach. It should not be overlooked 
that there may be intrinsic reasons embedded in the cultural codes and heritage that 
might have caused the phenomenon. As if to attest to the existence of this fallacy, 
Talal Asad claims: “Discourse involved in practice is not the same as that involved in 
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speaking about practice. It is a modern idea that a practitioner cannot know how to 
live religiously without being able to articulate that knowledge” (1993, p. 36). Then, 
the unsatisfied “modern” mind still raises more questions that if it is not from books 
and research, how do people know how to live religiously, and how do they gain their 
religious knowledge? 
In the current society, according to statistics discussed in the next section, 
mediation may be the answer to these questions as a dominant theme in the 
transmission of Islamic knowledge. However, based on Asad’s warning-like assertion, 
it again becomes inevitable to further investigate the forms of mediation within the 
practices that are existent in the transmission of knowledge and the very 
understanding of knowledge itself within Turkey, in the search of any answers to 
these kinds of questions. That is why, to study the tendency to practice religion but 
not to investigate it individually, the reasons behind the abundance and dominance 
of mediators as the main resources of religious knowledge within current Turkey, and 
the possible link between practice and mediation, this thesis has to take up mediation 
and religious practices in three different contexts: 
1. Theoretical context to see if mediation and practice is intrinsic to the 
understanding of knowledge within the cultural heritage of Turkey. 
2. Historical context to understand how mediation was put into practice in the 
medieval times.  
3. Current context to discuss the existing phenomenon in the light of previous 
contexts. 
Since these are very general contexts, it becomes really hard to limit the topic 
into a specific era; however, as it will be discussed, the educational institutions of the 
past, namely the medreses and tekkes, comes to be quite useful as a framework to 
be able to study the topic through juxtaposing their outlook on the religion, their 
understanding of knowledge, and the different practices of knowledge transmission. 
This dichotomy, also proves very useful to shed some light onto the current society 
since the overhang of the differences between the two, no matter how intertwined 
they might have been, still shapes or is used as a tool to shape the perception of 
religion.  
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Utilizing this dichotomy, the thesis compares the forms of mediation thus the 
personal experience while acquiring knowledge between now and the medieval era 
and determines the transformations on the goals, processes, and results of these 
practices. It also explores the changes in people’s outlook on religious knowledge, 
religious learning and the religion itself due to the transformations. Moreover, the 
thesis investigates if through these transformations, the ways people construct their 
identity and subjectivity is also altered through time. However, to be able to go into 
these discussions, first of all, it becomes necessary to establish the very existence of 
the phenomenon of mediation within current Turkey through scientific means, and 
that is why the statistics gathered to understand the religious life in Turkey by Turkish 
Statistical Institute (TÜİK) 1 for the Presidency of Religious Affairs is analyzed in detail 
within the next section. 
 
1.1) Religious Life in Turkey: 2014 TÜİK Survey 
  
In this section, the underlying claim of this thesis, namely the existence, or 
more bluntly, the abundance and dominance of mediation and mediation forms 
within the Islamic education, is studied through the startling statistics published in 
2014 about the religious life in Turkey. This study is conducted by the Turkish 
Statistical Institute, with the request of the Presidency of Religious affairs and it is the 
largest statistical study done to this day. That is why this thesis focuses on its analysis. 
Of course there are other various studies about the subject as well but their scopes 
are not as extensive. For example, Günay’s study focuses on Erzurum (1999), Arslan’s 
on Çorum (2004); Çarkoğlu and Toprak’s study focuses on political and social issues 
(2006). KONDA’s (2007) and Akşit’s (2012) research results are somewhat more 
related with this thesis but again not as extensive, still they will also be referred 
shortly in this chapter. 
                                                          
1 TÜİK: Turkish Statistical Institute. The statistics are taken from the 2014 survey called “Türkiye’de Dini Hayat Araştırmaları” (Research on Religious Life in Turkey) which was conducted due to the request of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in Turkey (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). 
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According to the statistics published by TÜİK in 2014, Turkey is a dominantly 
Muslim country in which 99.2% of the people claim to be a Muslim (p. 3).2 Therefore, 
it is only natural that the culture is intertwined with religious elements, and the 
presence of Islamic practices and references is strongly felt in the daily routine of its 
citizens. Here, life of an infant begins with ezan (call to the prayer), in the ears during 
the naming ceremony, and ends with the same call for the cenaze namazı (funeral 
prayer). This ezan continues to be heard every day, five times a day, in a person’s life 
and 42.5% of the people strictly observes this worship (TÜİK, 2014, p. 44).3  On 
Fridays, at least 57.4% of the men stop working and crowd the mosques for cuma 
namazı (Friday prayers), usually overflowing to streets (TÜİK, 2014, p. 51).4 During 
the whole month of Ramazan (Ramadan) 83.4% of the people start oruç (fasting), 
with the morning ezan, restaurants close till sundown, and big feasts are prepared 
for the poor inside municipality tents till another ezan announces the break of the 
fast (TÜİK, 2014, p. 72).5 Ezan also marks the start of both of bayram (Eid holidays), 
and 77.1% of the men joins bayram namazı (Eid prayers) in the mornings (TÜİK, 2014, 
p. 57). These religious practices obviously have quite a role in the society. 
Interestingly, in all these traditional practices engraved in the daily lives of 
Turkish citizens, one element of Islam always comes forth quite apparently and 
almost as a manifestation of religious affiliation: Kur’an in its Arabic form. For 
example, ezan in Turkey is in Arabic, and all the recitations of Kur’an during the prayer 
are also in the original form, Arabic. Thus, it should not be very surprising that 41.9% 
of the people in Turkey can recite the Kur’an in Arabic (TÜİK, 2014, p. 88). However, 
it is noteworthy that 67.9% of these people actually spends time reciting it every 
week; 84.2% of these recites it at least once every month (TÜİK, 2014, p. 90).6 Many 
Turkish women gather for mukabele to recite the Kur’an to each other, and many 
Turkish men gather for sohbet, where they listen both to some Islamic preaching and 
                                                          
2  According to KONDA’s survey, 96.6% of the people are believers, and 62.5% are practicing the religion. 
3 43.9% in KONDA’s survey. In Akşit’s study, 31.2% prays regularly, 46.4 prays very often. 
4 56.1% in KONDA’s survey. 
5 82.5% in KONDA’s survey. In Akşit’s study, 88.9% fasts, but 73.3% claims to fast very often.  
6 26.3% in KONDA’s survey “reads” it regularly, 31.2% “reads” it once in a while. The statistics does not differenciate the knowledge of Arabic recitation. In Akşit’s study, 40,5% reads/recites the Kur’an in Arabic. 
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recitation of Kur’an. Since children are usually at the stage of learning how to recite 
Kur’an, they usually attend courses in mosques during the summer holidays. The 
recitation is also common as a part of the rituals after people pass away as a 
commemoration, or when people are sick or in need of some sort of help as an 
element of invocation. Moreover, since Sünnet, the exemplary life of Prophet 
Muhammed, permeates people’s most basic activities like eating, drinking, dressing, 
and even toilette etiquette, shaping them through reenactment, people inherit and 
commonly use various Arabic vocabulary in their daily lives. For example, people 
begin every activity with besmele (with the name of Allah), greet each other with 
selâmun aleyküm (peace be upon you), say inşallah (Allah willing) when 
acknowledging wishes, and mâşallah (Allah has willed it) when they express praise. 
As exemplified, since such religious rituals are embedded into people’s daily 
routine from one’s birth till burial, it is natural to assume that some of this religious 
knowledge is actually learned through observation and hearsay starting from 
childhood to some extent. However, it is surprising that 51.8% of the people in Turkey 
actually attain most of their religious knowledge before the age of 10; 81.9% before 
the age of 13; and 91.3% before the age of 16 (TÜİK, 2014, p. 111). Considering 
Piaget’s cognitive development theory, which states that children start to develop 
the ability of abstract thinking at the age of 11 or higher, it can be claimed that most 
people in Turkey gain their religious knowledge without the fully-functioning ability 
of abstraction (Keklik, 2011, p. 72). These percentages also mean that people do not 
really add much on to their previous religious knowledge in the following years, when 
they are considered adults, even though the very religion they believe in advices or 
even mandates the pursuit of knowledge as it will be discussed in the following 
chapter of this thesis.  
Statistics also show that 91.8% of people in Turkey states their close family 
and friends as a source of their religious knowledge; 43% also points to religious staff 
(imam and müezzin) from the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı); and 24.6% includes TV, radio, newspapers, and magazines as a bases of 
their religious knowledge (TÜİK, 2014, p. 113). Similarly, most people (83.4%) claim 
their family and close friends as their main and most important source of religious 
knowledge; then, many (30%) considers the religious staff at the mosques as the 
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second most important source; and some people (22.2%) accepts TV, radio, 
newspapers and magazines as their third most important source (TÜİK, 2014, p. 122). 
In contrast, only 1.9% of the people in Turkey sees books as their main source of 
religious knowledge; 8.6% sees it as their second most important source and 17.5% 
of the people only considers it as a third source (TÜİK, 2014, p. 117).7 These statistics 
do not change much among people who have graduated from high school or 
university either.  
If over 90% of the people gains their religious knowledge before the age of 
16, it seems only natural that they had their family as their main and most important 
resource of information; then they might met and learned from imams at the 
mosques or Kur’an courses, or they had easy access to TV, radio etc. However, what 
is most striking is that, when people above the age of 18 are asked about their 
primary choices of resources for learning new things about their religion, they again 
claimed the staff from the Presidency of Religious Affairs (24.9%), religious programs 
on the TV and radio (23.3%), and people around them with religious knowledge 
(20.7%) (TÜİK, 2014, p. 126). Books are again a less preferred option, even among 
university graduates: only 14.7% of them refers to books from Presidency of Religious 
Affairs and 14.3% refers to books from other publishers (TÜİK, 2014, p. 126). 
Moreover, again after the age of 18, 34.3% of the people never reads meal, the 
Turkish translation of Kur’an, and 49.1% never reads tefsir, exegesis, or in other 
words, explanations of the verses (âyet) in Kur’an, even if they know how to read and 
write in Turkish (TÜİK, 2014, pp. 95-96).8 Therefore, even though people pass the 
abstraction and reasoning stage as adults, they do not lean much towards researching 
the questions that they have on their own, nor towards resources like books, even to 
the translations of Kur’an itself. Instead, when people have a question 65.6% of them 
asks their close relatives and friends; %58.9 asks the imam and müezzin; 17.9% asks 
müftü and vâiz, 17.2% to Kur’an course teachers, 12.6% to religious TV show hosts, 
                                                          
7 In KONDA’s survey, when people are asked about their preferences about where their children should learn about religious knowledge, 44.2% said their families, 26.1% Kur’an courses, 19.7% schools, 5.9% imam-hatip schools, and only 3.4% answered as books. In Akşit’s study, 47.1% prefers the family as the best source of religious knowledge, 24.1% prefers a hoca, and 13.8% books, 6.9% schools. 
8 In Akşit’s study, 35.8% never reads the Kur’an in any format, 13.1% only reads it from the Arabic version without understanding its meaning. 
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11.3% to people from their religious groups; and 5.4% of the people calls the Alo 
Fetva (legal option or learned interpretation) call center of Presidency to get 
information about their questions (TÜİK, 2014, p. 139). Only 4.3% of the people, and 
6.2% of university graduates do not claim the need to seek advice (these two statistics 
also include people who do not have any religious questions). 
From all the statistics above, it is quite obvious that most people in Turkey 
acquire their knowledge from a mediated resource in their early childhood or 
adolescence and they still prefer to have a mediator to reach new religious 
knowledge and to ask questions about religion, whether the mediator is a family 
member or a friend, an appointed staff at the mosque, a person they trust with their 
religious knowledge, even if they are on the TV/radio. This need becomes related 
with the abundance of mediators in the society as some listed in the paragraph 
above; only the number of the staff employed under the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs is close to one hundred and twenty thousand (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 2014).  
With such statistics one wonders why people prefer a mediator in the first 
place. Of course one can easily claim that religion has become a mere tradition that 
is passed from generation to generation via observation and hearsay, and people 
would like to continue their habits in learning, but then the question becomes about 
why religion has become so, especially while this traditional approach contradicts the 
many verses of Kur’an which denounces people who believes in a religion upon which 
they found their fathers: “When it is said to them: "Follow what Allah hath revealed:" 
They say: "Nay! We shall follow the ways of our fathers." What! Even though their 
fathers were void of wisdom and guidance?” (Kur’an 2:170)9. The answer to why 
mediation has become so widespread, accepted and sought after, seems to require 
more than a situation analysis that is an archeological (in Foucault’s definition) 
research on the transmission of knowledge in the Turkish-Islamic tradition, in other 
words within the history of Islamic education. Thus the main goal of this thesis is to 
create a background and a stepping-stone for such immense endeavor and for that, 
the methodology and the theoretical framework that is followed is explained in the 
following section. 
                                                          
9 All the Kur’anic references are written in the (Kur’an Sûre/Surah: Âyet/Ayah) format to make it easier to follow and the translation of the Saheeh International is used for the quotations (2004). 
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1.2) Methodology & Theoretical Framework 
 
This thesis investigates the importance of mediation in the transmission of 
Islamic knowledge, especially within the Turkish-Islamic tradition, to better 
understand the possible reasons behind the abundance and dominance of mediators 
as the main resources of religious education in current Turkey, with an underlying 
question that if this situation has any effects on the perception of religion, intellectual 
inquiry, and identity formation in a broader sense. From a different perspective, this 
thesis is asking if it is possible that the concept of knowledge within the Sünnî-Islamic 
heritage of Turkey is so distant to the “modern” rationalistic perspective that it may 
become hard for us, the “modern” outsiders, to comprehend and analyze the 
practices of the transmission of knowledge and the relation of mediation to these 
practices. In other words, due to the very nature of this knowledge and its perception, 
is it at all possible that there is more to what meets the “modern” eye about the 
transmission of Islamic knowledge? Bluntly, the thesis is questioning if there would 
be a possible and feasible reason within the cultural heritage of learning practices 
why mediation is so central to the transmission of Islamic knowledge, so much so that 
knowledge itself needs a unique signification. If that is the case how does this 
heritage affect the current practices and understanding of religion? 
To be able to study the questions above, in the second chapter, the nature 
and perception of knowledge with its connotations within this very culture is 
analyzed through theoretical study, almost in a theological sense, and comparison of 
knowledge within the traditional and inter-cultural contexts. Thus, first the 
understanding of knowledge is differentiated from the secular, rationalistic, 
‘westernized’ or ‘modern’ Turkish understanding as well as from episteme and gnosis. 
Then the cultural understanding of knowledge is reconstructed through the analysis 
of Kur’an and Sünnet, the canonical texts of Islam to show that practice and mediation 
are intrinsic to its transmission.10 Afterwards, the digression from this understanding 
                                                          
10 There are discussions about the validity of Sünnet and Hadis as the canonical texts of Islam and some Muslims refer to Kur’an as the only main resource. However, in the Sünnî-Turkish culture, the former is also widely accepted, and thus has a dominant effect in the understanding of religion within the public. 
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as the Sûfî’s point of view11 is studied under the name of mârifet, to highlight its 
absolute, certain and transcendental qualities. All along, the foundation to discuss 
the necessity of mediation and the required practice to attain it both embedded in 
the signification of Islamic knowledge is laid out. 
In the third chapter, the historical practices of Islamic education in two 
different institutions, namely the medrese and tekke, are juxtaposed with the 
intention of grasping the place of mediation and practice in the transmission of 
knowledge within the cultural heritage. The comparison between the two is used to 
study and bring out the manifestations of the theoretical differences within various 
understandings of knowledge, which are analyzed in the previous chapter. From this 
perspective, the learning practices in the medreses are shortly handled, and the 
nuances like the authority of the teacher within the transmission of knowledge during 
the time of Ottoman Empire is explained. Afterwards, the tekke culture is deeply 
investigated, since the difference between their learning practices and today’s 
seemed a lot more significant compared to the ones in medreses. To be able to grasp 
the practices fully, the discussion turned into Sûfîsm. Within that discussion, the 
disciplining processes of the tekke, controlling the desires and stripping the 
attachments of the ego, is studied through Foucault’s theory of “technologies of the 
self” to see how these practices are related to construction of a subject – the Sûfî – 
in contrast to the “technologies of power” exercised in the medreses, which only 
leads to the construction of identities. In this context, power relations between mürid 
and mürşid, and the individual experiences emerged in relation to religious 
knowledge are analyzed to understand how tekkes affected the understanding of 
religion in those days. Besides, the self-disciplinary practices are considered as “art 
of existence” in Foucault’s terms, and discussed from the perspective of art history, 
which helped to bring up the paradoxical ways of thinking within this culture. Next, 
due to the intrinsic need of mediation in the understanding of Islamic knowledge 
learning, the role of the mürşid, the guide is discussed and laid out from popular 
stories and famous Sûfî texts. In addition to the metaphysical need of the mürşid in 
the path of enlightenment, which is explained in this chapter thoroughly, his role in 
                                                          
11 There are various Sûfî perspectives within the Turkish culture, I prefer to stick to the one close to İbn Arabi’s theoric foundations. 
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this process of embodying moral dispositions as an authority and role-model is also 
investigated through Bourdieu’s concept of Habitus.  
In the fourth chapter, the rupture from the traditional ways of learning with 
the reforms of the founders of Turkish Republic is studied. To be able to do that, 
initially, the potential influence of the medreses and tekkes over the public is 
discussed through historical statistics. Then the new forms of mediation as well as 
the new ways of transmission of Islamic knowledge are outlined. Hence, the 
transformations within the institutions of religious education and religious people are 
stated, and the new sources of authority and their utilization by the state are 
discussed through Althusser’s theory of “ideological state apparatus”. The effects of 
the newly constructed public space through the rupture from the tradition for the 
“modern” is analyzed and the struggle and resistance of the groups left outside this 
new space to re-exist is studied through de Certeau’s conceptualization of tactics and 
strategies. Then, looking into preaching in the mosques and the religious shows on 
the TV, the formation of new identities is questioned using recent papers and 
publications, especially from the field of communication studies. Moreover, using 
Neil Postman’s theories, the effects of these newly utilized mediums of religious 
knowledge transmission are investigated and their entertainment values are 
debated. In other words, through de Certau’s perspective, how the new ways of 
consuming religious knowledge produces new forms of religious practice and 
understanding is discussed. 
Having identified the power relations revolving around mediation and 
knowledge, the thesis finally leads to questions of secularity in the daily practices of 
the citizens, as well as the extension of the mediation to other fields of power; thus 
it turns into a question of the citizen’s subjectivity in general.  
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CHAPTER 2 
UNDERSTANDING OF “KNOWLEDGE” IN THE SÜNNÎ-
ISLAMIC HERITAGE OF TURKEY 
     
2.1) ‘ilm as a Unique Signifier of Knowledge 
 
Throughout this thesis, the discussion over “knowledge” and the practices of 
its transmission revolves around the Sünnî-Islamic cultural heritage of Turkey; 
therefore, I first intended to use the Turkish counterpart of the word “knowledge”, 
namely ilim, to also signify the unique aspects attached to this concept within this 
background. However, I soon realized that ilim, is considered synonymous to bilim 
(science, knowledge of nature) in the Turkish Language Association’s (TDK) dictionary 
(Türk Dil Kurumu, 2016), and it is ripped from any of its probable religious 
connotations. This reductionist definition as a manifestation of the constructionist 
approach deliberately taken by the state institutions (apparatus) to reform the 
national identity, is the very reason behind this thesis: to investigate the intrinsic 
signification of knowledge from the traditional perspective given above and to 
determine the effects of this understanding on the transmission of it. Therefore, I will 
use the transliteration of the Arabic term for knowledge, ‘ilm (ملع in Arabic) as a 
signifier when also referring to all the cultural understanding, connotations and 
implications attached to it. 12   
Within this framework, I believe that ‘ilm is a unique and a paradoxical 
concept, which is critical to understand for the purposes of this study, and cannot be 
represented easily. Thus, to differentiate this term from the common understanding 
of knowledge and strip it from any probable presuppositions, especially from the 
                                                          
12 I chose to use ‘ilm - the Arabic transliteration of ملع in Hans Wehr system- instead of the Turkish word ilim to avoid any confusion because in the official TDK dictionary, ilim is shown synonymous to bilim (science, knowledge of nature), and is ripped from any probable religious connotations, which is against the whole argument In this thesis. 
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ideological Western ones, I will start with the very basic question of what knowledge 
is and then step by step re-construct what ‘ilm actually signifies within the context of 
this thesis.  
To a general Western or Western influenced reader, the signification of 
knowledge, so the answer to the question above would be similar to the following 
definition: “Facts, information and skills acquired through experience or education, 
the theoretical and practical understanding of a subject” (Oxford University, 2010, p. 
976). Similar to this Western perspective, knowledge could also translate into bilgi 
(synonymous to bilim) in Turkish, which again according to Turkish Language 
Association (TDK) means “the collection of facts, realities and principles that a human 
intellect can achieve… by thinking and through learning, research and observation; 
the basic ideas the mind grasps at the first intuition (Türk Dil Kurumu, 2016). In 
philosophical terms, Plato defines it as episteme, which is considered “reliably 
justified true belief” as opposed to general or popular opinion (doxa) (Steup, 2015). 
Many more answers could also be given from the lineage of epistemology, one of 
which would be “the connection between the subject and the object” (Filiz Ş. , 2014, 
p. 13). That is to say, when a subject gravitates towards an object (attitude) and the 
object influences back with its binary state: appearance and reality; hence the 
knowledge occurs (Filiz Ş. , 2014, p. 14).  
Unfortunately, these probable answers to the question of what knowledge is, 
or any other answer that could be picked from the Western/Westernized perspective, 
runs into unresolved philosophical debates, whether concerning the duality of the 
Subject and the Object, which questions the reliability of the influence among these 
two in terms of appearance, perceptions and reality, or whether actually concerning 
the possibility of knowledge itself. Actually, these debates are one of the main 
reasons behind the need to distinguish ‘ilm from episteme; therefore, even though I 
do not at all aim to enter these debates in this thesis, to distinguish ‘ilm from episteme, 
I find it useful to briefly lay out the general course of thought in epistemology. 
In the dominant Western Philosophical tradition, according to sensualism, 
one knows things by sensing them, smelling, touching, seeing, simply by experiencing 
things with the five senses. This kind of knowledge gained through sensations is 
observational, descriptive and personal, dependent on subjective experiences. 
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Empiricism also puts sensations as the source of ideas but, since mankind is capable 
of dealing with thoughts that cannot be experienced like infinity, it does not reduce 
knowledge to intellectual productions resulted solely through various experiences. 
Instead, it tries to understand and categorize sensed experiences to reach 
conclusions. Positivism is not very different from the predecessors either. However, 
even though sensations are still the basis of knowledge, it takes experience one step 
further, and tries to remove any personal or social influence on knowledge, isolating 
it to reach positive facts or more reliable knowledge using logic and mathematical 
equations etc. However, it limits knowledge within the human mind, within the 
sphere of intellect as the source of innate knowledge. Similarly rationalism regards 
reason as the chief source of knowledge; solipsism even takes it a step further and 
claims that anything outside of one’s own mind cannot be certain. After all, 
skepticism questions the validity of all human knowledge.  
The main issue with all these movements in epistemology can be summed in 
the regress problem (diallelus), which points out the problem of providing a logical 
foundation for human knowledge. According to this argument, any proposition, any 
reasoning requires a justification and this creates an infinite loop which is impossible 
to break due to lack of a true base statement (Steup, 2015). Therefore, they all lack 
certainty. On the other hand, another problem is that the philosophical schools all 
base knowledge on sensations and experiences, and/or limit the sphere of knowledge 
within the human intellect and logic. Idealism somewhat seems to differ in this issue 
in which knowledge is based not solely on experiences but on a priori or it is innate. 
However, still the a priori, or the innate knowledge that episteme signifies depends 
purely on reason, mathematical equations, tautologies or logic. Derrida, actually 
points out the problem here with his question: "Is not the idea of knowledge and of 
the theory of knowledge in itself metaphysical?" (Derrida, 1973, p. 5). I believe, he 
basically is referring to the regress problem, and stating that when you trace back all 
the logical statements, at some point you will have to rely on an assertion that is of 
the metaphysical type like signifiers. This is where ‘ilm differentiates from all the 
previously stated philosophical schools.  
First of all, ‘ilm, as it will be discussed in the next part, is unquestionably 
precise and absolute due to its religious connotations; ‘ilm actually originates from 
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the knowledge of Allah, or the knowledge handed down from Allah, the ultimate 
source for the believer. Second, while all the previously stated philosophical schools 
trust the mind to grasp the tangible as well as the intangible, the Prophet trusts Allah; 
that is to say, the prophet claims that ideas including the likes of infinity and having 
no dimensions are all innate attributes of Allah, not just notions peculiar of the mind 
(Filiz Ş. , 2014). Therefore, within the Islamic perspective, “the root of the concepts 
that do not have a direct correspondence to the outer world is not the mind (or the 
world) itself but another “world” which is above and beyond this human mind (Filiz 
Ş. , 2014, pp. 204, 205). At this point, the forms (ideas) of Plato and his cave allegory, 
may give some insight on the understanding of ‘ilm, especially if one correlates the 
forms to the attributes/names (esmâ) of Allah; however it is still distant from 
complying its signification. In short, we can claim that the main difference between 
knowledge (episteme) and ‘ilm is that “while all the philosophical schools start and 
finish the process of knowledge in the same sphere” (Filiz Ş. , 2014, p. 213), Islamic 
doctrine creates an epistemic and ontic relationship with the metaphysical world” 
(Filiz Ş. , 2014, p. 212). That is why none of these philosophical approaches towards 
knowledge could actually satisfy what ‘ilm signifies.  
One can say that gnosis, the spiritual or mystical knowledge, is separated from 
episteme in a similar way and claim that even the Western philosophies has left an 
opening for this kind of probable and metaphysical source of knowledge, suggesting 
that we can use gnosis as an alternative to ‘ilm. However, it is critical to acknowledge 
that the theologies, so the real source of knowledge is very different between 
alternative religions. Especially in the understanding of the creator and on the belief 
of tevhid (unity and oneness of Allah), Islam differentiates from other religions; thus 
so its mysticism. On top of that, while gnosis is generally understood as exclusively 
spiritual, ‘ilm is uniquely intertwined with and even is an encapsulating term for all 
sorts of knowledge. As it will be discussed in the following sections, ‘ilm not only 
transgress the intellect and reaches the supreme transcendental divine plans but at 
the same time comes into this very life with its practicality, through imitation diffuses 
into the minute details of being; even encapsulates attributes which cannot be easily 
acquired with what we understand from studying and learning like modesty or love. 
Hence, it is best to stick to ‘ilm as a signifier while discussing knowledge during the 
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course of this paper because the issues I refer to in this study surely have roots and 
connections to the prominent Islamic culture traditionally carried over and still being 
actively observed in Turkey as exemplified in the introduction. In addition, stressing 
the cultural Islamic connotations through the deliberate usage of this term is 
important since they may actually have underlying effects for the current attitudes 
of the Turkish people towards knowledge and learning. That is why, to better 
understand the mediation phenomenon in question, the understanding of ‘ilm in the 
given cultural frame should be traced back to the canonic Islamic resources, namely 
Kur’an, Hadis (recorded verbal statements of the prophet Muhammed) and Sünnet 
(practices and deeds of the prophet)13, which intersect with and feed each other, as 
well as to Sünnî and Sûfî14 traditions that dominated the Turkish culture since the 
medieval times. 
 
2.2) ‘ilm in Kur’an  
 
In this thesis, while studying mediation within the transmission of Islamic 
knowledge in Turkey, the underlying question becomes related directly to the 
perception of knowledge, to be exact, it is about how ‘ilm is perceived and regarded 
through the lenses inherited from the Sünnî-Islamic roots in Turkey and if this 
understanding has any effect on how mediation comes into play during the 
transmission of it. Therefore, since it is now clear that ‘ilm has religious connotations, 
first of all, I need to study the perspective of Holy Scriptures –Kur’an, Hadis and 
Sünnet– on ‘ilm because they are considered the main canonical resources in Islam. 
It can be pointed out that some sects in Islam, even those in Turkey, do not believe 
in or still debate about either the whole or some the parts of the Hadis and Sünnet, 
but this claim would not necessarily require me to go into a debate about this. Since 
Hadis and Sünnet are mostly accepted and widespread in Turkey’s Islamic written and 
                                                          
13 The term Sünnet can be used interchangably with Hadis in some sources, and in that case includes the latter. 
14 Sünnî and Sûfî traditions are quite intertwined within the Turkish-Islamic cultural heritage, thus I chose not to exlude the latter from the former when referring to the overarching cultural background as a whole. 
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oral tradition and they are used as examples and keys to pursue a righteous living, I 
will include them in this study. 
Keeping this context in mind, when we are talking about ‘ilm, the very first 
thing to notice in Kur’an is that Allah declares Himself15 as the alîm (derived from the 
same root of ‘ilm), the all-knowing. According to Kur’an, alîm is an attribute or one of 
the names (esmâ) of Allah and its meaning is explained vividly in the following verses:  
And with Him are the keys of the unseen; none knows them except Him. And He knows what is on the land and in the sea. Not a leaf falls but that He knows it. And no grain is there within the darknesses of the earth and no moist or dry [thing] but that it is [written] in a clear record (Kur’an 6:59). He knows the unseen (aspects) of the heavens and the earth, and what one reveals or have concealed (Kur’an 2:33). He knows what is within yourselves (Kur’an 2:235).  
According to these verses above, His knowledge not only encompasses all but 
it also goes beyond the limits of the creation. There are things that are only known to 
Him and this distinction is made very clear in Kur’an. During the creation of man, for 
example, when the angels question Allah if He is going to create someone who will 
cause corruption and shed blood on earth, He tells them that He knows that which 
they do not know (Kur’an 2:30). Similarly, when people question the Prophet about 
the soul, Kur’an seems to bluntly define the boundaries of human knowledge by 
stating: "The soul is of the affair of my Lord. And mankind have not been given of 
knowledge except a little." (Kur’an 17:85) 16 . As observed, Allah’s ‘ilm not only 
surpasses the human mind, but it is also goes beyond the limits of any physical or 
metaphysical being; it is a self-originated attribute.  
Besides, Allah is not just all-knowing, He also claims the ownership of all ‘ilm, 
like everything else, in the famous Âyetü’l-Kürsî (the Throne Verse). In this very verse, 
Allah states that no one can get a hold/grasp of His ‘ilm without His permission 
(Kur’an 2:255). Therefore, it can only be His will and generosity, a favor towards 
mankind that He decided to hand down some of His ‘ilm, (Kur’an 27:15). Kur’an, in 
the story of creation already mentioned above, actually gives a detailed portraiture 
                                                          
15 In this thesis He is used while talking about Allah to be more consistent with the general English usage for God. However, it should be noted that this or any other sexual or gendered representation is not really suitable in Islam. It should be noted that due to the Rahmân and Rahîm attributes of Allah, which at the root of the words are related to “womb”. Therefore, the signifier “She” could have also been chosen when referring to Allah. 
16  Another interpretation to this verse, which leaves an opening for people to attain this kind of knowledge will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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of the moment when Allah decides on sharing some parts of His ‘ilm with a new 
creation, that is to say Adam – the mankind. He teaches Adam all the esmâ –names 
or attributes of Allah, or names of the things– and asks the angels to prostrate before 
him. (Kur’an 2:31-34). Actually this bestowed quality upon mankind is so great that, 
not only the Angels prostrate before Adam, but with this ‘ilm, he becomes the halife 
(caliph, the successive authority on Earth) (Kur’an 2:30). Therefore, according to 
Kur’an, it is clear that ‘ilm of mankind, or at least some part of it, is innate, a gift of 
the creator – not something studied or gained. Given this information, we can claim 
that the regress problem raised in the previous section does not really exist for the 
Islamic doctrine since Allah is the unquestionable source and owner of all ‘ilm, and a 
fundamental part of this self-existent ‘ilm is passed onto mankind. That is to say, in 
Islam, any true statement can be traced back to Him and the ‘ilm he has bestowed 
upon mankind as a foundation for new statements.  
It is obvious from the verses described above in which angels prostrate to 
Adam that from the very beginning, Islam has a structure of hierarchy due to the 
possession of ‘ilm and there is a definite and clear direction that the transmission 
occurs – from Allah to Adam, hierarchically from top to bottom. As Kur’an states: 
“over every possessor of knowledge is one [more] knowing” (Kur’an 12:76) and Allah, 
as the alîm, stands at the top of this hierarchy. Then, as He passes on the ‘ilm to Adam 
-the first of the Prophets- on behalf of mankind, He also automatically declares 
Himself as the teacher and Adam as the student, and establishes the up-to-down 
course of transmission of ‘ilm. Thereafter, like Adam, all the other prophets becomes 
the addressee of Allah’s teaching in a lineage17, Muhammed being the last, and 
successively they, in return, also teach mankind as their disciples:  
[To Joseph:] And when Joseph reached maturity, We gave him judgment and knowledge. And thus We reward the doers of good (Kur’an 12:22). [To Abraham:] O my father, indeed there has come to me of knowledge that which has not come to you, so follow me; I will guide you to an even path (Kur’an 19:43). [To Moses:] And when he attained his full strength and was [mentally] mature, We bestowed upon him judgment and knowledge. And thus do We reward the doers of good (Kur’an 28:14). [To David & Solomon:] And We had certainly given to David and Solomon knowledge, and they said, ‘Praise [is due] to Allah, who has favored us over many of His believing servants’ (Kur’an 27:15). [To Lot:] And to Lot We gave judgment and 
                                                          
17 It is known that Allah, Himself teaches the prophets, because Kur’an itself rejects people who claim: "It is only a human being who teaches the prophet" (Kur’an 16:103). Also Joseph (Yusuf) clearly states in Kur’an that his ability to interpret dreams comes from what Allah has thought him (Kur’an 12:37). 
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knowledge, and We saved him from the city that was committing wicked deeds. Indeed, they were a people of evil, defiantly disobedient (Kur’an 21:74). 
Similar to other prophets, knowledge was bestowed upon Muhammed as 
well, as the following verse declares: “Allah has revealed to you the Book and wisdom 
and has taught you that which you did not know. And ever has the favor of Allah upon 
you been great” (Kur’an 4:113). Interestingly though, even though ‘ilm is a given gift, 
a revelation to the Prophet, Muhammed’s very first vahiy (revelation of Kur’anic 
verses) from Allah was a mandate to “Read/Recite!”18 In other words, when Allah 
decided to transfer some of His ‘ilm to His prophet Muhammed, He actually ordered 
him to read/recite, ordered him to undertake the reading/reciting of the Book He 
revealed. The angel Gabriel (Cebrâil), which brings him the mandate, actually repeats 
this order three times before revealing the rest: “Read/Recite in the name of your 
Lord who created – created man from a clinging substance. Read/Recite, and your 
Lord is the most Generous – who thought by the pen – thought man that which he 
knew not” (Kur’an 96:1-5). It should be noted that at the beginning of the teaching 
process, the very first order Allah gives to His prophet Muhammed is to read, whether 
it is about reading the Kur’anic verses, in other words reciting the very verses (âyet) 
he received, or about reading the universal truths and miracles (âyet, the same word 
that signifies a verse) of Allah. Whichever the interpretation, the emphasis within the 
first revelation is clearly on personal endeavor or personal application during the 
transmission of ‘ilm. It should also be noted that Allah explicitly states that He teaches 
by the pen; and it is the angel Gabriel who brings the revelation to Muhammed. Thus, 
it would not be wrong to claim that there are various levels of mediators in the 
transmission of Allah’s ‘ilm. In short, with this very first verse, Allah not only declares 
the source of ‘ilm as Himself from the very beginning, He mandates an endeavor to 
gain ‘ilm kind of like a requirement, and hints at a mediated path of learning which is 
transmitted from the top to bottom, both at the same time.  
As inferred from the very first revelations above, even though teaching, at 
least in its initial form, is represented as a grace in Islam, learning ‘ilm is actually a 
must, a mandate because ‘ilm is not only a bestowed, innate and esteemed human 
quality, which even causes the angels to prostrate before man, but it is something 
                                                          
18 This Arabic word in the Kur’an can be translated into both “to read” and “to recite”. 
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that should also be sought after, something that requires some sort of endeavor like 
reading/reciting. In other words ‘ilm is a quality both granted and acquired at the 
same time; in a sense ‘ilm is an act of accepting two mutually contradictory beliefs as 
correct, which is almost like a positive manifestation of George Orwell’s doublethink 
in life.19 To better understand this complexity, it is necessary to look further into 
Kur’an to see how ‘ilm is defined, explained, and treated. For that, first of all, I have 
searched for vocabulary that are derived from the grammatical root of ‘ilm which is 
‘alm in Kur’an like ‘alleme and ‘aliym. This, I think, was enough to reveal the general 
outline of ‘ilm and the attitude towards it.  
In the verses, for example, there are many references to people who 
possesses ‘ilm and Kur’an clearly glorifies them in many places. As stated before, the 
verses in Kur’an are called âyet, which also means signs, examples or miracles shown 
to mankind. Keeping both of these meanings in mind, Kur’an states that to be able to 
understand Allah’s message either through the verses or through the signs in the 
universe, one needs ‘ilm: “And these examples We present to the people, but none 
will understand them except those of knowledge [âlimûn]” (Kur’an 29:43). In this 
verse, ‘ilm seems like a requirement to understanding God’s examples, and through 
the examples his presence and his message. Similarly the following verse clearly 
states that the only witnesses that know that there is no deity except Allah are again 
those of ‘ilm. “Allah witnesses that there is no deity except Him, and [so do] the 
angels and those of knowledge [ulul-‘ilm] - [that He is] maintaining [creation] in 
justice. There is no deity except Him, the Exalted in Might, the Wise.” (Kur’an 3:18). 
To put it simply, those who possess ‘ilm knows Allah, His supremacy, and his 
manifestation as the only deity; that is probably why in Kur’an it is clearly stated that 
people who know and do not are not equal: “Is one who is devoutly obedient during 
periods of the night, prostrating and standing [in prayer], fearing the Hereafter and 
hoping for the mercy of his Lord, [like one who does not]? Say, ‘Are those who know 
equal to those who do not know?’ Only they will remember [who are] people of 
                                                          
19 Doublethink: “The term is widely used to describe a capacity to engage in one line of thought in one situation (at work, in a certain group, in business, etc.) and another line in another situation (at home, in another group, in private life), without necessarily sensing any conflict between the two.” (McArthur, 1992, p. 321) See The Oxford Companion to the English Language for further information.  
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understanding [ulul-elbab]” (Kur’an 39:9). Here it is clear that ‘ilm is a virtue in Kur’an, 
a merit for men whose intellect is considered the recipient of Allah’s message. 
Moreover, ‘ilm brings out respect for Allah. The more one understands about his 
surroundings the more he respects the creation of Allah. “And among people and 
moving creatures and grazing livestock are various colors similarly. Only those fear 
Allah, from among His servants, who have knowledge [ulemâ]. Indeed, Allah is 
Exalted in Might and Forgiving.” (Kur’an 35:28). All these verses exemplifies the 
importance of ‘ilm for people in the eyes of Allah, which makes it clear why it is 
bestowed to humankind in the first place and seems like a quality that people should 
aspire for, but interestingly all of the referrals are to the people who already 
possesses ‘ilm, in a way Kur’an mostly exalts the ‘ilm that is already there as a given, 
not specifically a knowledge that is gained. 
In parallel, the following verses also supports that ‘ilm as a given quality, not 
only to Muslims, but also to previous societies of belief. “Say, ‘Believe in it or do not 
believe. Indeed, those who were given knowledge [utul-‘ilm] before it - when it is 
recited to them, they fall upon their faces in prostration, and they say, "Exalted is our 
Lord! Indeed, the promise of our Lord has been fulfilled" (Kur’an 17:107-108). The 
people who were given knowledge are “the people of the holy books” like Jews and 
Christians. According to Islam, they knew the true message of Allah and they were 
expecting a new prophet to reveal it; therefore, when they hear the recitation of 
Kur’an they confirm it as the truth. Since ‘ilm existed before Islam, we can claim that 
the ‘ilm that is praised in Kur’an is not only the knowledge of Islam but the ‘ilm of 
Allah’s true message and His presence, or his names (esmâ) bestowed upon Adam 
during creation. The following verse clarifies this as well: “And so those who were 
given knowledge [utul-‘ilm] may know that it is the truth from your Lord and 
[therefore] believe in it, and their hearts humbly submit to it. And indeed is Allah the 
guide of those who have believed to a straight path.” (Kur’an 22:54) Here Allah calls 
out to people who were given ‘ilm beforehand, and tells them that they should know 
that this new text is also genuinely descending from Him and they should submit to 
it. Since ‘ilm mostly signifies the message of Allah in these verses above, it is again 
portrayed as if ‘ilm is mostly given, like a message and mandate handed down to 
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people as a favor of Allah and these people who are praised and exalted are one more 
time referenced as the possessors of ‘ilm. 
In contrast to the bestowed quality of ‘ilm, Kur’an itself states that the verses 
are revealed to mankind in Arabic so that people can actually understand them, 
hinting at an invitation to reasoning (Kur’an 12:2): “Indeed, We have made it an 
Arabic Kur’an that you might understand” (Kur’an 43:3). In addition, similar to the 
very first order that the prophet receives during the transmission of Allah’s ‘ilm, 
which encompasses a meaning of endeavor and application, in many places, Kur’an 
gives examples of the might of Allah, His miracles and the wonders on Earth and 
openly asks people to think about them, asks for an endeavor: “He shows you His 
signs [miracles] that you might reason (Kur’an 2:73); ”Thus does Allah make clear to 
you [His] signs [verses] that you might give thought” (Kur’an 2:266). Moreover, Allah 
also gives the examples of very earthly matters in Kur’an and invites people to think 
and question about them as well: “Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the 
earth and the alternation of the night and the day are signs for those of 
understanding. Who remember Allah while standing or sitting or [lying] on their sides 
and give thought to the creation of the heavens and the earth, [saying], "Our Lord, 
You did not create this aimlessly; exalted are You [above such a thing]; then protect 
us from the punishment of the Fire” (Kur’an 3:191-192). Here, stating that there is a 
goal for the creation, Allah promises the gardens of heavens to those who have put 
the effort into it, claiming that any work of any worker will not be lost (Kur’an 3:195). 
After all, He puts people on the spot and ask: “Do they not reflect upon the Kur’an?” 
(Kur’an 4:82) and compares those who does not use reason to deaf people who 
cannot hear stating that without reasoning His message will not be understood. 
(Kur’an 10:42). Then, Allah takes it a step further and calls these people who does not 
reason as dumb and the worst living creatures in sight (Kur’an 8:22). With all the 
emphasis on reasoning and contemplation, it would not be surprising if a devotee 
feels the urge to attain ‘ilm. 
As seen from the verses above, ‘ilm is for sure of great importance in Islam 
according to Kur’an. It is an attribute of Allah, which He fully owns and shares with 
His creation only if He wills; mankind is the recipient of this ‘ilm as a favor since its 
beginning. This innate quality of mankind raises him over other creations as well as 
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among themselves since it is stated that only people of ‘ilm are able to know the 
exaltation of Allah and those are the ones that respect Him the most. However, as 
seen, even though Kur’an states that ‘ilm is handed down to mankind, paradoxically 
it also constantly reminds people to think and warns them that not using their reason 
is a dumb act which reduces their value to the bottom of the creation. From all these 
verses, even though the importance of ‘ilm for mankind is apparent in Kur’an, we 
cannot really find a clear discussion on what exactly ‘ilm is in Kur’an except that it is 
related to His words; at best it can be defined as the knowledge of Allah and His 
message. Through interpretation, we may also be able deduct the presence of 
hierarchy in ‘ilm and the existence of mediation during the transmission of it. 
However, there are no clear definitions of what it actually represents, or how it can 
or should be transferred to other people. Moreover, the paradox of doublethink does 
not seem to be resolved as well. Therefore, it is necessary to turn to Prophet 
Muhammed’s Hadis and Sünnet, which are considered the manifestations of Kur’anic 
verses in real life as explanations, to be able to understand more about Islam’s 
perspective on ‘ilm, what it stands for, how one can attain it in this paradoxical 
situation and the role of mediation in the acquisition of it. 
 
2.3) ‘ilm in Hadis and Sünnet 
 
When we look up the Hadis and Sünnet of the Prophet Muhammed, we 
naturally find parallels with the verses from Kur’an on the nature of ‘ilm and how 
exalted it is. However, we can also find some more details about ‘ilm, which enables 
us to gain a better understanding of the subject matter and differentiate it from the 
common understanding of knowledge and episteme. First of all, not surprisingly, the 
Prophet reiterates what Kur’an states about the man of knowledge and praises him 
as well in a similar fashion:  
The superiority of the learned man over the devout is like that of the moon, on the night when it is full, over the rest of the stars. The learned are the heirs of the Prophets, and the Prophets leave neither dinar nor dirham, leaving only knowledge, and he who takes it takes an abundant portion (Sunan Abi Dawud, Book 25, Hadis 3634). 20  The superiority of the learned over the devout worshipper is like my 
                                                          
20 Hadis are searched through online archive called Sunnah, and translations are also taken from that website (www.sunnah.com).  
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superiority over the most inferior amongst you (in good deeds) (Riyad as- Salihin, Book 13, Hadis 1387). One Faqih (knowledgeable man) is more formidable against the Shaitan than one thousand devoted worshippers (Sunan İbn Majah, Book 1, Hadis 227).  
However, in contrast to the Kur’an which concentrates more on the given 
quality of knowledge, there is a big emphasis within the Hadis to seek for knowledge. 
The Prophet encourages people to go after knowledge in the following hadiths, and 
adds that it is a cause for Allah and a compensation for one’s previous sins: 
If anyone travels on a road in search of knowledge, Allah will cause him to travel on one of the roads of Paradise. The angels will lower their wings in their great pleasure with one who seeks knowledge, the inhabitants of the heavens and the Earth and the fish in the deep waters will ask forgiveness for the learned man (Sunan Abi Dawud, Book 25, Hadis 3634). 
Similarly he praises this search by saying: “"Whoever goes out seeking 
knowledge, then he is in Allah's cause until he returns." (Jami at-Tirmidhi, Book 39, 
Hadis 2647). Moreover, the prophet states that seeking knowledge is a compensation 
for one’s previous sins: "Whoever seeks knowledge, he is atoning for what has passed 
(of sins while doing so)" (Jami at-Tirmidhi, Book 39, Hadis 2648).  
Besides, in various Hadiths, the Prophet even calls seeking knowledge as a 
duty upon every Muslim (Sunan İbn Majah, Book 1, Hadis 224) and tells his disciple 
Abu Dharr that learning a matter of knowledge more beneficial than praying for 
thousands of rekat (each unit of prayer): "For you to come out in the morning and 
learn one Verse from the Book of Allah is better for you than praying one hundred 
rekat, and for you to come out and learn a matter of knowledge, whether it is acted 
upon or not, is better for you than praying one thousand rekat.'" (Sunan İbn Majah, 
Book 1, Hadis 219). From all these Hadis above, it becomes a lot clearer that 
undertaking an endeavor to attain 'ilm is actually encouraged in Islam and considered 
a duty. Therefore, one should not just wait for ‘ilm to be miraculously bestowed upon 
him, thinking that it is only a quality that Allah owns and shares with people he 
wishes. Even though ‘ilm is portrayed as an attribute of Allah in Kur’an, and seems at 
first unattainable by one’s work, according to Hadis one should still seek it or go into 
the endeavor of seeking it no matter the nature of this transmission.  
Since knowledge and attaining it is so important both in Kur’an and Hadis, one 
needs more of an explanation on what ‘ilm is. From the famous (but not well-
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documented) prayer of the prophet Muhammed, “Show me the reality of objects”21, 
it can be inferred that there is more to what the eye can see or one can normally 
sense in this world. According to this prayer, in parallel to what Kur’an states, it 
becomes clear that the boarders of ‘ilm is actually beyond the sphere of material 
objects and there is a reality beyond the human intellect or “eye”. That is to say, one 
cannot comprehend the reality through the work of the intellect. Therefore, again 
with this prayer, the Prophet directly points out to and denounces the basic 
philosophical problem of reliability/certainty of knowledge when there is the duality 
of the subject and object, rendering it futile. With this, the Prophet automatically 
changes the course of knowledge from experience and senses to a metaphysical 
world (bâtın), which is not apparent to the eye at first sight. Therefore, he breaks the 
sphere of intellect that surrounds knowledge, and trusts Allah to endow him with this 
knowledge.  
While breaking the sphere of knowledge from the limitations of intellect, the 
prophet also categorizes ‘ilm and sets precedence to the metaphysical ones. For 
example, according to the Prophet, “Knowledge has three categories; anything else 
is extra; a precise verse, or an established Sünnet, and a firm obligatory duty (or the 
rulings by which the inheritance is divided fairly according to a different account).”22 
(Sunan Abi Dawud, Book 18, Hadis 2879; Sunan İbn Majah, Book 1, Hadis 56). 
Therefore, inferring from this Hadis, it can be claimed that ‘ilm is defined in three 
categories: One of them is the knowledge of the verses in Kur’an, which is the basis 
of all Islamic knowledge; second, the knowledge of Sünnet, including Hadis, as the 
living example and explanation of Kur’an; and third, though it is a little ambiguous, 
and there are various accounts, the knowledge about doing a fair job, or a fair 
endeavor, probably meaning the application and practice of one’s knowledge from 
the first two. From this Hadis we can infer that ‘ilm according to Islam is, similar to 
Kur’an’s statements, mainly about the knowledge of Allah, His message, and the 
practice of the doctrine of Islam. However, considering the previous Hadis which 
differentiates between learning a Kur’anic verse, which is better than one hundred 
                                                          
21 This prayer can not be located in the general Hadis books; however, we usd it since it is very common knowledge. See Cemal Doğan, "Eşyayı Anlamanın Gerçek Yolu" Yeni Ümit Dergisi, Volume: 12, Year: 3 
22 English translations of the Hadis are taken from Sünnet.com. However, the references to English translations are given to the actual authors and books to make it easier to follow in the classical sense. 
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rekat of prayer, and learning a matter of knowledge, which is instead better than one 
thousand rekat of prayer, one questions what learning a matter actually is. Since 
learning a verse is less of a value, to my understanding, the importance or precedence 
in the hierarchy of knowledge for humans is then more on the practice –the third 
category, which is keeping the obligatory duties that is understood from Kur’an and 
Hadis – the first and second categories. Rest of the knowledge is already out of the 
question, since it is just mentioned as extra or even superfluous. We know that 
because the Prophet used to seek refuge (with Allah) from “knowledge that is of no 
benefit” (Sunan an-Nasa’i, Book 50, Hadis 5444), and ask for knowledge that will 
benefit him, while advising the Muslims to do the same (Bulugh Al-Maram, Book 16, 
Hadis 1565). Therefore, obviously, there is a type of knowledge that he considers 
useless and unbeneficial to humans. From these Hadis above, we can deduct that 
knowledge that would not benefit a person in the realm of Islam, which is the 
knowledge outside the religious doctrine or knowledge that would not fulfill its 
mission of guiding a person to Allah, is extra, not worth obtaining and even something 
to avoid. In short, the knowledge that is praised and should be sought after in Islam 
is not only the knowledge of Allah and his commands throughout Kur’an; it is also the 
practice of this knowledge. That is to say, one also seeks the practice of Allah’s orders 
as a form of knowledge; in other words according to this framework, practice is 
knowledge. 
This kind of practical knowledge, is also referred to as zikir, remembrance. 
This claim is based on a verse in Kur’an, which describes a moment in creation when 
Allah gathers the souls of humans and ask them if He is their Rab (God, creator, 
teacher, discipliner) and they testify Him (Kur’an 7:172). Therefore, when humans are 
sent to Earth, they forget this testimony. That is why Islam starts (initiation ritual to 
Islam) with the şehâdet, a testimony stating that Allah is the only god and 
Muhammed is his messenger and that is the reason why the Kur’an is also called a 
tool of remembrance. Therefore, what people really find in Kur’an is the knowledge 
that will make them remember Allah and their testimony to Him. All other is cursed 
in this world anyway, according to the following Hadis of the Prophet: "Lo! Indeed 
the world is cursed. What is in it is cursed, except for remembrance of Allah, what is 
conducive to that, the knowledgeable person and the learning person." (Jami at-
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Tirmidhi, Book 10, Hadis 2322). Therefore, we can infer that the knowledge that 
should be sought after in Islam is that which aims to make one remember Allah.  
It should also be noted that, in the Hadis above, it is clearly stated that what 
is conducive of this knowledge, what makes the remembrance of Allah certain or a 
likely or even a possible outcome, is the knowledgeable person and the learning one. 
Therefore, while a person is learning, it is implied that he is learning from a learned 
one. This Hadis gives a clue about the existing presuppositions in the transmission of 
knowledge as well. In parallel, similar to the encouragement and the importance 
placed upon knowledge and the endeavor to learning it, the Prophet also urges 
people to teach what they know, exalts those who teach as the superior, and calls 
their teaching a charity in the following Hadiths:  
The most superior among you (Muslims) are those who learn the Kur’an and teach it (Sahih al-Bukhari, Book 61, Hadis 546).  Allah, His angels, the dwellers of the heaven and the earth, and even the ant in its hole and the fish (in water) supplicate in favor of those who teach people knowledge (Riyad as-Salihin, Book 13, Hadis 12). The best of charity is when a Muslim man gains knowledge, then he teaches it to his Muslim brother (Sunan İbn Majah, Book 1, Hadis 243).  
Even though all the Kur’anic verses and Prophet’s Hadis clearly state the 
importance of ‘ilm, praising the people who poses ‘ilm, and encouraging people to 
attain it as well as teaching it, the attitude of the Turkish public does not really seem 
to be parallel with these advices and warnings, as it was mentioned in the 
introduction. Many people recite the Kur’an frequently, pray, and follow the 
traditional religious activities firmly. However, knowledge seems to be taken from 
the people. This situation actually seems to pertain in Prophet’s society as well. What 
I mean is that people follow all these religious practices but do not really pursue the 
knowledge of their practices. In other words, they do not really know what they 
believe in and why they really practice the things that they do, but do not attempt to 
investigate it themselves, as a personal endeavor. Instead, most of them seek some 
sort of mediation, a quick answer mostly to make sure they observe these practices 
right. The following Hadis from Jubair bin Nufair will clarify my point: 
From Abu Ad-Darda who said: "We were with the Prophet when he raised his sight to the sky, then he said: 'This is the time when knowledge is to be taken from the people, until what remains of it shall not amount to anything." So Ziyad bin Labid Al-Ansari said: 'How will it be taken from us while we recite the Kur’an. By Allah we recite it, and our women and children recite it?' He said: 'May you be bereaved of your mother O Ziyad! I used to consider you among the Fuqaha of the people of Al-
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Madinah. The Tawrah and Injil are with the Jews and Christians, but what do they avail of them?'" Jubair said: "So I met 'Ubadah bin As-Samit and said to him: 'Have you not heard what your brother Abu Ad-Darda said?' Then I informed him of what Abu Ad-Darda said. He said: 'Abu Ad-Darda spoke the truth. If you wish, we shall narrated to you about the first knowledge (‘ilm) to be removed from the people: It is Khushu', soon you will enter the congregational Masjid, but not see any man in it with Khushu' [modesty, bashfulness from a positive perspective, refers to a bad and uneasy feeling accompanied by embarrassment, caused by one's fear of being exposed or censured for some unworthy or indecent conduct.]'"(Jami at-Tirmidhi, Book 39, Hadis 2653).  
According to this Hadis it is clear that just the practice, the reciting/reading of 
the Kur’an is not enough to keep the ‘ilm on earth. The disciples recite the Kur’an all 
the time, they even teach it to their families and children. However, that is not so 
different from what Christians or Jewish people did in the past according to the Hadis, 
and still they have lost the ‘ilm. It does not benefit them right now (in the sense that 
they do not truly remember Allah and their testimony to them). That is why Prophet 
Muhammed re-revealed the Truth of the Lord. Moreover, another Hadis found in 
Rumi references supports this claim that many people read the Kur’an but Kur’an 
curses on them (Rumi, 2009, p. 121). Thus, we can justify that just reading and reciting 
the Kur’an even though it is practiced rigorously is not the way to attain knowledge, 
even though it is also the common practice among the Turkish Muslims as hinted at 
in the previous chapter. Thus, when we refer back to the three categories of 
knowledge, this kind of reading/reciting and learning of the Turkish people may be 
considered within the first two categories, the ones about the knowledge of the verse 
and the Sünnet; however, the simple knowledge of these does not account to 
practicing it, the third kind, which is also the superior one. 
Also a very key addition to the perspective of Islam on knowledge, according 
to the Hadis above and a similar one from Ubadah bin As-Samit, Khushu is considered 
a type of knowledge. Khushu refers to the modesty, humility, humbleness, 
bashfulness out of love as well as fear due to the consciousness of Allah’s greatness 
and presence, and the embarrassment that is due to doing a bad thing or leaving 
good habits (Çağrıcı M. , 1997b). Thus, in this Hadis, a feeling, an attribute, or a quality 
is called an ‘ilm. Here we see a clear evidence that ‘ilm is not just an intellectual entity 
that can be reasoned; there is more to it. ‘ilm does not only belong to the intellect 
but to the body as the practice and soul as the morals as well. It is inscribed into daily 
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rituals, and embodied in flesh. Like the basic instincts that we have, a thing that is not 
totally under control, a feeling as well as its consequent behaviors are also considered 
intrinsic to ‘ilm. People thus cannot attain this kind of knowledge simply by reciting, 
reading, researching or reasoning, but one has to somehow live it, experience it, and 
internalize it.  
These unique (to a Westernized “modern” Turkish perspective) attributes of 
‘ilm identified from the Hadiths above, added to the paradoxical entity of it being 
both given and gained, supports the idea that ‘ilm and thus any practice to attain it 
may not be clear to an outsider to the culture and may need to be uncovered first for 
us to be able to grasp it. If it is the case that ‘ilm can be identified as such, then it 
leads to questioning how the previous generations native to Sünnî-Islam actually 
understood it, interpreted these revelations, and tried to acquire and transmit it to 
younger ones so that it does not disappear from earth. Is it at all possible that there 
is again more then what meets the eye when it comes to the transmission of ‘ilm as 
well? Bluntly, would there be a possible and feasible reason within the Islamic cultural 
heritage of learning traditions why mediation is so central to the transmission of the 
knowledge, so called ‘ilm, due to its unique signification and if so, how does it affect 
the current practices? To get an insight about these questions, then, the need to 
study ‘ilm in various historical contexts in Islam arises; and thus in the following 
sections I first turn to the traditional explanations and interpretations of ‘ilm offered 
in the Sünnî-Islamic and Sûfî traditions, which have been quite dominant in the 
inherited Turkish culture. 
 
2.4) ‘ilm in Sünnî Tradition 
  
In the Encyclopedia of Islam, ‘ilm 23  is described, loyal to its original 
signification, generally as comprehending the reality and the essence of a thing or 
certain belief that coincides with the reality (Kutluer, 2000). The essence is an 
important keyword here. According to this definition ‘ilm is not just a description of 
                                                          
23 The actual word that is used in the encyclopedia is ilim, and used true to its original meaning. ‘ilm is used in the text for the purpose of consistency. 
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a relation between the object and the subject since the object (or even the subject) 
has an essence which also needs to be perceived – an essence which is not a bare a 
priori of the intellect but a fundament originated from Allah. This is why the Prophet 
prays Allah to show him the reality behind the objects as stated in the previous 
section. Thus, the perception of ‘ilm in the general Sünnî-Islamic understanding 
naturally follows the descriptions in Kur’an and Hadis, and it is actually accepted as 
an attribute of Allah, who is the Alîm. Within this description it is referred to as the 
knowledge of Allah that encompasses everything, including all the objects and events 
within the senses and beyond, hidden or apparent, not limited to any time or place 
(Yavuz Y. Ş., 2000a) and this understanding is also supported with various Hadiths as 
well. (Sahih al-Bukhari Vol. 2, Book 17, Hadis 149; Sahih Muslim, Book 1, Hadis 4). At 
first, as an attribute of Allah, ‘ilm seems like a quality that is not attainable by any 
endeavor. However, while it is still advised for people to pray for Allah to bestow 
them with ‘ilm relying on His graciousness, at the same time, it is encouraged by the 
Prophet to seek and attain ‘ilm, to work for, and to think about the creation and 
Allah’s message to remember Him – to apply doublethink. 
While the general nature of ‘ilm is encapsulated with the outlines given above, 
it does not hinder the refinements of the Sünnî tradition about this description due 
to various interpretations. According to Islamic scholars, the meanings which ‘ilm 
may refer to in Kur’an and in the Arabic language varies; and there are other words 
(like zikir, as stated before) which also represents knowledge with slightly different 
meanings. For example, when Kur’an talks about people who have transgressed 
concerning the Sabbath, the word which is derived from the root of ‘ilm has a 
connotation of a social memory and transmission of knowledge (Kur’an 2:65); when 
Kur’an warns people not to approach prayer while intoxicated, the word represents 
self-consciousness (Kur’an 4:43); and where it is stated that the night and day are 
given as two signs for people to keep account of time, ‘ilm solely refers to the 
intellectual knowledge (Kur’an 17:12) (Kutluer, 2000). As seen, what ‘ilm, as an all-
encapsulating umbrella term, signifies may vary according to the context as well as 
to the interpreter of Kur’an.  
On the other hand, there are not just different connotations of ‘ilm, but there 
are also various levels of knowledge and certainty of knowledge that we can talk 
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about in Islam, which can be represented by some of the following originally Arabic 
terms: mârifet/irfan, fıkh/tefakkuh, hibre, şuûr, hikmet and itkân (Kutluer, 2000). 
Among these examples, itkân for instance, means “doing something tenaciously or 
steadfast” (Aşıkkutlu, 2006), or hikmet means “making a judgment” and “knowing the 
most valuable beings with the most superior knowledge” (Kutluer, 1998). From these 
examples, the different levels of knowledge and different degrees of certainty within 
the understanding of ‘ilm becomes apparent. When studied carefully, this 
differentiation is also clear in the Kur’an when it talks about the knowledge bestowed 
upon the prophets, in the verses given in the section 2.2. There, the prophets are 
usually given ‘ilm, in addition to hikmet (judgment) (Kur’an 21:74; 12:22; 28:14), 
which is also related to the meaning of “to prevent, to hinder, to avert, in other words 
it is related with to guide a person for the good, and averting from the bad”. Here, 
İbn Manzûr draws attention to the relation between hikmet and the experience, 
claiming that the ancient Arabs used the word “muhakkam” to represent “a person 
with hikmet, one who is experienced and mature” (Kutluer, 1998). Consequently, 
since there is a Hadis which claims the scholars [ulemâ] as the heirs of the Prophets 
(Jami` at-Tirmidhi, Vol.5, Book 39, Hadis 2682), it is believed that they should also 
inherit the hikmet, and they should be able to give judgments. That by itself justifies 
the appointment of Kadıs (judges) from the Islamic scholars. 
Within these various possible boundaries and stretches of its meaning, ‘ilm is 
very much debated in Kelâm (‘ilm al-kalam, Islamic scholastic theology) as in the 
Western philosophy. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam, mutakallim (scholars of 
Kelâm) of Mu’tezile says that “‘ilm is the belief that erases any doubts in the mind”; 
Ibn Hazm, a scholar of Zâhirî, claims that it is “knowledge that has acquired certainty”; 
Eş‘arî scholars thought that these definitions are not enough, claiming that belief is 
more of a psychological phenomenon instead of concepts and they claimed that it is 
“knowing an object that can be known as it is”; then Cürcânî brings back the idea that 
“it is an absolute belief that is consistent with reality” etc. (Kutluer, 2000). On the 
other hand, Şâfiî approaches it from a different perspective and divides ‘ilm into two: 
“First, the religious knowledge which is clear in Kur’an and Sünnet, quoted by the 
majority of Muslims that does not require any further explanation or debate; and 
second, the knowledge which may need interpretation obtained through comparison 
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and syllogism, or which the scholars/wise gathers through private resources and 
methods” (Kutluer, 2000, p. 112). The former kind of ‘ilm given in this definition 
seems like a common knowledge and it should be easy to reach and grasp for people. 
Learning how to read the Kur’an, how to fast, or how to determine the age of a 
sacrificial calf by counting its teeth are all common or at least readily available 
knowledge in the books for mankind. Since this kind of knowledge is so accessible, it 
should not cause a problematic discussion in the society and we cannot easily talk 
about the loss of this kind of ‘ilm in the society as stated in the Hadis via Jubair bin 
Nufair before. Therefore, the latter kind of ‘ilm becomes more of an interest of 
discussion to the scholars. 
According to Bloomsbury Companion to Islamic Studies, “even though seeking 
knowledge in Islam is considered a religious obligation, the studying of 'ilm al-
Kalam is considered by Muslim scholars to fall under the category of necessity and 
only permitted to qualified scholars, but not for the masses or common people” 
(Bennett, 2015, p. 119). Thus according to this perspective, the scholars were 
differentiating themselves from the masses, and claiming a higher position to discuss 
these issues, may be referencing the previous Hadis about being the heirs of the 
prophets, and nominating themselves as qualified to dive into comparison, syllogism 
or even some private resources. However, again according to the hadiths, even 
though these ulemâ (scholars) may have the judgment (hikmet), they still could not 
reach an absolute decision about ‘ilm. The certainty in their arguments was 
apparently lacking.  
According to Kutluer, Ebü’l-Usr el-Pezdevî, who is a Hanefî scholar lived 250 
years after Şâfiî’, also divided ‘ilm into two in a similar manner: “‘ilmü’t-tevhîd ve’s-
sıfât” and “‘ilmü’ş-şerâi‘ ve’l-ahkâm”; and he claimed that for the first kind of ‘ilm, 
one should reference Ebû Hanîfe’s (founder of the Hanefî school) works; and for the 
latter kind of ‘ilm which he has called “fürû ilmi” or “fıkıh”, one should join knowledge 
and practice (amel) together in one’s self (Kutluer, 2000, p. 112). Therefore, the 
importance of practice, endeavor, in attaining knowledge comes up as an important 
part of the discussion one more time, may be hinting at its role in attaining certainty 
in ‘ilm. For example the latter kind of ‘ilm may include not only the discussion of the 
‘ilm itself, but also the Kur’anic verses that only consists of hurûf-ı mukattaa like “Elif 
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Lâm Mîm” (Kur’an 2:1). While some scholars refrain from giving an interpretation for 
these characters claiming that these cannot be known, some others, especially from 
the Sûfî tradition, associate some meanings in their writings. These people also 
interpret many verses of the Kur’an from a bâtınî (inner, secret) point of view. This 
division, makes one question about the special, the latter kind of knowledge that can 
be gained through not only logic but also some private resources and methods, as 
well as practice. If there is actually a higher, more valued kind of knowledge in Islam, 
who can attain it and what are those special resources and methods to attain it? Are 
these privileged people actually the ones, who are referred to in the Kur’an as the 
ones that are deepened in ‘ilm, “those of understanding” (ulul-albab) (Kur’an: 3:7)? 
Since the Sûfî people have been claiming that they hold a special kind of knowledge, 
I will investigate the answers to these questions from their perspective. 
 
2.5) ‘ilm in Tasavvuf: Mârifet 
  
From a broad historical perspective, knowledge is used to mean two different 
things: First, in parallel to Plato’s perspective, it is considered as self-improvement 
and intrinsic-development; second it is seen by the likes of F. Bacon and A. Comte, as 
a progress for mankind to rule over the Earthly matters; it is a matter of which is more 
important: Subject behind the viewfinder, or the Object in front of it (Filiz Ş. , 2014, 
p. 22). The latter is already discussed throughout the history and science has taken 
over it. This kind of knowledge is not really in the focus of the previously stated 
“people who are deepened in ‘ilm” or “those of knowledge” since ‘ilm itself has the 
intrinsic religious connotation discussed previously. Instead they gravitates towards 
the first kind of knowledge, which Emile Brehier defines as something that does not 
crawl over the surface of things but is inside and in the deeps of things, which unites 
with the existence to raise us up to the truth and perfection (Filiz Ş. , 2014, p. 22). 
This kind of “real” and “deep” knowledge is tied inseparably to knowing one’s self 
according to Spinoza and Bergson, and as especially Bergson stresses, knowing and 
doing are one and the same (Filiz Ş. , 2014, p. 23). These ideas of self-improvement, 
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attaining perfection, knowledge of one’s self and the union of practice and 
knowledge very much resemble Sûfî’s perspective on knowledge.  
According to one theory, the name Sûfî, follower of tasavvuf, is believed to 
originate from the disciples of Muhammed who were called the Ashâb-ı Suffe – an 
“elite” group of intellectuals so to say, or as Kur’an states those who have deepened 
in knowledge, or at least those who dedicated their lives to studying Kur’an 24 
(Schimmel, 1975, p. 14). They used to live in the mescid (prayer hall) of the time to 
focus on Kur’an and were taught by the Prophet himself privately. No matter how the 
naming occurred, afterwards Sûfî became a signifier given to people who dedicate 
themselves to the path of learning, to ‘ilm, self-realization and enlightenment within 
Islamic societies.  
These Sûfîs, since the very beginning, have been claiming that there is a 
special kind of knowledge they seek after and have reached – a knowledge that 
cannot be questioned, the truth which is absolute and certain (yakîn). According to 
them, there are different levels of certainty. For example, they claim that ilme’l yakîn 
refers to the knowledge that is at the first level of certainty. Even though it is still 
considered as a knowledge, which is based on indubitable rational and transmitted 
evidences, the Sûfîs believe that there are even higher levels of certainty, namely 
ayne’l yakîn which depends on outer experiences and hakka’l yakîn which is attained 
through inner experiences; thus they believe that these latter two are more apt to 
dispel the hesitations that comes to the mind (Yavuz Y. Ş., 2000b). In other words, 
ilme’l yakîn can be identified as an intellectual knowledge, ayne’l yakîn is an 
observational knowledge but in the metaphysical realm and hakka’l yakîn, the most 
certain of all, is the knowledge attained through personal experience, through living 
it. This differentiation is referenced from Kur’an through the examples of the 
knowledge of the death and the afterwards. One’s understanding that Allah is 
capable of taking one’s life and giving life back to dead as he visits the graveyards is 
considered ilme’l yakîn (Kur’an 102:2-5); Abraham’s witnessing that the bird, which 
he cut into pieces and left on four different mountains comes back flying to him is 
                                                          
24 For other theories and broader explanation of the beginnings of tasavvuf, please see Annemarie Schimmel’s Mystical Dimensions of Islam, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1975. Chapters 1 & 2. 
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considered ayne’l yakîn (Kur’an 2:260); and the experience of the one, who had 
wondered about how Allah gives life to dead and Allah took his life for hundred years 
and brought back to life is considered hakka’l yakîn (Kur’an 2:259) (Yavuz Y. Ş., 1997). 
Sûfîs believe that the âlims (ulemâ, scholars) can reach the first level of certainty 
called ilme’l yakîn, but the latter two can only be attained by the prophets and velîs 
(saints) – the best among themselves – who also has private metaphysical ways to 
attain knowledge directly from Allah. Therefore, within this distinction of certainty 
among various ‘ilm, the special knowledge that the Sûfîs claim to have acquired is in 
the realm of ayne’l yakîn and hakka’l yakîn. More specifically, this special and 
absolute knowledge which is at the utmost level of certainty, the goal of the Sûfî way 
of life and “philosophy”, is hakka’l yakîn.  
Aside from these terminologies that represent the level of certainty of ‘ilm, to 
completely differentiate this private knowledge from the general understanding of 
‘ilm that other scholars can also attain, Sûfîs have intentionally referred to it with 
other signifiers like mârifet (ةفرعم in Arabic), irfan, and yakîn (Uludağ, 2003). There 
are also similar words that have been in place like ledün ilmi, bâtın ilmi (hidden 
knowledge), and hal ilmi according to the Encyclopedia of Islam. Among these 
signifiers, in this thesis, I prefer to refer to this special knowledge of Sûfîs using the 
term mârifet, which means “the knowledge of Allah (zât), His attributes (sıfat), acts 
(fiil), names (isim, esmâ), and manifestations (tecelli) directly gained through spiritual 
experiences”, which is thus pure and distant from impression, suspicion, or reasoning 
(Uludağ, 2003). Mârifet is believed to originate from Allah’s own gratuity, directly 
descending from Him (Rabbâni) through divine inspiration; hence, it is absolutely 
certain, hakka’l yakîn. It is considered beyond the senses and the intellect – the very 
kind of ‘ilm that is similar to which Allah owns as the Alîm; therefore, due to its 
metaphysical nature, it is a spiritual kind of knowledge.  
Due to this very nature, and the direct, special and metaphysical link that is 
believed to exist between the source of knowledge (Allah), and the receiver (Sûfî who 
became insan-ı kâmil), this kind of knowledge is thus considered pure among the 
Sûfîs: uncontaminated by the intellect, imagination or any other delusions. Therefore, 
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Sûfîs place mârifet at the top of the hierarchy25 of ‘ilms as the truth and the absolute, 
and finds it more reliable than any other ‘ilm in the sphere of human reasoning; 
Cüneyd-i Bağdâdî even bluntly claims: “If there would be any other ‘ilm that is more 
honorable than theirs (Sûfîs), he would go ahead and learn it” (Uludağ, 2003). 
However, this declaration which esteems mârifet as a more valuable quality does not 
mean that Sûfîs disregard what they think of as the rest of ‘ilm. According to them, 
mârifet should not contradict the Kur’an or the Hadis since they are the true guidance 
of Allah, keeping Sûfîs assertions within the boundaries of Sünnî-Islam. In 
concordance, Zünnûn el-Mısrî states that the nûr (light) of mârifet should not 
extinguish the nûr of takvâ (piety), and there should not be talk of bâtini (secret) ‘ilm 
that contradicts zâhirî (visible) ‘ilm; Ebû Saîd el-Harrâz, denounces all bâtınî ‘ilm that 
contradicts zâhirî ones; Ebû Süleyman ed-Dârânî requires that Kur’an and Hadis 
should attest to the mârifet; and Cüneyd-i Bağdâdî emphasizes that only the mârifet 
within the framework of Kur’an, Hadis and Sünnet is valid (Uludağ, 2003). As a result, 
Sûfîs consider şeriat (Islamic law and framework) as the first step in attaining ‘ilm, 
only then comes the hakikat26, and finally mârifet rests at the top of the hierarchy of 
knowledge.  
Since mârifet is believed to include the spiritual aspects stated above, the 
possibility of attaining it becomes questionable, especially from our “modern” and 
“uninitiated” perspective, which mostly consider knowledge within rational 
boundaries. However, Sûfîs argue against it based on the following kudsî Hadis 
(sayings of the Prophet referencing Allah, but not a part of Kur’an) that can also be 
found on the much debated book of Aclûnî, Keşfü’z-Hafâ: “I [Allah] was a hidden 
treasure; I loved to be known. Hence I created the world so that I would be known” 
(Uludağ, 2003). Thus according to this Hadis, Sûfîs assert that since it is the goal of 
the whole creation to know Allah, it has to be intrinsically possible to know him, to 
attain the knowledge of Him as well. 
On the other hand, another evidence of the possibility of the attaining this 
kind of spiritual knowledge can be found in Kur’an, in the verses that are related to 
                                                          
25 Eventhough this is a very common theme, in some tarikats like the Bektaşi, switches the order of mârifet and hakikat, considering the hakikat as the final destination of reality. For more information see Hikmet Özdemir’s article published in Horasan’dan Anadolu’ya Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (2010). 
26 More information will be given on this in section 3.3. 
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the transmission of knowledge between Allah and the apparently chosen people, 
namely the prophets, who are thought by Allah, through His speech, pen, and vahiy, 
which is the divine revelation. They are special and selected beings; therefore, it is 
natural to assume that they may have private ways of acquiring ‘ilm, even directly 
from Allah. Due to the involvement of some special channels, it can be inferred that 
it is actually mârifet that is passed on to the prophets – that is to say ‘ilm and hikmet 
together as seen in the previous sections. These miraculous situations are commonly 
exemplified in Kur’an. For example, in Surah Al-Qasas, Allah talks directly with Moses: 
“…he was called from the right side of the valley in a blessed spot - from the tree, "O 
Moses, indeed I am Allah, Lord of the worlds" (Kur’an 28:30). On another account in 
surah al-Maryam, Allah sends angel Gabriel (Cebrâil) as a well-proportioned man to 
give the news of her pregnancy to Jesus (İsa) and he says: "I am only the messenger 
of your Lord to give you [news of] a pure boy." (Kur’an 19:19). Similarly, Abraham 
sees that he should sacrifice his son in his dream, and takes this as a sign from Allah; 
right before he accomplishes what he was ordered, Allah calls to him: “…O Abraham, 
you have full-filled the vision.” (Kur’an 37:102-105). From these verses, it can be 
understood that Allah has various ways of communicating with His prophets, some 
of which through talking, via sending a messenger like Gabriel or through showing 
visions in their dreams. All of these special ways of communication seems beyond the 
capacity of a normal human being. However, considering the Hadis, which is already 
stated before, if ulemâ (those of knowledge) are like the heirs of the prophets, there 
is a chance that they may also have a way of directly being in contact with Allah and 
gathering knowledge as such. It should be noted here though, as Sûfîs differentiate 
‘ilm according to its certainty, they also differentiate between the ulemâ. Dekkak, 
calls the people in the stage of ilme’l yakîn as avam (public, ordinary), the people in 
the stage of ayne’l yakîn as havas (the elite), and call the ones that has attained the 
highest level of knowledge, hakka’l yakîn, as hâss-ül havas (elite of the elite), or ehl-i 
mârifet (people of mârifet) [insan-ı kâmil] (Ceyhan, 2012). Sûfîs believe that the 
latter, especially the insan-ı kâmil, are the true heirs of the prophets who have these 
kind of special connections with Allah. 
Besides the infamous “hidden treasure” Hadis, and the evidence gathered 
from Kur’an that explains the possibility of the transmission of mârifet in the previous 
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paragraph, Sûfîs believe that there is one more proof that mârifet can be acquired by 
them, and that goes all the way back to the relation between Allah, Muhammed, and 
Ali (Muhammed’s son in law and nephew). Among all the prophets, Muhammed is 
considered the crown-jewel of the lineage by the Muslims; he is the Habib Allah 
(beloved of Allah); he is the peak of prophethood, and thus he is believed to have 
reached the highest level of mârifet. That is why he is considered to be the actual 
reason, the fruit of creation – as he is the one who has attained the highest level of 
knowledge about Allah, he is the one who realized the goal of creation stated 
previously. Supporting this, Kastalani records that when Adam was created, he saw a 
name above him written with nûr (light): Ahmed (which is another name of the 
prophet Muhammed); then, Allah explains to Adam that it is a light of a prophet from 
his own descendants, which is also the first of all creations, and adds that if it was not 
for him, He would not have created Adam (Yılmaz, 2002). It is believed that this nûr 
(light) of Muhammed was passed on to Adam, and then to all the prophets 
successively until it reached back to Muhammed, the last of the prophets. This nûr 
seems like an entity that can be transferred from Allah to the Prophet and then on to 
other prophets; this is critical to acknowledge, because, this nûr seems to have a big 
impact on the transmission of mârifet as well, which will be discussed later on.  
As the reason behind the creation, Muhammed is highly praised and exalted 
as explained previously. His nûr is the first of the creation and he is the one that has 
attained the highest level of mârifet. Therefore, according to the popular account of 
Tirmidhi, he also declares himself as the “house” of hikmet, meaning he is the source 
or embodiment of the highest degree of decisive knowledge, which to my 
understanding also signifies mârifet (Jami` at-Tirmidhi, Vol. 1, Book 46, Hadis 3723). 
While this is all somewhat expected information, in the same Hadis, Muhammed 
himself adds that Ali is the “door” of this “house”. Therefore, in a sense, the Prophet 
is kind of inviting people who wants to attain this kind of knowledge to use this 
“door”. According to Sûfîs this is a clear indication that it is possible for people to pass 
the realm of ‘ilm, and combine it in the realm of hikmet and thus to the grounds of 
mârifet. That is to say, it is actually possible to attain mârifet, through passing this 
“door” of Ali, who symbolizes the source for many of the orders in tasavvuf. Ali 
(similar to Ebu Bekir) is considered to have received the special teachings of the 
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Prophet about mârifet, and having acquired that knowledge, he in return passed it 
on to the Muslims through a silsile (lineage) of mürşids (guides, teachers).  
Even though the evidences of the possibility of attaining mârifet are stated 
above according to the Sûfî belief, and the gateway to mârifet is hinted as Ali above, 
how one can actually attain mârifet still needs more elaboration. The clarification for 
this can be found out through other definitions of mârifet in Sûfîs tradition. For 
example, to further distinguish mârifet from the other understandings of knowledge 
and stress its authenticity, Sûfîs use the word hal ilmi for the prior and kâl ilmi for the 
latter. This distinction emphasizes the importance of practice (hal) in tasavvuf, which 
is observing the Islamic orders, over the intellectual discussion which is about the 
verses, Hadis and words (kâl) of Allah. This is not to say that tasavvuf denies the Şer’i 
(theological) knowledge and not deal with it; however, this kind of knowledge and 
the methods to attain it are not the main focus of a Sûfî. Hence, the knowledge of 
Sûfîs does not depend on studying, memorizing, discussing, analyzing, and any other 
methods that come to a Western influenced “modern” mind. In other words, it can 
be stated that the five senses and the rational mind do not really help in the process 
of reaching this kind of knowledge called mârifet. According to Sûfîs, this is why 
Muhammed leaves Gabriel, the symbol of intellect, behind in the night of mi’rac 
(physical/spiritual ascend, encounter with Allah, processes of abstraction) (Schimmel, 
1975, p. 219). Symbolically and hermeneutically, Muhammed transcends the 
intellect, leaves it behind to reach the absolute knowledge, or to have the experience 
of direct and unmediated communication with Allah. Or from a different perspective, 
in the presence of Allah, or in the realm of mârifet, reasoning just do not function as 
we understand it. Therefore, at this point, Sûfî seems to ignore the rational mind, 
rejecting most of the Western philosophical approaches to knowledge and rely 
heavily on the practice instead.  
Rumi refers to this transcendental quality of mârifet by comparing the 
intellect to a donkey which gets stuck in the mire, in its attempt to explain love 
(Schimmel, 1993, p. 103). In other words, Rumi states that it is an inexpressible form 
of knowledge, a feeling, and a state of enlightenment. Mârifet is not only 
inexpressible, it is also paradoxically not possible to know what mârifet is within the 
realm of our intellect and rationality. In this framework, according to Zünnûn el-Mısrî 
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and other Sûfîs it is not possible to perfectly “know” Allah; thus Ebû Saîd el-A‘râbî and 
Sehl b. Abdullah et-Tüsterî has claimed that mârifet is actually the confession of one’s 
lack of knowledge on this issue; and Cüneyd-i Bağdâdî has supported this by stating 
that there is no one that knows Allah, except Allah (Uludağ, 2003). While Allah cannot 
be known fully by the intellect and cannot be contemplated upon, paradoxically, 
mârifet can still be attained through methods called keşf, which means to raise the 
curtain in the dictionaries but mostly means to receive direct knowledge about things 
when the intellect and the senses fail, or to know the bâtın (hidden); it also has the 
meaning of witnessing the manifestations of Allah (Uludağ, 2003). Since the receiver 
of this kind of direct knowledge, which becomes available through keşf, cannot be 
the mind, it is attributed to the heart (kalp); that is to say, according to Sûfîs, a nûr 
(light) gets thrown into the heart, and with this nûr one reaches the state of internal 
enlightenment and sees the divine realities with kalp gözü (eye of the heart) (Uludağ, 
2003). The nûr which is the prerequisite of keşf in one’s heart is a given, a gift of Allah; 
one cannot acquire it directly through his own endeavor. However, it is believed by 
the Sûfîs that at least a person can make his heart suitable to receive this nûr through 
cleansing it from the earthly matters and indecencies and opening it to Allah to fill in. 
Therefore, the person who wants to have a chance to attain mârifet has to purify the 
heart (soul) to receive this nûr first. Therefore, the path to attain knowledge seems 
to be related to personal purification more than a thought process.  
If we were to analyze this further Gazâlî calls the five senses as zâhirî nûr 
(visible/known light), which helps us gather data from our surroundings; however, 
this data only constitutes the external forms (lafız) of those things and thus Muhâsibî 
categorizes this kind of knowledge as zâhirî bilgi (visible, sensual knowledge) (Filiz Ş. 
, 2014, pp. 196-197). This kind of knowledge is within the sphere of logic and intellect 
– in other words within the realm of akl-ı me’aş, which serves humans to understand, 
organize and categorize the objects and the representations of these objects in their 
minds (Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, p. 111). The ability called akl-ı me’aş, which is 
considered a kesbî quality – one that can be attained through work – can only 
function in Şehâdet Alemi (the realm of senses/ the visible) and it belongs to nefs 
(ego), that is why it can lead people easily into mistakes and deviance. Özemre 
compares it to a wild horse: “One cannot direct it to the direction he wishes; on the 
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contrary, this horse takes him to wherever it wishes; moreover, throws him off and 
runs him over” (Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, p. 110). When Kur’an asks people to 
contemplate the signs of creation, it is probably referring to this kind of knowledge. 
However, according to Sûfîs, this does not constitute the reality (hakikat). In parallel 
to the perspective above, things that are sensed may differ from one person to 
another. For example our vision is limited by some wavelengths of light, and we 
cannot see beyond those limits, but dogs can. It is like that, if we base our knowledge 
purely on our senses, we would not understand the microwaves. Even now in 
sciences mostly we try to materially observe the realities in our world, trying to bring 
things to our spheres with representations to make sense of the universe.  
According to İbnü’l-Arabî, this kind of knowledge gathered from our senses, 
zâhirî bilgi, is nothing but an imagination. Instead he proposes that the outer world 
consists of various forms that appears and disappears in succession; however, our 
senses and brain are not capable of understanding this phenomenon, and he adds 
that one needs keşf to realize this. (Filiz Ş. , 2014, p. 347). That is how he explains the 
gap between the brain and the heart, which is more like the place that gives meanings 
to these sensual data according to Muhâsibî, and that is why a Sûfî “has to look at 
(turn to) everything with the (with an open) heart” to reach enlightenment (Filiz Ş. , 
2014, pp. 198-199). In other words, Sûfîs believe that the sensed data is processed 
within the brain, but it is given meaning (mâna) in the heart, which reflects these 
meanings from the actual source, Allah. This may sound a little different and new 
from a “modern” scientific perspective but this difference attributed to the mind and 
heart would also be an accurate description of the difference in the sphere between 
philosophy and tasavvuf that of episteme and mârifet. 
After the purification of the heart (soul), if Allah puts his nûr into one’s heart, 
it is like attaining a different metaphysical sense for him (kalp gözü). According to 
İbnü’l-Arabî, akıl (intellect) reaches a different level when it is bestowed with the nûr 
that he calls idrak (awareness) and becomes the rational nefs (ego, soul)  (Filiz Ş. , 
2014, p. 203). Similarly, Özemre calls this akl-ı me’ad, a vehbî quality that cannot be 
attained but only bestowed upon by Allah, which helps to understand the Bâtın Alemi 
(the realm of the hidden/secret/metaphysical) (Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, p. 110). The 
difference is that while the intellect can fall into fallacies, this rational nefs or akl-ı 
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me’ad does not. The reason is that if the intellect doubts its own production, the only 
thing that can assure it is again the intellect itself from the same sphere, but in 
tasavvuf, the direct knowledge from Allah can transcend this sphere and become a 
source that satisfies the doubts with certainty (yakîn) (Filiz L. , 2009, p. 259). In other 
words, rational nefs is free from the limitations of the intellect. Thus, this knowledge 
that is directly transferred to him is an a priori (but from Allah) (Filiz Ş. , 2014, p. 259). 
In this situation, Sûfî has mostly discarded his ties with the world and he is directly 
perceiving; he has attained the müstefad akıl in Kindî’s terms; and thus he is not after 
the partial and epistemic knowledge but he is aiming for the absolute knowledge with 
all its variety and oppositions, discovering the archetypes; he starts to see Allah in 
everything. (Filiz Ş. , 2014, pp. 203-204) Therefore, from this perspective, the state 
which is called mârifet “aims for a unity more than a relationship; it aims for the unity 
of knowledge, that is to say the unity of the one who knows and the thing that is 
known” (Filiz Ş. , 2014, p. 213). 
In short, we can deduct from all the discussions in this chapter that both ‘ilm 
and mârifet (‘ilm in the certainty of hakka’l yakîn), differentiates vastly from the 
general and current understanding of both knowledge and episteme. While ‘ilm 
encapsulates the knowledge of Allah and his orders, mârifet specifically refers to a 
kind of knowledge that includes moral dispositions, good judgment and correct 
practices. Therefore, theoretically, knowing in the Sünnî-Islamic heritage of Turkey is 
intertwined with morality and practice; thus it is expected that the learning practices 
will also be quite detached from the modern methods like reading, studying, and 
research. Primarily, we are talking about a paradoxical “knowledge”, which cannot 
even be attained by one’s endeavor, but still requires one’s hard work especially to 
cleanse his heart and soul in the hopes of attaining it. Even so, the transmission of it 
still requires some sort of mediation, due to the intrinsic God-given hierarchical 
transmission of it. This theoretical framework, thus understanding the importance of 
morality, practice and mediation for what is considered the absolute knowledge in 
the Islamic traditions, will help in the investigation of the learning practices that were 
dominantly used in the medieval times (in Chapter 3) and the ones that are still in 
place (in Chapter 4). 
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CHAPTER 3 
AUTHOTRITY AND MEDIATION WITHIN THE 
TRANSMISSION OF ISLAMIC KNOWLEDGE 
     
3.1) Authority of Müderris in Medrese 
  
The beginning of the educational tradition in Islam can be traced back to 
Prophet’s time. At first education was in a sense the transmission of the Kur’an from 
the Prophet to his disciples. Then after the Prophet passed away, the disciples started 
to transmit his acts and sayings to the younger generations as well. However, the 
systematization of the Islamic education starts with the establishment of medreses, 
around the eleventh century (Berkey, 2007, p. 42). With the spread of these 
institutions over time throughout the region, their understanding of ‘ilm and 
education is accepted throughout the Sünnî-Islamic world; that means, most of the 
ulemâ (learned men, sing. âlim) educated in this tradition, including the Ottoman 
ones, passed through the same educational system, and learned from the same 
resources (Unan, 1999, p. 150). That means, in these institutions, the students called 
the talebe (danişmend or sohta in other contexts) would mostly study Islamic 
knowledge like fıkıh (Islamic law), tefsir (exegesis), Hadis (Hadis, Prophet’s sayings), 
akâ’id (issues related to belief), kelâm (Islamic philosophy), mantık (logic), as well as 
the base for all these studies, the Arabic language. At the end of the studies, this 
education would enable a commoner to reach the administrative duties in the 
Ottoman Empire in a similar way to today’s upward mobility (Unan, 1999, p. 154). 
In the Ottoman educational system there would be only one teacher called 
âlim, hoca, or müderris in a medrese, and the “classes” were based on famous books, 
or it can be said that the “classes” were actually the books. All the students would 
gather in a big room in a semi-circular pattern around the teacher (Grunebaum & 
Abel, 1947, p. 16), according to the hierarchy among the students – seniors in the 
center closer to the teacher and the younger and the less experienced ones on the 
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periphery (Berkey, 2007, p. 46). Even though in the earlier times the students would 
be able to ask questions and discuss the topics they study, later on, in general, the 
teacher would analyze a text word by word and explain the meanings to the students; 
instead of saying something new, the aim of the education was to be able to use the 
language delicately, and to comprehend the texts fully (Kazıcı, 1999, p. 174).  
The learning of this typical Muslim [fakih] is authoritarian. Revelation and tradition are its foundation, the commentary the principal vehicle of advance. Salvation of the soul, not control of nature and society is the end. Preservation and systematization of knowledge, rather than expansion is aimed at (Grunebaum & Abel, 1947, p. 16). 
“When [the student] understood his material, [he] was then told to learn it so 
he could later recall the subject of the study”. At this point the technique of repetition 
was to be brought into play” (Grunebaum & Abel, 1947). Thus the texts would be 
read over and over again and be memorized by the students, then the process would 
be checked by the teacher one by one (Çelebi, 1999, p. 214).  
Zarnūjī in his infamous book on instructions to students, talks extensively on 
repetition quoting from variety of resources (Zarnūjī, 1947). He even gives specific 
directions for helping memory and for preventing forgetfulness. According to his 
advice, “using a toothpick”, “drinking honey” and “eating incense plant” strengthens 
the memory; but, “eating fresh coriander and acid apples”, “passing through a camel 
train”, bring about forgetfulness. The importance of repetition and memorization 
should be clear from these specific advices. However, according to Berkey, this 
“memorization was a tool, not an end in itself”, which, through this close supervision 
of the teacher, actually “did reinforce the hierarchical character of instructional 
relationships.” (2007, p. 46). It is clear both from the sitting pattern in the classroom 
setting and emphasis on the practice of memorization under the teacher’s 
supervision that hierarchy is more of an important part of the medrese education. 
Zarnūjī even “goes so far as to say that the persistence of the aspiring scholar alone 
won’t insure his education; it will be achieved only if his teacher ... persists with him 
in his learning endeavors” (Grunebaum & Abel, 1947, p. 11). Since the need or 
importance of the teacher is clear in medreses, one cannot help but to raise the 
question: “What purpose would the teacher or this authority serve?” 
There can be many speculations about the need for the authority in medreses, 
like the possibility that it helped disciplining the students to study harder due to 
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respect or more like fear. Even though it is not easy to know this for sure, there is one 
function of this authority that is certain. As Berkey notes, this authority would 
guarantee the credibility of the “graduates”, in other words, if a student would study 
with a teacher, and successfully completed his studies under his supervision, he 
would get a certificate called icâzet, which would testify the student’s “authority over 
texts and over a body of learning” (1992, p. 23). There were no examinations, no 
tests, neither a systematized assessment nor an institutional diploma at the time. It 
was the authority of the teacher, whose authority was also based on his own teacher, 
which attested to the student’s qualification on the specific knowledge, mainly a text. 
Therefore, we can claim that since the very beginning, the center of this educational 
system was not the institution but the teacher; “a center of learning... represented 
by scholars to whom students flocked from different parts of the Islamic world” 
(Grunebaum & Abel, 1947). Berkey adds to that: “Indeed, medieval Muslims 
themselves seem to have been remarkably uninterested in where an individual 
studied. The only thing that mattered was with whom one had studied” (2007, p. 43).  
In this tradition, thus, it was really important and more prestigious to study 
with a well-known and well-established teacher. This was due to the firm belief 
among the scholars, one of which is Ibn Jama’a that “true knowledge derives only 
from a learned person, and not from books… Learning requires… not to proceed 
independently, [relying on] one’s self and one’s intelligence” (Berkey, 1992, p. 26). 
Hence, according to Zarnūjī,  
A snap judgment on a teacher would be inadvisable since the student might find it later that he did not care for the rationale of teaching of the professor to whom he had gone in haste. Rather the student was to settle down for a couple of months of patient mediation and counseling for the choice of a teacher (Grunebaum & Abel, 1947). 
In this careful and intensive search of a teacher, the qualities that should be 
sought after in so called a proper teacher were also noted in Zarnūjī’s texts, like “the 
most learned”, “the most pious”, and “the most advanced in years” (1947, p. 29); in 
addition, the teacher was also expected to be a good example for the students and 
be responsible for their moral behavior as well (Berkey, 1992, p. 37).  
 From the qualities expected in the teachers, the ones that pertains to the 
instructional part are easy to understand, but how they actually make sure of the 
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morality of the students is not very clear. In many studies about medreses, 
intellectual growth, transmission of “correct” knowledge and continuity of the 
authority are presented to be of dominant discussion topics. For example, Zakariya 
al-Anşari says: “Taking knowledge from books [alone] leads to spelling errors [tashîf] 
and mistakes [galat] and mispronunciation [tahrif]. Whoever does not take his 
learning [‘ilm] from the mouths of men is like he who learns courage without ever 
facing a battle (Berkey, 1992, p. 26). The emphasis in this statement for the need of 
a teacher is clearly on the importance of correct transmission, and this kind of details 
became the focus of the discussions revolving in medreses.  
While there are many other examples of the care for the transmission of the 
texts in writings, there are not many accounts about the ways how moral education 
is handled in medreses. There are various accounts of beating the students as a tool 
of discipline in the sıbyan mektebi (primary education institutions during Ottoman 
Empire), but that should not really be transferrable to the higher education levels of 
the medrese system (Hızlı, 1999, p. 215). For example, Al-Kâbisi’s text on teacher 
student realationships in Islam, it is advised to be just among students, to balance 
kindness and strictness towards students, and to scold or beat (how to beat a student 
is explained in detail in this text) when necessary; however, except these kind of 
advices, the details of moral education are not very clear in this text either (1966). 
There are also claims that the teacher should be a role-model for the students in his 
behaviors and in his meticulousness of observing the Islamic rituals as a way of 
sustaining moral dispositions in students, but it is not really discussed or analyzed 
again (Berkey, 1992, p. 37). Zarnūjī tells the following story, which kind of hints at the 
education of morality in medreses, but the expectation from this education seems to 
be more of an authoritative imposition: 
It is reported that the Caliph Harun ar-Rashid, sent his son to al-Asma’i to take up the study of science [i.e., in this context, grammar] and ‘adab’ [morality]. One day [the Caliph] saw [al-Asma’i] purifying himself and washing is feet, while the son of the Caliph poured water over his feet. So [the Caliph] reprimanded al-Asma’i in this manner saying: “Indeed, I sent him [my son] to you to learn grammar and be instructed in ‘adab’, so why is it that you don’t ask him to pour water with one hand and wash your foot with the other?” (Zarnūjī, 1947, p. 34). 
Again from Zarnūjī’s writings, it is understood that in medrese education, the 
protection from attributes like against avarice, cowardice, arrogance, and achieving  
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morals like generosity, courage, and humility comes with the knowledge of these 
opposites, in other words from being able to differentiate between the good and bad 
(Zarnūjī, 1947, p. 22). However, again, there is not a discussion in this famous 
educational text on how one should embody the good qualities within a medrese. 
Moreover, it is claimed that “[t]he [medrese], the house of learning, differed little 
from the mosque: devotional exercises as well as studying were performed in both 
places; but instruction was the [medrese]’s prime purpose” (Grunebaum & Abel, 
1947, p. 17).  
Still, even though the ways of teaching moral dispositions are not explicitly 
stated in texts, similar to the advices given about the qualities of the teachers, there 
are also advices to students who would like to attain knowledge on how to interact 
with their teachers. “A student was expected to behave toward his [teacher] as a 
dutiful son to his father His responsibilities extended to: physically shielding his 
[teacher] from pressing crowds of people; approaching him only with clean clothing, 
clipped nails, and trimmed hair, and without unpleasant bodily odors.” (Berkey, 1992, 
p. 36). The student should not sit near the teacher during the lecture (Zarnūjī, 1947, 
p. 37), judge his teacher critically, treat him with the highest respect, never walk in 
front of him, sit in his place, speak without permission, eat with him; but he should 
prepare his food and wash his feet (Grunebaum & Abel, 1947, p. 6). From these 
accounts, the existence of a discipline and an order grounded in the authority of the 
teacher in the medrese is clear; however, the ways of helping students embody moral 
qualities still are not clear. Besides, it should be noted that in this system, students 
do not take care of themselves due to intrinsic dispositions, but it is portrayed more 
like that the student should be aware of his being and his actions, how he looks, 
where he sits, and how he interacts in the presence of the teacher. Zarnūjī, who was 
a collector and synthesizer of the ideas of scholars and sages proceeded him, 
discusses the problems of education and learning during medieval times in his famous 
book Taʻlim al-mutaʻallim tạrıq̄ al-taʻallum. However, even his discussions do not 
really extent to the details of constructing moral dispositions, which is seen as a part 
of ‘ilm. 
No matter how the moral dispositions were constructed in the medreses, it is 
clear that the teachers were central to Islamic learning. As stated at the beginning of 
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the section, with the spread of the medreses all over the Islamic territories, their 
understanding of ‘ilm and their practices of transmitting it became the norm of 
education in Islam. Therefore, at least, it can be claimed that “the preference for 
personal instruction as opposed to private reading and study, and the belief that only 
oral transmission is truly legitimate, [became] deeply embedded in the Islamic 
educational system” (Berkey, 1992, p. 24). This value given to mediation is important 
to acknowledge to understand the practices of the current day. However, since, the 
ways of embodying moral dispositions not very clear from the traditions in the 
medreses, but given utmost priority in tasavvuf, this thesis concentrates more on the 
analysis of the learning practices in the Sûfî culture. 
 
3.2) Sûfî Technologies of the Self & Mediation of Mürşid  
 
3.2.1) Tarikat: A Path which Leads to Knowledge of Self 
 
In the second chapter, the understanding of “knowledge” in the tradition of 
Sûfîsm or tasavvuf is already discussed in detail and the differences between the 
perception of ‘ilm and mârifet is clarified. It was a theoretical overview of the topic 
to reveal the intrinsic association of mediation within the transmission of knowledge. 
However, the distinction given above, not only distinguishes the knowledge that the 
Sûfîs are after theoretically, but it also radically changes their practices to attain it 
from the endeavors of the ulemâ. Then, since this thesis starts with questioning the 
practices of current Muslims in Turkey, it becomes important to study the practices 
of Sûfîs as well, given that these cultural habits might have also inherited through 
generations or at least might have some persisting effects. Therefore, still keeping 
base with the previously explained theoretical framework, to better understand how 
this tradition might have affected the understanding the knowledge and its 
transmission within the society, the educational practices of Sûfî culture will be 
investigated in this chapter. 
Within the Sûfî life, the transmission of knowledge mostly occurred in 
convents or lodges called tekke (zawiyah in Arabic, khanqah in Persian). Even though 
tekke could mean a small corner of a mosque at the early stages of Sûfîsm, with the 
49  
spread of this culture through Muslim societies they turned into bigger and dedicated 
complex structures where Sûfîs gathered, studied, prayed and even lived together 
and their number also increased. They have become the vibrant centers of Sûfî 
education and life. In these structures, there were many parallels with the classical 
educational institutions, namely the medreses covered in the previous section, since 
these two institutions were blended in together in many cases in history (Berkey, 
1992). However, there were also some very distinct differences in the way they were 
utilized as a center and a tool of discipline.  
First of all, a tekke is not barely a structure and an institution where people 
mainly gather to study ‘ilm, but rather a gateway of a path on which one (Sûfî) seeks 
mârifet, the true wisdom, tries to reach enlightenment and become an insan-ı kâmil 
– the person who has reached perfection as the short definition of Ahmet Albayrak 
suggests (Albayrak, 2006, p. 302). While students learn about Şeriat (religious law and 
information) in medreses and memorize the Kur’an, Hadis and jurisprudence books 
as shown previously, Sûfîs in tekke do not really study in the same way, they instead 
pursue the path called tarikat, which at the end is believed to lead to the knowledge 
of one’s own self and to the knowledge of Allah within possibilities He allows.  
“Savm-u Salat-u Hac ile sanma biter zahid işin / İnsan-ı kâmil olmaya lazım 
olan irfan imiş” (Altuntaş, 2011). In these famous verses, which is also converted into 
a very popular hymn in Turkey, Niyâzî-i Mısrî announces that it is not enough for a 
Sûfî to know the practices of Islam like Savm (oruç), Salat (prayer), Hac (pilgrimage) 
and observing them; to reach the state of insan-ı kamil, the perfect human, the wise, 
one needs a different and transcendental kind of knowledge intertwined with 
practice, which is irfan / mârifet as explained in the previous chapter. That is the 
aspiration for Sûfîs, who thinks that Allah wanted to be known and has created 
humans.  
 
The Path to Know One’s Self is The Path to Mârifet 
   
The tariqa [tarikat], the "path" on which the mystics walk, has been defined as "the path which comes out of the shari’a [şeriat], for the main road is called shar’, the path, tariq." This derivation shows that the Sûfîs considered the path of mystical education a branch of that highway that consists of the God-given law, on which 
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every Muslim is supposed to walk. No path can exist without a main road from which it branches out; no mystical experience can be realized if the binding injunctions of the shari'a [şeriat] are not followed faithfully first. The path, tariqa, however, is narrower and more difficult to walk and leads the adept—called salik, "wayfarer"—in his suluk, "wandering," through different stations (maqam [makam]) until he perhaps reaches, more or less slowly, his goal, the perfect tauhid [tevhid], the existential confession that God is One (Schimmel, 1975, pp. 98-99).  
This idea of perfect tevhid, is intertwined with the idea of mârifet, which is 
already defined as to know about Allah with his being (zât), attributes (sıfat), acts 
(efâl) and names (esmâ). However, as discussed previously, we know that there is no 
clear way of attaining this knowledge in the holy texts, thus in şeriat; instead this kind 
of knowledge seems impossible to be learned on one’s own. Still Sûfîs claim to have 
devised or found a deviated path, one that may lead to this kind of knowledge called 
mârifet and they base their claim on the following very well spread but also debated 
Hadis of Prophet Muhammed: “The one who knows his nefs (self) knows his Rab 
(Allah, one of Allah’s names meaning the discipliner)” (Uludağ, 2013, p. 57). Using this 
Hadis as their basis, Sûfîs twist their perspective on attaining knowledge: since one 
cannot directly know Allah, they concentrate on knowing themselves, claiming that 
it is in fact possible. Therefore, according to Sûfîs, mârifet is considered to be 
dependent on one’s knowledge of his self. This very statement is what leads to the 
main difference in tasavvuf: the need to know one’s self. With this statement, the 
knowledge that the Sûfî seeks differ from a medrese student; the focus changes from 
the mastery of the şeriat of Allah and becomes about one’s own being, soul and 
reality (hakikat). The famous Sûfî, Rûmî (Mevlânâ) points out this difference by 
saying: “The âlim of our time are splitting the hair and knows very well about things 
that not related to them. However, they do not know what is more important and 
closest to them, meaning themselves (their nefs).” (Rumi, 2009, p. 62) At first, this 
new path the Sûfîs seem to have devised, knowing oneself to attain divine knowledge 
may look like a solution to the dilemma of attaining absolute knowledge. However, 
the need to know oneself leads to another complicated issue, to one of the biggest 
philosophical questions in history: “What is the self, and how does one know the 
self?”  
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The Self: Foucault’s Perspective on Constructed Being 
 
“Self is a reflexive pronoun,” according to Foucault, “and it has two meanings. 
Auto means ‘the same,’ but it also conveys the notion of identity. The latter meaning 
shifts the question from ‘What is this self?’ to ‘What is the plateau on which I shall 
find my identity?’” (Foucault, 1988, p. 5). Diverging the question from the essence to 
existence Foucault has suggested us that “man” is a historically constructed being. 
According to him, there are various ways that humans develop knowledge about 
themselves. For example, students in medrese dedicate their efforts to learning and 
memorizing under the strict hierarchy of the system as discussed previously. They are 
always under the control of their şeyh to be kept in the pre-determined boundaries 
of the transmitted Islamic knowledge. Hence, they are prone to what Foucault calls 
the technologies of power, “which determine the conduct of individuals and submit 
them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject.” (Foucault, 1988). 
The students clean themselves as suggested, wear the clothes that their social 
network of scholars wear, memorize the texts in the order that is given to them and 
read/recite in front of the teacher just as they have instructed by him. At the end of 
their studies, they become identified as a şeyh, a kadı, a teacher, or a hatip 
(preacher), exposed to subjection. However, what they learn about themselves are 
not more than what is written in books, or what is told by the şeyhs, a reproduction 
of a reproduction. They become mere “objects” that hold knowledge imposed upon 
them. Entangled in the web of power relations, they keep reproducing the same 
technologies of power over and over again. As such, they cannot establish a real 
subject as Foucault argues, they become objectivized, in other words, they are 
identified through “a precise set of beliefs, values and practices which are assumed 
to constitute a normative,” in this case, “scholar” or a “learned man” (Berkey, 2007). 
Obviously, the answer to the abstract philosophical question of how to know 
the self is not a simple one, and it is not explicitly found in the holy texts of Islam. 
Therefore, even though the scholars in medrese could study the definitions of the 
nefs (self), the ruh (soul), they cannot know what these actually are, considering that 
this question transcends to the metaphysical dimensions, especially when there is a 
verse which is traditionally interpreted as not much from the knowledge of ruh is 
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given to people (Kur’an 17:85). Even while within the realm of senses, one cannot 
know the taste of a food or smell of a flower no matter how detailed it is described 
to the person unless he actually experiences it, how can one be sure about 
metaphysical issues? As the definition suggests, the information given can only be a 
description and not the actual experience; thus hearsay information is not equal to 
actual experienced knowledge.  
Once upon a time a Sultan leaves his son with a talented bunch and they have thought him about the knowledge of stars, remil (fortune telling from sand), and many others. Sultan’s son, even though he does not have the capacity, became a master after learning all these knowledge. One day, the Sultan hid a ring in his fist, and asked his son and asked him what is in his hand. The son replied that it is a circular, yellow and empty thing. The father confirmed that the attributes are all correct, but he also wanted the son to tell him what that thing actually is. Then the son replied that it is a sieve, not being able to comprehend the reality that it cannot fit into his fist. (Rumi, 2009, p. 62). 
With this story, Rumi exemplifies the difference between the ‘ilm of ulemâ 
and the mârifet of Sûfîs that is to say the students in the medreses “study” the texts 
through memorization, imitation, logic, comparison, analogies, juxtaposition, and 
linguistic analysis, they even know how to reach to some conclusions and judgment 
through synthesis. If we further pursue the previous example, the student being 
instructed that a strawberry is a fruit, and fruits contains fructose sugar which is 
sweet, he can infer that a strawberry is sweet. However, this student will not actually 
grasp what that conclusion really means, that is to say he will not know the taste of 
the strawberry till he experienced it through eating. Thus Rumi is trying to say that 
the ulemâ lack the practice to bring their knowledge into life, to indulge in 
experiences. From Foucauldian perspective, they are exposed to the dogmas in 
medreses to be later identified as ulemâ or scholars in the normative sense, but they 
do not really practice anything, go into an endeavor of constructing themselves as a 
subject. 
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3.2.2) Practices in Tekke: Foucault’s Taking Care of the Self & Arts of 
Existence 
 
Initiation Rituals in Tarikat: Conscious Acceptance of the Path 
 
While it seems impossible to comprehend the metaphysical concepts like ruh 
(soul), nûr (the light of Allah), and the zât of Allah, tasavvuf has come forth as a path, 
the plateau that Foucault is talking about on which one shall find his identity. It offers 
a basic premise to lead to the answers of these ontological questions and more. That 
is why people who wanted to learn the realities in the world and beyond, those who 
wanted to attain the knowledge of one’s self and the knowledge of Allah has been 
drawn to this path. Thus there are many stories in the Sûfî culture about why and 
how people are drawn to this diverted path. Noticeably, many of the famous ones 
are about men who were well educated in medreses but at some point realized that 
there are things that they did not learn yet or cannot learn as they have been 
studying, usually things that belongs to the bâtın (hidden, immanent) or metaphysical 
world, solidifying the necessity of the deviation of tasavvuf. For example, as the story 
goes, the famous Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî is drawn to tarikat due to the following 
miraculous event according to the leader of Hüdâyî Foundation: 
When Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî was a kadı (a judge who presides over matters in Ottoman court according to Islamic law) in Bursa, a woman came to him with the intention of divorce claiming that her husband is a liar, who was absent for five-six days during the Eid al-Adha (Kurban Bayramı) claiming that he went to Hac (pilgrimage) which is not possible of course at the time. The man then argued that because he wanted to go to pilgrimage for a long time, Eskici Mehmed Dede held his hand, made him close his eyes, and when he opened them again, he was in Mecca; besides, he claimed that he met other people from Bursa there as well, and he cried: “The enemy of Allah, the devil goes around the world in a moment, why could not his beloved servant go to the Kâbe (al- Kab’ah)” Thus kadı decided to wait for the people to return from Mecca. After hearing from the returning pilgrims that they had actually met the man there, he wanted to figure out about this miraculous event and went to meet Eskici Mehmed Dede, who then referred him to Murşid-i Kamil (the perfect murşid) of the time Muhammed Üftade. When Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî found Muhammed Üftade he asked him to become his mürid. However, Muhammed Üftade rejected him at first saying that Kadı is rich, has a good life, and status but his door is the door of austerity. When Kadı insisted that he would like to become his disciple, Üftade made him quit his job, sell all his belongings and distribute to the poor. Then asked the Kadı to sell liver from door to door wearing his “kaftan” (luxury garment) to break his ego… Kadı was also assigned the duties of cleaning the tekke. One day, while he was cleaning the toilets, he hears someone outside announcing 
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that the new Kadı will be arriving to town and feels a little movement in his heart towards the compelling call. Realizing the game of the devil, he intends to clean the toilets with his beard, as a punishment to discipline himself, to cleanse his ego as well. Right before he acts, his mürşid Üftade stops him saying that the beard is a holy Sünnet of the Muhammed, adding: “In this path of Seyr-i Sülük, the aim of all the “hizmet” (service) given to you was for you to be able to conquer this mertebe (level, station of nefs). From now on you will prepare the water for my abdest (ablution). (Topbaş, n.d.) Similarly according to the popular story, Akşemseddin is also a learned man, 
however, clearly, he is in search of a mürşid and again drawn to the path of tasavvuf 
after a miraculous dream: 
Akşemseddin… after memorizing the Kur’an and getting a solid Islamic education, he became the müderris of Osmancık Medrese. During this time it is understood that he also had a medical education as well. According to Enîsî’s Menâkıbn’ame, in which we can find the most and accurate information about him, since he could not stop thinking about the ‘ilm-i batın’ [bâtın ilmi] he went to Fars and Mâverâünnehir to find a mürşid at the age of twenty five. However, he could not accomplish his aim and returned back. Due to some advice, he considered subjugating to Hacı Bayrâm-ı Velî but decided against it. Then he went to Halep to subjugate to Zeynüddin el-Hâfî. However, one night in his dream, he saw that he had a chain on his neck and Hacı Bayrâm was holding the other end, thus he returned to [his door]… in short time he was appointed as the caliph of Hacı Bayrâm” (Köprülü & Uzun, 1989). 
Like Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî and Akşemseddin, to enter this path, first of all, one 
needs to arrive at the door of a mürşid (teacher, guide), or a tekke. İbnü’l-Arabî bases 
the cause of this diversion into the path of tasavvuf to one’s endeavors for Allah, 
through his interpretation of a verse in Kur’an (29:69); therefore, it should not be 
surprising that the learned men like these two are also drawn frequently to this path 
(İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, p. 18). However, it should also be noted that there is no open 
invitation to this path, as Ahmed Yüksel Özemre states; it is the duty of Prophets to 
openly call people to Islam since it relates to everyone, but mürşid should not because 
it is a very personal thing and not everybody can walk this path, neither should they 
(Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, p. 38). This is parallel to the general belief that people who 
are drawn to tasavvuf are already destined to arrive at this door; they are selected 
by Allah but they have to act on their urges and consciously find a tarikat, and be 
fully-determined to enter it. 
In any case, once arrived at this door of tarikat, one should declare his own 
wish to join among the mürids (disciples) with an intentional decision. This conscious 
decision is very important since it suggests that what comes afterwards is also the 
choice of the tâlib (the one who wants to enter the path of tasavvuf, seeker of 
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mârifet) as a subject. It is made clear for him, who wishes to enter a tarikat that 
diverging from the main path of şeriat and entering this path of tarikat is a very big 
commitment and a lifelong dedication to struggle with himself. Therefore, as 
Schimmel states in her book, “The master who had to teach the method and the 
exercises had first to test the adept to determine whether he was willing and able to 
undergo the hardships that awaited him on the Path. The newcomer was sometimes 
made to wait for days at the sheikh's door, and sometimes as a first test was treated 
very rudely. Usually three years of service were required before the adept could be 
formally accepted in a master's group—one year in the service of the people, one in 
the service of God, and one year in watching over his own heart.” (Schimmel, 1975, 
p. 101) That is why Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî is asked to leave all his wealth and status to 
enter into the tekke, and the popular story is that Akşemseddin eats his first meal 
with the dogs asking for forgiveness. İbn-ül Arabî confirms this tradition clearly stating 
that a mürşid should not accept a mürid without first testing him (İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, 
p. 18).  
Obviously these test of will are harsh, but necessary to make sure that one is 
completely serious about entering this path and it is his own conscious, intentional 
decision, as a proof of his subjective self-act. This is made clear by Rumi when scolding 
the mürids of his time for being loose in their will with a shocking accentuation: “Your 
[mürşid] is not commanding you as the previous ones did, and tells you to leave your 
wife, child, wealth and status. Old [mürşid] used to tell people: Divorce your wife, I 
will marry her.” and the mürids used to obey.” (Rumi, 2009, p. 133). These kind of 
rituals are not only testing the determination of the talib as a tool of self-reflection 
and self-realization to single out his act as his own subjective one, but at the same 
time they aim to break the ego of the mürid from the very beginning and lay the 
foundation of the total submission to the mürşid. Only after the talib willingly accepts 
any hardships associated with the path, proves himself after passing these tests, and 
subjugates to the mürşid with all his life, then the path of enlightenment which is 
called the seyr-i sülük (wandering of the path of Tarikat) starts for him.  
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Path of Discipline: Foucault’s Technologies of the Self in Tarikat 
 
When a tâlib enters the path of tasavvuf, it does not mean at all that the tests 
will cease; on the contrary, he will be continuously tested against his ego, his desires, 
and the embodied habits and presuppositions residual of the power relations from 
his life prior to entering the tarikat, by doing humbling activities like in Aziz Mahmud 
Hudâyî’s story, cleaning the toilets, selling liver in the streets, begging etc. so that he 
would be rebuked by the society. Annemarie Schimmel quotes another story about 
Majduddin Baghdadi in the twelfth century, which illustrates this attitude very well: 
“When he entered the service of a sheikh, he was made to serve "at the place of 
ablution," i.e., to clean the latrines. His mother, a well-to-do lady physician, asked the 
master to exempt the tender boy from this work, and sent him twelve Turkish slaves 
to do the cleaning. But he replied: "You are a physician—if your son had an 
inflammation of the gall bladder, should I give the medicine to a Turkish slave instead 
of giving it to him?" (Schimmel, 1975, p. 101). It should be noted that according to 
the mürşid, these humbling disciplinary practices are like medicine for the mürid. If 
we think about it, when someone is sick, naturally he goes to a doctor, and when one 
wants to attain mârifet, he goes to a tekke. Therefore, we can say that these 
disciplining acts are what awaits him in the tekkes as the way to attain mârifet. With 
this very statement, the mürşid hints at one of the main tools of Sûfî education: 
discipline. To help overcome the desires of ego, to strip from the previous identities 
and to humble the mürşid within the system of the tarikat, he is constantly put to 
practices of discipline.  
Even though the decision of entering a tarikat and passing the tests on its own 
is already an act of self-disciplining, as the time passes and the mürid starts to 
advance in this path, he gets used to the imposed discipline upon himself, learns to 
live under an authority. Moreover, he also starts acting on his own to discipline 
himself, just like Aziz Mahmud Hüdâyî tries to clean the toilets with his beard when 
he tries to overcome his desire for status or the devils call to his previous status as a 
Kadı.  
These consciously agreed and self-imposed practices of discipline do not seem to 
really fit into Foucault’s technologies of power; rather they resemble what Foucault 
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calls the technologies of the self. McNay claims in her work, Foucault, A critical 
Introduction published in 1994, his perspective on the topic of subjectification 
changes towards the end of his career. “Although Foucault had insisted on the 
weakness of the subject who is manipulated and oppressed by different forms of 
power as a ‘docile body’ in his early studies, he started to consider the subject as an 
agent who has the capacity of autonomous action toward the end of his life. In other 
words, Foucault, initially, was concerned with the social construction of an individual 
by different patterns of power, but later he came to a position to emphasize the 
autonomous aspects of the subject who can re-create himself through everyday 
practices” (Gözel, 2012, p. 154). 
In parallel to Faucault’s late emphasis, tasavvuf can be seen as a discipline 
acted upon oneself as well. Instead of the general symbol of a path, we can even say 
that tasavvuf is a combination of tools, or technologies to turn the common “man” 
into insanı-kamil who has reached enlightenment. Similarly, R.A Nicholson even 
claims that “Sûfîsm is wholly self-discipline” (Gözel, 2012, p. 158). Even though this 
path of self-disciplining is embedded within power relationships like any other 
relationship, and the traditional practices of the Sûfîs seems to be quite prone to the 
exercise of power-knowledge, the self-acceptance of intentional submission, and 
conscious acceptance of practices of attenuating the self, and stripping the nefs 
through all its embodied attachments (put) may still be able to create an opening to 
allow the subject be. Thus, if entering the path of tasavvuf becomes a conscious and 
“subjective” act of completely giving up on one’s self and subjectivity, to reconstruct 
the real “self” – the subject, would it be possible for the Sûfî to make a resistance 
against the subjection of the power relations? 
According to Foucault’s later works, technologies of the self is another 
technique of humans to develop knowledge about themselves, “which permit 
individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number 
of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so 
as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, 
wisdom, perfection, or immortality.” (Foucault, 1988). Through Foucault’s lenses, we 
can claim that tasavvuf is a structured pack of techniques as such, thus it can be called 
among the technologies of the self, consisting of various disciplining tools and 
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practices executed on one’s body and soul to reach the insan-ı kamil, the perfect, 
content, pure and wise subject which is the ultimate aspiration of the tâlib. 
Therefore, by accepting this path, we can assert that the mürid covertly tries to 
constitute himself as a subject even though he is still surrounded with the web of 
power relations. 
This new “technology” in Islam, which is believed to lead to the knowledge of 
the self, namely the act of disciplining one’s self within a tarikat originates from the 
Hadiths of the Prophet. The following Hadis, for example, comes up often as a 
reference point and is quite popular among especially the Sûfîs: When the prophet 
was returning from a cihad (war) he says that they have returned from the small cihad 
(war) to the big cihad and when asked what is the big cihad, he stated that it is 
mücahede (struggle) with the nefs (Sorularla İslamiyet, 2010). However, it should be 
noted that this Hadis is much debated among the scholars and is considered false by 
some scholars; still, based on another similar Hadis quoted from Tirmidhi, “mücahid 
(one who participates in cihad) is who enters a cihad with his nefs” the idea behind it 
is widely accepted by the Sûfîs and became spread among many others as well (Özel, 
1993, p. 528). Anyhow, through the centuries cihad has come to signify the struggle 
with one’s self, and even valued more than the war that one join for the name of 
Allah, which is already very highly valued in Islam.  
Compared to the abstract and metaphysical notion of knowing one’s self, the 
struggle with the self is an easier concept to understand. In a reductionist way, it 
simply means, when one wants to drink wine against the Islamic rules, he can just 
decide against it, when one falls into devils tricks and finds himself/herself in front of 
a lusting body, he/she can abstain from that, when one starts to get angry he can 
concentrate to calm down etc. In short one can discipline himself not to listen to the 
temptations of his own self called the nefs or as the Prophet stated in a different way, 
he can try to convert his devil to a Muslim.  
These disciplining practices, since we have compared to Foucault’s 
technologies of the self, should help people understand more about themselves and 
construct themselves as subjects through certain practices. However, if the 
technology of self, which Foucault elaborates and the whole tradition of tasavvuf 
pursues for centuries can be summed up (or reduced) as the one above, it leads to 
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many questions about the simplistic approach. For example, what does it really mean 
when a person struggles with his desire to eat chocolate and overcomes it, in the 
sense of disciplining his nefs? How does this kind of daily practice of self-enforced 
discipline makes one learn more about himself? Frankly, what is the relation between 
struggle and knowing? 
 
Cleaning the Soul: The Relation between Struggle and Knowing  
 
According to Foucault, in the Ancient Greeks, the possibility of the occurrence 
of knowing oneself was believed to be related, moreover, depended on the 
realization of the taking care of the self; in other words, “one had to occupy oneself 
with oneself before the Delphic principle [gnothi sauton / know yourself] was brought 
into action (Foucault, 1988, p. 3). Similar to what Foucault points out, the path of 
tarikat is not about knowing oneself first, that is surely a part of it but it only follows 
after the care of oneself (epimelesthai sautou), which in the ancient times was often 
understood to involve a cultivation of the soul, a matter of self-mastery, but over the 
course of history it became a matter of learning to shape one's own inner character 
(Gözel, 2012). This clarifies a really important topic in tasavvuf because as it is 
explained in the second chapter, paradoxically one cannot attain absolute knowledge 
by his efforts and studying; therefore, at first it seems like there is no way of attaining 
absolute knowledge. However, Sûfîs think otherwise basing their claim on the 
following verse in Kur’an: “Worship your Rab [Allah] till yakiyn is given to you” (Kur’an 
Hicr 99). Since worshipping cleanses or purifies the soul, the basic premise in this 
verse becomes that one should worship and constantly discipline himself to clean his 
soul until he is bestowed with yakiyn, which is considered the absolute certainty in 
knowledge in the Sûfî tradition. In other words, Sûfîs believe that if they purify their 
hearts from the sins and the attachments to desires imposed upon them from within 
the society and their very “identity”, the knowledge of the self, thus the ‘ilm of Allah 
can reflect through their pure souls. This is usually represented with a mirror 
metaphor in the Sûfî tradition: The heart (used interchangeably with soul) is a 
“mirror” which has the ability to reflect Allah’s reflections (manifestations). However, 
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it has to be kept clean, not to obstruct the reflection. The following story is told by 
Rumi to explain this as well: 
Rum and Chinese painters argued about who is the best. They both got a room facing each other’s. The Chinese asked for hundreds of paints from the padişah (ruler). Instead the Rum said: “No paint or picture works except luster and started glossing the wall, made it clear like the skies. Being colorless is better than being painted over with two hundred colors. Color is like a cloud, colorless is like the moon; if you see a brightness on a cloud you should know that it is from the moon. The Chinese finished their paintings, delighted about the beauty of the images. When the padişah came in he also loved the paintings; then went onto the Rum’s room. One of the Rum painters removed the curtain that obstructed the view of the other room and all the paintings that the Chinese made reflected on to the glossed over wall of the Rums and looked better there. Son, the Rum painters are the Sûfîs, they do not have study books to be memorized, but they have glossed over their hearts, cleansing it from desires, greed, stinginess and grudge. The pureness and clearness becomes the attribute of their heart like a mirror, and innumerable images may reflect on it… Here the mind either hushes or baffles because: ‘Is the heart God, or is God the heart? (Rumi, 2015, pp. 3467-3500). 
Since, as explained in the previous chapter, one can attain ‘ilm only if Allah 
wills, the care of oneself aims to purify and cleanse the self to make the body worthy 
of the ‘ilm, thinking that Allah would only want to put His precious “treasure” only in 
a suitable holder/ cup. However, “the self is not clothing, tools, or possessions.” Plato 
argues in Alcibiades: “It is to be found in the principle which uses these tools, a 
principle not of the body but of the soul. You have to worry about your soul—that is 
the principal activity of caring for yourself. The care of the self is the care of the 
activity and not the care of the soul-as-substance” (Foucault, 1988, p. 5). Thus, similar 
to the ancient Greeks, the Rum painters’ glossing over the wall symbolizes this effort 
to take care of themselves, to discipline the self and purify their souls. However, the 
Sûfî differs from the ancient Greeks in the intention of their practices: while 
Alcibiades aspires to become a good politician, the Sûfî only asks to be accepted by 
Allah as a kul (slave), a good devotee. Actually this is part of the paradoxical thinking 
introduced in the previous chapter, while the Sûfî seriously asks to be welcomed as a 
kul, he also knows that when he is accepted and esteemed worthy by Allah, he might 
be bestowed with mârifet. Isn’t it the Prophet Muhammed himself, and all the other 
prophets who are called out many times in the Kur’an as the kuls of Allah? (Kur’an 
21:25). 
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On the other hand, Rumi says: “For the Friend to show his face, you have to 
become tired of this world and of yourself; you have to be the enemy of your own.” 
meaning that one should clean his heart from all the desires except Allah, so that he 
can completely fill it in (Rumi, 2009, p. 150). The assertion from the previous story of 
Rumi is that while the Rum painters do not concentrate on the painting at all, the 
Chinese paints with hundreds of colors, which represent the adornments of the body, 
whether it is the outlook, the wealth, the status or even the knowledge; but still the 
work of Rum painters is clearer and more valued. Thus, Sûfî’s taking care of himself 
in the hopes of constructing a subject, as exemplified through this story, is not about 
embellishing the self with the things that are esteemed in the society, even with the 
moral dispositions that were imposed upon him before he started his seyr-i sülük. On 
the contrary, it is about eliminating the unwanted sides of the previous subjected self, 
and to understand that he is actually not a subject. Therefore, according to Sûfîsm, 
one should mainly exercise the religious practices, and go into an endeavor to 
discipline himself within the path of tasavvuf to be able to cleanse his soul. From a 
different perspective, he is to avoid the arrogant endeavors to establish himself as a 
“subject” by identifying himself in accordance to the impositions of the power 
relations which ends up in subjection, in the Foucauldian sense anyway. That is 
different than what we, as the “modern” people and the scholars in the medreses 
understood as “studying”, which is nothing more than being subjected to the 
doctrines of the era’s power/knowledge. 
This is a strange and counter-intuitive way of acquiring knowledge to the 
“uninitiated observers” – those who do not have knowledge of or experience with 
this paradigm, like us. In this system, the actual focus in learning is not on the studies. 
Moreover, one tries to get rid of the books and his pre-established knowledge. The 
endeavor is not focused on learning even though knowledge is the final goal. One 
gets into the practices of this discipline through an act of doublethink, like one 
continues to observe the Islamic religious rituals and rules even though it is already 
known before birth if one will end up in the heaven or hell. “According to Hadis, Allah 
while creating the human, sends an angel to the womb of the mother, and makes him 
write the sex, life span, gains, and deeds of the child, as well as if it is going to become 
a said (saved) or şaki (doomed); then the pens dry, and the books are closed… when 
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some of the sahabes (Prophet’s friends) question if they should stop their endeavors, 
the Prophet tells them to continue in their endeavors because the deeds are made 
easier to them based on the nature of their creations” (Akçay, 2008, p. 543). This 
paradoxical way of doublethink also comes into play when we are talking about 
constructing a subject through the path of tarikat. Just like when the Kur’an is being 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammed, he was ordered to recite thus to take up an 
endeavor even though it is a revelation to him, when one intends to enter a path 
(tasavvuf) to establish himself as a subject, that is in the insan-ı kamil, he has to 
forsake his desires, his aspirations, his ego, his will and his nefs – his subjectivity. 
 
Allah’s Color: Foucault’s Art of Existence and Tarikat as Suprematist Art   
 
İrvin Cemil Schick states that for the last twenty thirty years, “as text came to 
represent any object that is given a meaning, writing also came to represent any act 
that includes giving meaning to an object” and quoting Elizabeth Grosz, he adds that 
“thus, social norms as fashion, etiquette, or laws, so to say; altering techniques like 
scarification, tattoo, make-up or piercing; bodily norms like heterosexuality, chastity, 
the cult of virginity are written on the human body (Schick, 2011, p. 10). From this 
perspective, since almost all the daily even activities are governed by the Sünnet, that 
is to say, it is already determined how people should dress, clean themselves, cut 
their fingernails, leave their beards, clean their hairs, enter the toilet, have sex etc., 
and by doing these they intentionally try to differentiate from the disbelievers, we 
can say that practicing Islam, in a way, is a writing written on the Muslim body. 
Similarly it is true that the clothing and symbols in Sûfî traditions also do have a big 
importance, which differentiate the tarikats from one other and from the avam (the 
public); moreover, it is believed that even the name Sûfî itself is may be originated 
from the wool (Arabic suf) hırka (a type of garment, murakka‘) that they wear 
(Schimmel, 1975, p. 14). Therefore, the body of a “Muslim” or a “Sûfî” can be seen as 
a text. 
However, for the human body which becomes decorated with writing as the 
examples above, a body which is converted into a text like a “Muslim” or a “Sûfî”, 
Shick claims that it looses its neutral singular entity, but finds its place within the 
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cultural system (Schick, 2011, pp. 10-11). He then uses the quote of Desiderius 
Erasmus Roterodamus who said: “It is not the cloak that makes the monk” to further 
his argument. This brings to mind the famous Turkish Sûfî poet Yunus Emre, who 
made a very similar statement in his poem that it is not the hırka (garment) that 
makes a derviş (Sûfî): “Dervişlik dedikleri / Hırka ile taç değil / Gönlün derviş eyleyen / 
Hırkaya muhtaç değil” (Sarı, 2016). 
With this example, Schick argues the other way around; he claims that it is 
actually the cloak or the hırka that makes the monk or the Sûfî, those garments are 
the ones that differentiates between them, and constitutes their identity. “For 
example”, Shichk says, “if a person with shabby clothing is not accepted to an elegant 
restaurant, it is not due to the clothing itself, but because of the things that are 
thought to be revealed about his character by him wearing it” (Schick, 2011, pp. 10-
11). Therefore, in as similar fashion, as the Sûfî wears his hırka he also takes his place 
in the social and cultural construct.  
However, Plato declares in Alcibiades that “when you take care of the body, 
you don’t take care of the self. The self is not clothing, tools, or possessions. It is to 
be found in the principle which uses these tools, a principle not of the body but of 
the soul. You have to worry about your soul—that is the principal activity of caring 
for yourself” (Foucault, 1988). Thus, if we were to consider Plato’s perspective similar 
to the practices of tarikat, and then apply it with Shick’s ideas, we can say that the 
disciplining practices in seyr-i sülük are like writing on one’s soul as a form of text. In 
a way, what Erasmus and Yunus claim still holds true, but in a different context. The 
Sûfî actually cares about disciplining his soul, and writing his text in a different realm, 
actually in various metaphysical realms. Even though he is identified on the outside 
as a part of the social construct, and that surely is the case, he is also actively trying 
the break out of this construct. The Sûfî actually believes that the cleanliness of the 
nefs is what actually defines who a Sûfî really is. The clothing and symbols become a 
veil that hides the self that is under construction and the final text he is trying to 
create from the avam (public), those who would not be able to understand the value 
of his mârifet – a veil like an encryption, or even a for-edge painting.  
These disciplining practices of the Sûfîs, their endeavor to create a new text, 
constitutes what Foucault calls the art of existence, which he defines as “those 
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intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of 
conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their 
singular being, and to make their life in to an oeuvre, that carries certain aesthetic 
values and meets certain stylistic criteria” (Foucault, 1990, p. 10). Therefore, this care 
of one’s self in the Sûfî tradition is not only a form of life, but it is a form of art and 
thus Sûfîs should be considered artists whose whole lives and beings are turned into 
art. They are painting or writing over themselves, over their own souls, and at the 
end becoming a subject who will be signing under it.  
However, their art is also quite unique. The final text, or the final painting at 
the end of all these practices looks nothing like them at the beginning; it becomes a 
manifestation or a reflection of Allah. This is because, so to say, they do not use colors 
to paint their own canvases, which is their own souls like the Rum painters of 
Mevlânâ. They try to create their art through ṣibḡah-Allah (the color/dye of Allah), 
the color that is pointed at in the following Kur’anic verse: “(We take our) color from 
Allah, and who is better than Allah at coloring. We are His worshippers.” 27 (Kur’an 
2:138). Foucault is shocked that art has become something related only to objects 
and not to individuals or to life and wonders if everyone’s life could not become a 
work of art (Gözel, 2012). Sûfî’s answer to this question would be positive, in fact, 
they have been doing that for a very long time. However, if Foucault calls the care of 
one’s self as an art in a classical sense, the disciplining practices in tarikat would be 
more like a Suprematist art with its paradoxical and metaphysical underlying 
elements. 
 If studied closely, a painting of one’s self painted with the color of Allah, has 
similarities to Kazimir Malevich’s (originator of the Suprematist art) Black Square for 
which he claimed that it is not just an “empty square” he exhibited, but rather the 
feeling of non-objectivity [representing or intended to represent no natural or actual 
object, figure, or scene]” (Malevich, 2003, p. 68). That means aside from the 
consisting of only one color, just like the only color Sûfîs use which is of Allah’s, this 
painting tries to reach and convey a feeling of not being related to anything in this 
                                                          
27 For this Kur’anic verse, Marmaduke William Pickthall’s literal translation is preferred because in the Sahih International the literal meaning of color is interpreted as religion, thus ṣibḡah-Allah is given as Allah’s religion (Pickthall, 1997). 
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materialistic world. Similarly, a Sûfî in seyr-i sülük does not care about the visible 
(zâhiri) world, like the clothes, attractions, wealth, status, and how he looks either, 
but he deeply cares about the inner (bâtıni) experience.   
 The very aim of Malevich in the creating of this piece can be traced back to 
his Manifesto of Suprematism in which he says:  
Under Suprematism I understand the primacy of pure feeling in creative art. To the Suprematist, the visual phenomena of the objective world are, in themselves, meaningless; the significant thing is feeling, as such, quite apart from the environment in which it is called forth. The so-called ‘materialization’ of a feeling in the conscious mind really means a materialization of the reflection of that feeling through the medium of some realistic conception. Such a realistic conception is without value in suprematist art (Malevich, 2003, p. 67). 
 Instead, according to him, “color and texture are of the greatest value in 
painterly creation—they are the essence of a painting; however, he also believes that 
“this essence has always been killed by the subject” (Kazimir, 1916, p. 123). In a sense, 
from a Sûfîs perspective, all the attachments to the visible world, all the outer forms, 
power relations, dominance of the ego and all the attributes that are dumbed on a 
person that turns him into a “subject” kills the essence of a human being – the soul, 
which should primarily be in the color of Allah. That is why Malevich does not intend 
to represent any object, figure, or scene in his paintings; he is not interested in the 
forms of the outer world and depicting objects, instead he cares about the pure 
artistic feeling and values. In parallel to Malevich’s ideas, the Sûfî is interested in a 
different path, a different realm as well, in which the experiences can neither be 
perceived with the conscious nor can they be later represented back to the outside 
world through a realistic conception. Thus as the Sûfîs reach mârifet, Malevich 
liberates the color, which he thought was beyond the boundaries of artistic creativity 
of the time, and color becomes “the fundamental principle of painting for the 
Suprematists” (Gurianova, 2003, p. 53). 
 Therefore, we can claim that this non-objective form of Malevich’s art, which 
is about getting rid of the material world, getting rid of shapes, forms, perceptions 
and constructions and instead emerging into color, is quite familiar in the art of the 
Sûfî, which is also about getting rid of the nefs that tightly connects with the earthly 
desires so that the soul can emerge into a new realm, the color of Allah. Malevich 
himself gives out the formula of how he came up with this new form of art, “a new 
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religion of the spirit” or “a religion of the pure act” in his own words (Marcade, 2003, 
pp. 40-41). He says: "I transformed myself in the zero of form and emerged from 
nothing to creation, that is, to Suprematism, to the new realism in painting - to non-
objective creation" (Kazimir, 1916, p. 133). Thus he claims: “It is from zero, in zero, 
that the true movement of being begins” (Marcade, 2003, pp. 40-41). His claim 
resonates with the whole struggle of the Sûfîs, who try to strip themselves from all 
he desires of the nefs almost to a degree of killing the nefs through disciplinary 
practices and through writing on their bodies and souls with the commands of Allah, 
the Sünnet of the Prophet Muhammed, and the way of the Tarikat, so that at the end 
they can emerge as an insan-ı kâmil. When a person reaches this ultimate new form 
of being, it means, as it will be presented in the next section, that the Sûfî has gone 
through the utilitarian practices first, then started to get inspirations from Allah, and 
finally by balancing practice and inspirations, has arrived at his goal, mârifet, just as 
the new art forms of Malevich “announce that man has attained his equilibrium; he 
has left the level of single reason [utilitarian] and reached one of double reason 
(utilitarian and intuitive) (Malevich, 1916, p. 133). In other words, in the end, Sûfî, 
going through a creative art of existence, with all its similarities to Suprematism, has 
created a non-objective masterpiece, a true subject, which is beyond any 
representation, form or norm of the visible (zâhiri) world – that is being united with 
Allah. 
 
Paradoxical Subject: Deconstruction of the Self & Resubjectification 
 
While it is believed that the insanı-ı kâmil is a real subject, as stated 
previously, one can easily claim that a Muslim, or even a learned scholar of Islam, 
who has completed a medrese education is exposed to subjectification through 
memorizing the canonical texts, analyzing the acknowledged books of jurisprudence, 
and studying the exegeses of the holy book. Basically he is crushed under the 
domination of power/knowledge, objectified. At best, he is trying to resist back by 
exerting some power through the acts of argumentation, within the web of power 
relations. However, when a tâlib consciously and intentionally decides to enter the 
paradoxical path of tasavvuf, he steps into a journey in which he will deconstruct his 
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subjectivity, the pre-written text of his being within power relations, and break the 
boundaries of his subjection with all the attributes it attaches onto his identity. How 
he does this is quite paradoxical. Like the Party slogans expressing the doublethink in 
the novel 1984 – “War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, and Ignorance is Strength” – the 
Sûfî also subjugates to become free; he decides not to decide; he accepts to perish to 
exist (McArthur, 1992, p. 321). To give birth to the soul, one kills the self; to become 
free, one subjugates the will, for the sake of self-subjectification, one accepts 
objectification.  
To explain this paradoxical form, we can try to use an analogy. If we, the 
subject, put our hands on to an object, depending on the force that we apply, the 
object moves, thus we either push or pull it, or it just stays on the same location, like 
a wall. However, if we were to lean on water, that would not be possible, even less 
so if we try to push the air. When we wave our hand in air, most of it just moves and 
brushes over our hand and through our fingers. That is to say, as an object leaves 
behind its strict, outlined state like the whole subjection it has already endured, and 
becomes more flexible, adept into new forms of existence, and learns not to resist, 
which means that it does not try to exert any reactive force back and just move with 
the flow, like tossing out ones ego and will, it cannot be pushed around, dominated 
and lead as easily, somewhat escaping the domination of the power relations.  
Similarly, normally one can see anything he sets his eyes on as long as it is not 
somehow obscured. However, one cannot exactly see a frameless mirror. All the light 
beams just reflect back from the mirror as they hit it without changing the magnitude 
of the angle. The cleaner and shiner the mirror, the better the reflection, so as the 
mirror gets more and more polished, the more it becomes invisible to the eye. Even 
though the mirror is there, all that can be seen in the mirror exactly becomes the 
reflection thus the person looking at it and his surroundings. Consequently, it is like 
the mirror disguises within the environment. As such, when a person cleanses his 
soul, get rids of his desires, taboos, ambitions, suppositions, even pre-suppositions, 
he also kind of vanishes within the web of power relations and liberates himself. 
Sacrificing himself, the ego overcomes the exertions of power, breaks the never-
ending-cycle of subjection and actually becomes a subject. 
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3.2.3) Necessity of Mürşid: Consciously Utilizing Bourdieu’s Habitus  
 
Makams in Tarikat: Step-by-Step Subjectification   
 
Mainly, what tarikat does is to alter mürids’ habits, soften their ego, break 
their prejudices, break their attachments to things they cannot detach from, and 
bring them into a malleable form, until the mürid manages to submit himself fully 
against the will of all-powerful Allah. In fact, it creates the suitable environment in 
which the mürid manages to control his nefs and discipline himself into total 
submission. Then it is hoped that Allah will mercy up on the tâlib and grant his 
intrinsic wish, and bestow upon him the mârifet. However, actually the path to 
mârifet is not that simple. Tarikat, as its name suggests means only the path, but 
there is more to it when it comes to reaching mârifet. One cannot jump directly into 
the mârifet from tarikat. According to the popular belief among Turkish Sûfîs, 
especially originating from the Bektaşi traditions, the path of tasavvuf is consisted of 
şeriat, tarikat, hakikat and mârifet. The current leader of the Cerrâhî Tarikat, Ömer 
Tuğrul İnançer confirms this belief, but clarifies it as well: “This quadruplet is a bare 
slogan. It does not only consist of these four. After Mârifet, there is Kudbiyet, then 
Kurbiyyet after that is the kulluk (vassalage) which is the makâm-ı hass-ı Muhammed 
(makam specific of the Prophet), Abdiyyet (Çetinoğlu, 2013). Therefore, the makams 
lines up more like the following: Şeriat, Tarikat, Hakikat, Mârifet, Kudbiyet, Kurbiyyet 
and finally Abdiyyet. However, in this thesis there is no need to investigate the last 
three makams since we believe that it is superfluous to go into the details of these 
very makams for the sake of this thesis, especially when these last three makams are 
believed not really be expected from a devotee, or a mürid since all that he acquires 
after seyr-i sülük is mârifet and the rest three is like extra stages that could be reached 
on top of mârifet with Allah’s blessing. They describe more like the hierarchy among 
the velîs (sages) and prophet. 
As it is shown above, there is one more step between the tarikat and mârifet: 
hakikat, which literally means the reality, being true and certain. In tasavvuf, the term 
hakikat means “the veiled or hidden mâna (meaning, soul, interior) beyond the zâhir 
(the seen, sensed); getting accustomed to the divine secrets through observing the 
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religious life at an utmost level; and contemplating the reflections of Hakk (name of 
Allah, the same root with hakikat) with pleasure. Since it is believed that it cannot be 
explained with words, Sûfîs usually use this term without describing it.” (Çağrıcı M. , 
1997a, p. 178). Therefore, through all the struggle and discipline, the knowledge that 
one can start to observe as reflections of Allah is actually hakikat, not really mârifet 
yet28, which rather means according to Ömer Tuğrul İnançer, “reaching the hakikat, 
but not deserting the şeriat and tarikat” and compared to the descend of the Prophet 
back to earth for completing his duty after the Mi’rac (the unmediated encounter of 
the Prophet with Allah). (Çetinoğlu, 2013) Since the issue gets complicated, the 
differences between the first four makam are usually exemplified with the very 
popular story among the Sûfîs: 
A mürid asks his mürşid about the four makams in tasavvuf. Mürşid says: ‘Go to the mescit. There next to the vâiz, you will see four people sitting. Slap each one of them and come back and tell me about what you see.’ Mürid goes there and does as he is told. First man slaps him back with the same force. The second, turns his head and gives an angry look. The third did not reach at all. The fourth though, turned to the mürid and asked for forgiveness… Mürşid later explains this as such: ‘the first man who slaps you back symbolizes şeriat. The general principle in şeriat is eye-to-eye. The second one symbolizing tarikat sees you as the source of the slap and looked at you with a hurt feeling, because tarikat is the beginning of the path, not the end. However, hakikat is to know that everything originates from the same source. The third man from symbolizing this makam knew that the slap was from Hak (Allah) and did not relate it to your action. On the other hand, the last one symbolizing mârifet, knew that Hakk made you (the mürid) the intermediary for this action, and asked for forgiveness because of tiring you. The real aim is to reach this knowledge. Whoever reaches this knowledge is in the makam (state) of gratitude and acceptance. This is the final makam expected from the vassal. (Konca, 2007). 
Another popular Sûfî in current Turkey, Cemal Nûr Sargut, explains it further: 
“In şeriat, there is kısas (retribution). Tarikat knows that the deed belongs to Hak 
(Allah) but is still interested in the intermediary. Hakikat does not care about the 
intermediary, and only occupied with Allah. Mârifet is to reach the level to see the 
Hakk (Allah) at Halk (public)” (Sargut, n.d.). 
As I have mentioned before, seyr-i sülük is the journey of the mürid from one 
makam (stage/step/position) to another till he reaches mârifet and become an insan-
ı kâmil. However, understanding these makam is difficult, especially since the 
                                                          
28 It should be these mârifet and hakikat can be used interchangibly in different Sûfî texts and paths or may even be considered the same, but the one used in the thesis seems to be the most common way of describing the stages. 
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experience of these stages cannot really be explained, and learning the information 
does not help the Sûfî to acquire the experienced real knowledge. Thus again instead 
of trying to understand the various makams, which also reflect the properties of the 
knowledge that one can acquire, the Sûfî turns into himself, following the Prophet’s 
Hadis (“one who knows his nefs, knows his Rab”), to his ego and try advance on the 
path of tasavvuf by disciplining it.  
When a mürid enters a tekke and enters the path of tasavvuf, he most 
probably has the most primitive nefs (ego) called the nefs-i emmare, the ego that 
commands the person, drives him into sins with desires. It as an inferior motive that 
leads to sins which blocks the person from reaching his full potential. That is why 
discipline comes in handy as one of the technologies of the self to bridle this “wild 
horse” (nefs). As the mürid advances on the path of tasavvuf, he passes onto the next 
stage called the nefsi levvame. Then, if he can keep advancing, then he goes through 
all the seven stages of the nefs in order and completes the cycle of the path. Studying 
the explanations of Ahmed Yüksel Özemre, Nazim Adil al-Haqqani (the Turkish 
Cypriot mürşid of the Nakşibendi Tarikat), Mahmud Erol Kiliç’s article in Routledge 
History of World Philosophies: History of Islamic Philosophy, and Süleyman Uludağ’s 
article on the Encyclopedia of Islam, the descriptions of the stages (makam) of the 
nefs can be compiled as the following: 
1- Nefs-i Emmare (Ordering/Inciting Nefs): The nefs that orders/incites evil things. This 
is considered the most primitive, untamed nefs. The ego is in full-power and incites 
all the bad habits. The lower self always prompts one to disobey Allah and to do evil, 
bad actions and the gratification of the animal lust. One is pleased with oneself and 
full of bad actions. The (zikir) invocation is: “La ilahe illallah / There is no god but 
Allah” and the direction of travelling is “progress towards Allah” (Allah’a / seyr 
ila’llah). The hal (state) is that of alternating spiritual optimism and pessimism. The 
realm is sense of perception. 
2- Nefs-i Levvame (Self-Accusing Nefs): The nefs that accuses oneself. The conscience is 
awakened, and the self accuses one for listening to one’s ego. One repents and asks 
for forgiveness, but falls back into bad behavior. The zikir is “Allah”, the esoteric 
meaning of which is “There is no aim but Allah.” The direction is “progress to Allah” 
(Allah için / seyr li’llâh) and the hal is “contraction and expansion” (kabz ve bast). The 
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realm is the Isthmus (berzah alemi). In this stage love for this world begins to 
disappear. The degree of knowledge is certainty by knowledge (ilme’l yakîn).  
3- Nefs-i Mülhime (Inspired Nefs):  The nefs that receives inspirations. These 
inspirations can be from Allah or the devil as well. One becomes more firm in 
listening to one’s conscience, but it is not surrendered. Zikir is “Hu” the esoteric 
meaning of this is: “there is none to be loved but Allah.” The direction is “progress 
within Allah (Allah üzere / seyr ala’llah). The state is that of giving up everything. The 
realm is the realm of Majesty (heybet alemi). At this stage the sâlik (traveller) seeks 
only the love of Allah. He or she hears the zikir of everything and every creature, 
knows what’s inside the heart, and has many secrets here. He or she becomes the 
manifestation of Allah’s Action and Attributes. The degree of knowledge is composed 
of certainty by vision (ayne’l yakîn). 
4- Nefs-i Mutmainne (The Nefs at Peace): The nefs that has reached content. One is firm 
in faith and leaves bad manners. The soul becomes tranquil and at peace. The zikir is 
Hakk, the esoteric meaning of which is “There is none but Allah.” The journey (seyir) 
is the journey with Allah (Allah ile birlikte, seyr maa’llah). The hal alternates between 
spiritual drunkenness and soberness. The realm is that of omnipotence (ceberrut 
alemi). The love for Allah is increased. Sâlik witnesses Allah everywhere in 
everything, and undergoes the second unveiling (feth el-mubin; however, the veil 
over things is not yet completely raised. 
5- Nefs-i Radiyye (The Pleased Nefs): The nefs that is pleased with Allah. One is pleased 
with whatever comes from Allah and does not live in the past or future, but in the 
moment. Zikir is “Hayy”, the esoteric meaning of which is “There is none but Allah.” 
The hal is full absorption (fena) of the human qualities in the Qualities of Allah and 
His Attributes. The journey is the “journey in Allah” (Allah’ta / seyr fi’llâh) and the 
realm is the realm of Divinity (Lahut Alemi). Sâlik is located in the Secret of Secrets 
(sır el-esrar). In this hal he or she knows by direct tasting rather than inspiration. 
6- Nefs-i Mardiyye (The Pleasing Nefs): The nefs that which Allah is pleased with. The 
two ruhs have made peace. The person is soft and tolerant with people and has good 
conduct. Zikir is “Kayyum”. The hal is establishing (temkin) and astonishment 
(hayret). The journey is the journey from Allah (Allah’tan / seyr ani’llâh). The realm 
is the realm of the Visible (şehadet alemi). In this stage the manifestations of Names 
of Allah begin to replace the manifestations of the actions of Allah. Although the sâlik 
lives among the creatures, he or she is always with Allah. This stage is also called “The 
Grand Vicegerent”: one who returns from unity to multiplicity in order to awaken the 
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people. The sâlik can attain to this stage through his or her own effort and conduct, 
but they do not suffice to pass beyond it. Only Divine Grace can attract the traveler 
from the sixth to seventh stage.  
7- Nefs-i Kâmile / Nefs-i Safiyye (The Perfect / Pure nefs): The nefs that has reached 
perfection and that is pure. One is dressed in the attributes of insan-ı kâmil, the 
perfect human, who is in a state of complete surrender and inspired by Allah, in full 
agreement with the Will of Allah. Zikir is Kahhar. The journey is the Journey for Allah 
(Allah’la / seyr bi’llâh). The state is subsistence (beka). The realm is the realm of 
“unity in multiplicity and multiplicity in unity”. The degree of certainty is certainty by 
truth (hake’l yakîn). This stage is also called ahadiyyet, cem el-cem, yakîn etc. This is 
the beginning of the inner kingdom where all actions as well as inactions are worship. 
The breathing is power, and favor, the face is ease, the words and actions are 
wisdom. Sâlik is reached sainthood has become a sage at the end of the stages of 
annihilation, essence and manifestation are one in the seeker after Truth and Reality. 
(Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, pp. 67-68) (Al-Haqqani, 2004, p. 103) (Kiliç, 1996, pp. 954-
955) (Uludağ, 2010, p. 128). 
 
The Need of Guidance in the Metaphysical Realm 
 
In the first three stages of the purification of the soul, mürids are clearly 
struggling with their nefs, egos. Those in the first two stages are called the avam, “the 
public, ordinary people whose belief and worship generally consists of imitation, 
those who cannot go beyond the contour and rituals of the religion” (Şener, 1991, p. 
105). In these two stages, people can struggle with their own selves, their egos. They 
can probably discipline their nefs in these two makams according to the commands 
of Allah, which are clear in Şeriat, the forbidden sins and the advised good deeds. One 
can learn these from the Kur’an, Hadis and the books of Sünnî tradition. Then he can 
try to judge his own actions and desires to see if they fit into one or the other. If they 
can succeed, they are promised the heavens. However, when we start talking about 
the third makam and after, we are talking about another metaphysical sphere in 
which the mürid starts getting inspirations from the divine. Then the question 
becomes that since it is the first time one becomes exposed to metaphysical things, 
how can he be sure about what these inspirations are, or that these inspirations are 
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from Allah himself, especially considering the belief that the devil can also inspire 
these kind of ideas and visions at this stage. That is why Özemre warns the people: 
“Nefs-i mulhime is a very dangerous makam, and one can only dodge these threats if 
one’s râbıta (connection) with his master, his mürşid, is very strong.” (Özemre & 
Şahinler, 2011, p. 44) 
On the other hand, even though the sâlik reaches ayne’l yakîn at this third 
stage, and starts to conceive the hakikat slowly with this vision, he has not completed 
his sülük yet, and thus has not reached mârifet, the perfect knowledge with hakka’l 
yakîn. Moreover, he has not even won the battle against his nefs at this stage to 
become stable, content and peaceful. Even in the fourth stage, nefs-i mutmaîne, in 
which the sâlik becomes firm in his faith and leaves bad manners, it is believed that 
the veil over the things is not removed completely. Therefore, at this stage, Sûfîs 
claim that, one cannot know for certain what is right or wrong only by himself since 
he is not able to reach the correct information from the absolute truth within the 
metaphysical realm. Therefore, a mürşid, who has already walked the path to the 
end, has to assume the role of guidance and pass his mürids from these stages and 
onwards. Since mürşid is one who already possesses mârifet, it is best to ask his hand 
(help) to continue walking through the path, and decide to obey this guide, since he 
is the only one who can inform the mürid about the path, control if he is on the track 
and warn him against the obstacles on it if need be. This is where technologies of the 
self gets a twist, because in tasavvuf, to be able to reach the absolute knowledge and 
establish oneself as a true subject (insan-ı kâmil), one cannot simply discipline himself 
in a healthy manner further then the second stage, nefs-i levvame, and reach beyond 
ilm-el yakîn certainty of knowledge. Niyazi Mısri states this fact in the continuation of 
his famous poem converted into the famous hymn that people need a mürşid to let 
them know Hakk (Allah) in the form and certainty of hakka’l yakîn; and things that 
people without a mürşid know is nothing more than assumptions: “Mürşid gerektir 
sana bildire Hakk’ı hakkal yakîn / Mürşidi olmayanların bildikleri güman imiş” 
(Altuntaş, 2011, p. 90). 
As Niyazi Mısri claims, a mürşid who is in the mertebe (stage) of hakka’l yakîyn, 
who is aware of Allah’s will in this earth, is needed to teach one about the reality 
(hak). To explain it with an example, we can say that as one needs to eat a fruit to 
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know its taste, only the ones who know how to swim can teach others swimming. 
Most people (avam) are not really in the realm of a true human being, they only look 
like it within their skin but they are in the realm of perceptions. However, when one 
gets to know himself, then he starts to move up on the path to become a true human 
being, the halife (caliph) on earth, and for this, to climb up to stages to insan-ı kâmil, 
one has to hold the hand of another true human – that is a mürşid. Mürşid is believed 
to inherit or manifest the “Rab” name of Allah which disciplines and teaches. 
However, he is different than an âlim who is a man of study, reading and writes books, 
and appeal to the intellect of his students; mürşid aims at the hearts of his disciples, 
guides and develops their soul with his mârifet (ledün ilmi). Thus, Özemre claims that 
mürşid is actually able to directly get into contact with the Creative Force and open 
mürid’s eyes to the plans beyond the material World which he calls Veladet-i 
Maneviyye, spiritual birth; thus, both the father and the mother of this Veled-i Kalb 
(child of heart) is the Mürşid-i Kâmil (Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, p. 9). That is why he 
claims only an insan-ı kâmil can give raise to another insan-ı kâmil, that is to say: ilm 
cannot be attained by oneself, but it must be thought by a teacher, in this case a 
mürşid (Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, p. 38). It is believed that Bayezid El Bistami also 
supports this belief with the following claim that is ascribed to him: “In this path, 
whoever does not have a mürşid, his mürşid is the devil” (İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, p. 13). 
Mevlânâ also has a similar opinion that a seeker cannot reach his goal without a 
mürşid and, to be able to enter the circle of selected vassals of Allah one has to seek 
for a mürşid (Rumi, 2009, p. 20). The famous Turkish Sûfî Yunus’s following poem 
(again a hymn) also resonates with the former statements: “Doğruya varmayınca 
mürşide ermeyince / Hak nasib etmeyince sen derviş olamazsın” (Toprak, 2006, p. 
105), which translated into “You cannot become a dervish, if you do not reach the 
truth, find the mürşid, and if Allah does not grant you that.”  
 
Absolute Authority of Mürşid & Total Submission to the Guide 
 
As seen above Sûfîs claim that everyone who wants to attain mârifet needs a 
mürşid, and behind this claim is the recognition of the need for a mature, wise guide, 
kind of like a coach to train and discipline the self for a different league of 
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metaphysical realm. According to Lütfi Filiz, mürşids, as manifestations of the Rab 
name of Allah, is addressed with the following Kur’anic verse: “And they ask you, [O 
Muhammad], about the soul. Say, "The soul is of the affair [command/order] of my 
Lord [Rab]. And mankind have not been given of knowledge except a little." (Kur’an 
17-85). Therefore, Lütfi Filiz claims that mürşid’s words are orders, and similar to 
Özemre’s claims above, these words affect the soul, thus changes the behaviors of 
his mürids. (Filiz L. , 2009, p. 64). Instead of interpreting this verse as the soul cannot 
be known as the general apparent (zâhirî) interpretation of Şeriat, Sûfîs believe that 
a mürşid who is an embodiment of Allah’s name Rab, the teacher, discipliner, can 
know about the soul. Lütfi Filiz claims that life (can) is present in every creation 
though named differently, but ruh (spirit) is an improved version of this; when the 
previous verse is taken into account, there is the situation of one teacher (mürebbi 
/mürşid) warning someone with an order, and this warning turns one’s life (can) into 
soul (ruh) (Filiz L. , 2009, pp. 64-65). That is how one should understand the mürşid 
because the real Mürşid is Allah and the following verse according to Sûfîs testifies it: 
“Indeed, those who pledge allegiance to you, [O Muhammad] - they are actually 
pledging allegiance to Allah. The hand of Allah is over their hands. So he who breaks 
his word only breaks it to the detriment of himself. And he who fulfills that which he 
has promised Allah - He will give him a great reward.” (Kur’an 48:10). Allah who is 
distant from all descriptions, does not have a hand, but the meaning is that Allah acts 
through the owner of that hand, appears from him” (Filiz L. , 2009, p. 66).  
In parallel, the famous Turkish Sûfî saying which is believed to originate from 
the Bektaşi Tarikat, “El ele el Hakk’a” means you hold the hand of a mürşid seeking 
his help, who has already hold the hand of his mürşid, who also has had hold the hand 
of his own mürşid, which goes up to the Prophet Muhammed himself and from there 
to Hakk, Allah. This is where the icâzet (permission to teach from one’s mürşid) and 
silsile (the list of successive mürşids reaching to Prophet) comes into play and 
becomes important for the credibility of a true mürşid in the Sûfî tradition as well.  
Therefore, when a mürşid orders you, it is like the prophet Muhammed, or 
the Hakk, Allah is ordering you, because the chain of helping hands which has the 
authority to order reaches Him in the end. The order is certain, it cannot be 
questioned. One has to obey that order. This authoritative culture is very similar to 
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what Foucault describes for the monastic life, differing from the Greco-Roman type 
of relation to the master:  
Obedience isn’t based just upon a need for self-improvement but must bear on all aspects of a monk’s life. There is no element in the life of the monk which may escape from this fundamental and permanent relation of total obedience to the master. Here obedience is complete control of behavior by the master, not a final autonomous state. It is a sacrifice of the self, of the subject’s own will. This is the new technology of the self. The monk must have the permission of his director to do anything, even die (Foucault, 1988). 
With this understanding, the disciple, mürid consciously and willingly 
surrenders his will to his mürşid, who mediates his path of learning and helps him 
develop his soul. From then on, he has to obey his mürşid at all costs. The general 
belief is that even if the mürşid tells you to go jump off that roof you should, not that 
he would tell anything like that. The common example to this kind of surrendering of 
the will is the Prophet Abraham’s trial to sacrifice his beloved son after a revelation 
in his dream. Just like Abraham obeyed Allah, one has to surrender his will to his 
Mürşid. Similarly there are many Sûfî stories about this surrendering of the will, one 
of which is the following about Rumi, as his son is reporting it:  
One day, to test Rumi, Şems asks for a beautiful lover from him. Rumi brings him his wife Kira Hatun, the most beautiful and mature woman of the time. Şems says that she is like his sister and instead asks for a beautiful boy that would serve him. Rumi then brings his son as beautiful as the Prophet Yusuf, and hoping that he would be worthy of serving him. Şems says that he is like his son and asks for wine instead. Rumi gets up and goes to the Jewish part of the town, bringing back a jug of wine. Then Sultan Veled, Rumi’s son sees Şems crying out loud, tearing his clothes, and praising Rumi amazed by his obedience to his pir (mürşid) (Eflaki, 2011, p. 474). 
İbn’ül-Arabî states that it is a duty upon the mürid to be without any will, like 
exemplified above, because when one has a will he has his own way and he is with 
his nefs instead of with his mürşid (İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, p. 30). That means he has to 
obey all the orders of the mürşid without questioning. İbn’ül-Arabî tells another story 
to exemplify this, basing it also to a Hadis of the Prophet:  
A Mürşid asks his mürid: ‘If your mürşid gives you an order, and while you are on your way to accomplish this task, you see people gathering at a mescid to pray, what would you do?’ Mürid answered: ‘I would continue on my way, and would not pray till I complete the task and return by my mürşid. Mürşid said: ‘Well-done’ (İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, p. 34).  
İbn’ül-Arabî even adds to this story that if the mürid would go out to both 
complete the task and pray in one go, he would not reach tevhid. According to him 
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mürid should not hide any of the ideas that comes to his heart from his mürşid and 
he should not object to anything when he is with him. Besides, again according to 
İbn’ül-Arabî, if a mürşid lets his mürids bring forth şeri and intellectual arguments 
against his explanations, and if the mürşid does not force them to quit this behavior, 
that means he is in betrayal to his mürids discipline.” (İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, p. 19). When 
entering the path of tarikat, the mürid has to leave behind his desires, his lust, his 
love for wealth and status when entering this path as we have seen from Hüdâyî and 
Mevlânâ’s stories. İbn’ül-Arabî even compares mürids to dead people: As the dead 
cannot question what is done on their bodies during the burial ceremonies after their 
death, mürids cannot question mürşid’s orders as well because when they have 
intentionally left their will, there is no difference between them and dead bodies 
(İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, p. 35). 
 
Manifestation of Rab: Roles and Properties of Mürşid 
 
Since one will surrender all his will when entering this path, it should be pretty 
important to be with a mürşid who is aware of his responsibilities toward his mürids, 
and actually capable of guiding them. The icâzet and silsile of a mürşid may seem to 
authenticate him. However, there are also many texts written about mürşids and 
their attributes in the Sûfî tradition, not to let people misuse this authority or others 
to go ashtray. However, defining the duties of mürşids specifically and openly, 
starting a discourse of their capabilities also produces and strengthens the need for 
them. According to İbn’ül-Arabî, a mürşid should be capable of the knowing the 
following:  
Inspirations from the nefs, devil, angels and Allah, the root of these inspirations, actions of the mürid, the illnesses and faults that are present in the mürid which holds him back from the origin of the realities, the medicine to these illnesses, the duration and dose of these medicine, his character, mürids hindering outside ties with his mother, mother, kids, wife, friends and his status, how to handle these, and how to save the mürid from these ties (İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, pp. 16-17).  
Clearly, mürşid has to have some metaphysical insights and abilities beyond 
the natural human capacity, to be able to understand what is going on inside his 
mürid’s mind and heart; moreover, he should also know how to guide his mürid to 
78  
overcome the issues with his ego. A mürşid should be able to do all these because he 
should have already passed these steps in his own sülük, and cleansed himself from 
all the earthly desires and sins, and became a mirror on which the images freely 
reflect. As Foucault quotes Alciabides: “How must we take care of this principle of 
activity, the soul? Of what does this care consist? One must know of what the soul 
consists. The soul cannot know itself except by looking at itself in a similar element, 
a mirror.” (Foucault, 1988) Mevlâna states this through an exemplary story: 
Muhammed Sererzi was sitting with his mürids and one of the mürids were craving for Kelle Kebab. Pointing at him, he told his disciples to bring his mürid Kelle Kebab. When he was asked how he knew that, he said that he had cleansed himself of all desires for thirty years, and he does not need anything anymore – like a mirror clean and shiny. And then, suddenly he desired Kelle Kebab, at that point he knew that his mürid wanted that because the mirror is clear and does not have an image. If an image appears on it, it is the shape of another (Rumi, 2009, p. 83). 
Knowing the mind and heart of his mürid allows the mürşid to have full control 
over his sülük. “The master watches every moment of the disciple's spiritual growth; 
he watches him particularly during the forty-day period of meditation (arba’in 
[erbain], chilla [çile]) that became, very early, a regular institution in the Sûfî path 
(derived, as Hujwiri says, from the forty-day fast of Moses, when he hoped for a vision 
from God, as related in Sura 7:138)” (Schimmel, 1975, p. 103). It is the duty of the 
mürşid to determine when the mürid’s soul and will is ready to enter this çile- 
seclusion. Moreover, he should guide him in this stage very carefully for the mürid to 
focus on the target and not get lost within the mystical experiences. For this, when 
the mürşid decides to put his mürid into seclusion (çile), he first enters the room 
(çilehane) to pray to gather the necessary energy in that cell (İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, p. 
23).  
On the other hand, “to the talented mürids, that means to the ones that are 
already tested, and made sure that they have the capacity to be able to do zikir, the 
mürşid gives some of the names (esmâ) of Allah” (Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, p. 43). 
Some of the examples of zikir (invocation) was given while explaining the stages of 
sülük in section 3.2.9. As seen over there, each makam (stage) has a different 
invocation, depending on the spiritual situation of that level. To be able to practice 
invocation, one should be aware of which stage he is at, and that is not possible for a 
disciple to comprehend by himself, his mürşid has to know his makam and arrange 
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the invocation accordingly, the count and combinations. Moreover, the path is not 
the same for every mürid; thus, the invocation also changes depending on the 
character and capacity of the mürid. With the necessity of personalized attention and 
guidance for the mürid, mürşid’s role become even more amplified, and critical.  
To be able to curate a personalized path for the mürid, “The sheikh interprets 
the mürid's dreams and visions, reads his thoughts, and thus follows every movement 
of his conscious and subconscious life” (Schimmel, 1975, p. 103). It is believed that 
when somebody sleeps he enters into the misal alemi (world of representations), and 
in this realm watches some events or inspirations. Some of these representations are 
believed to originate from the Divine, but they can also be inspirations from the devil, 
rest of it is just manifestations from one’s subconscious.  
[No matter which kind of image one witnesses,] He filters [the image] through his intellect and deforms it as well. Changes the colors, changes what they really are. However, a person who knows this realm of representations can immediately notice all these deformations; a mürşid can tell the real meaning of dreams to his mürids through interpretation… This also gives an opportunity for the mürşid to determine the changes in mürid’s nefs. According to this information, mürşid adjusts the course, count of the zikir if that needs to be increased or decreased, with the accuracy of a jeweler (Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, pp. 43-44).  
Even though some of the interpretations of the dreams can be told to the 
mürid, the signs like the ones that signifies the (makam) stage of the mürid cannot be 
told to anyone; it is forbidden to disclose this information because if the nefs of the 
mürid would be aware of these signs, it is believed that it would do anything to hinder 
the improvement of mürid in their seyr-i sülük (Özemre & Şahinler, 2011, p. 78).  All 
of these disciplining rituals and the practices of the Sûfî path like the struggle, çile, 
and zikir, in addition to the need of personalized attention to mürids’ growth 
strengthens the belief that a mürşid is a must in tarikat for the search of the perfect 
knowledge, mârifet. 
 
Sobhet, Presence, and Sûfî Etiquette: Habitus of Subjectification 
 
Aside from being a guide in the seyr-i sülük of the mürid, another role of the 
mürşid is to be an example and a role model for the mürids, similar to the ulemâ in 
the madrasas. However, as an insan-ı kâmil, who’s icâzet is believed to originate from 
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the Prophet Muhammed himself, a mürşid should strictly follow the Sünnet of the 
Prophet and reflect similar manners and style of contact, while setting up a good 
example to be followed and copied. The common saying is that imitated belief 
creates real belief: “Taklidi iman tahkiki imanı dogurur”. Since in tarikat the ego is 
being consciously destroyed, the forms of living for the mürid is altered, and the nefs 
is tried to be eliminated from power, mürid’s life, identity and interactions should be 
restructured with new forms of behavior and new values. That is why mürşid 
becomes critical again with his presence in tarikat. To fill out the gap that his 
conscious surrender of will opens, mürid should start to imitate the mürşid, do exactly 
as he does, like following the manifestation of the Sünnet of the Prophet in real-time, 
in every moment. Thus the mürid can restructure a new visible identity based on the 
aspired one. Paradoxically, while he is walking on the path to reach the true subject, 
insan-ı kâmil, he is opening himself to the subjectivation of the tarikat again, 
intentionally and consciously accepting the form – the hırka of a derviş (devotee). 
The key to understand this practice of imitation is again from the Hadis of 
Prophet Muhammed, which is already stated in the previous chapter. According to 
the Hadis, hayâ (modesty) is considered a part of ‘ilm, thus one should attain it in the 
path of perfect knowledge as well. However, how can one really study and learn 
modesty? How can one learn about how to truly act modest? Commonly it is believed 
that people (even animals) in general learns about how to speak by imitation, they 
learn how to do mimics, how to interact with people etc. all through imitation. They 
see how people get married in the movies, and their belief and understanding of 
marriage is shaped as such. If people see others kneel before asking their wives 
hands, they do the same when they propose as well. They learn how to become 
macho, or gentlemen as such. Therefore, the stories that are told in the tekkes by the 
mürşids then become very important as well, that is how people learn about how to 
act.  
Beside the traditional discipline technologies to dispute the ego’s longings, 
one of the main tools of education in the tekke then becomes the sohbet since these 
exemplary stories are usually told in this format. This is a little different than the 
techniques in the madrasah. Still studying and the memorization is really important 
in tasavvuf, especially for the zikir that mürids practice, or the canonic books of the 
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tekke. On top of that, Kur’an and Hadis is still in the center of any practice, but the 
face-to-face time with the mürşid is not about reciting the memorizations or getting 
corrections, it is about the moving, touching, and motivating stories he tells, the 
hadiths that he explains, the Kur’an he interprets (tevil); and more importantly it is 
about the presence of the mürşid, the way he talks, the way he acts, the way he 
simply is and the way interactions happen between the disciples and mürşid.  
We already understand that “education”, the discipline in tekke is not a study 
like we understand today or like the one in medrese because there is not really a 
discussion or much of a verbal interaction. “In general, mârifet is not something that 
is explained and thought verbally but rather understood and learned silently. That is 
why Zünnûn el-Mısrî advises people who would like to enter the seyr-i sülük to be 
quiet next to ehl-i mârifet [insan-ı kâmil]… The important thing is not only the silence 
of the tongue but also the silence of the nefs and the mind, and not to be involved 
with anything except Hak. As long as silence gives way to contemplation, it is a tool 
of attaining mârifet (Uludağ, 2003). Moreover, İbnü’l Arabî states that “Silence is 
vâcib (a must) and verbalizing an opinion is Haram (a sin)” (İbnü'l-Arabî, 2009, p. 19) 
when meeting with the mürşid. With this kind of silent submission, the aim of sohbet 
clearly cannot be a discussion about the teachings of Islam; it is more about a 
transmission of ‘ilm through the hierarchy from top to bottom, as if Allah hands has 
handed down his ‘ilm to the prophets and successively to the mankind. Besides as 
explained before, this ‘ilm includes moral dispositions as well, thus the sohbet is also 
about hemhal olmak, to share the same state (hal) with the mürşid and other mürids 
in each other’s presence. Brian Silverstein’s following fieldwork in the late 1990s with 
the Gümüşhânevî branch of the Nakşibendi order and his revisit to his own paper in 
2008, gives excellent insight to the actual practice of sohbet and how it constitutes 
moral dispositions: 
Sohbet…is structured around the reading and discussion (izah; şerh) of Hadis…There is very little coming and going during the sohbet, no talking among listeners, and almost no note taking, and there questions are rarely asked… I realized that practically no one had ever been discussing the classic themes of Sûfîsm emphasized in Western literature on the topic, such as ‘intimate experience of God’ and ‘self-effacement [in the Reality of God]’… It became quite obvious that the members of the order simply were not particularly concerned with these themes on a daily basis…What members clearly were very concerned with, however, and what was a constant topic of lessons and informal discussion were the good (iyilik) and morality 
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(ahlak) and how one can become predisposed to ethical practice and avoidance of sin… What this means is the focus is not on something called ‘mystical experience’ but, rather, on disciplinary practice, ‘programs for forming or reforming moral dispositions (that is, organizing the physical and verbal practices that constitute the virtuous ... self)’ (2008, pp. 123-124). 
  
As explained in detail above, the aim of the sohbets are not to give 
information, instead, it reinforces one’s care for the self in the presence of others; 
one sees the interactions among the Sûfîs, and their relationships with the mürşid, 
and through imitation, and repetition, the mürid incorporates the attitudes of his 
companions into his own personality. As one of the members of the given tarikat 
(cemaat), his informant states to Silverstein: “Humans are such amazing beings, one 
is morally / spiritually [ma'nen] influenced by the people one stands next to. If one's 
friend is good, one will be influenced by this goodness. If the friend is bad, one will 
easily acquire bad habits” (2008, p. 130). Silverstein sees this companionship as a 
disciplinary program and a conscious one and refers to Alasdair Maclntyre to explain 
sohbet as a practice which involves “standards of excellence and obedience to rules 
as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority 
of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. 
It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards 
which currently and partially define the practice" (2008, p. 127). Hence referencing 
Saba Mahmood, Burnyeat and Foucault, he argues that this disciplinary practice of 
sohbet is explicitly and self-consciously pursued, repeated over and over again to 
constitute dispositions, thus it differs somewhat from Pierre Bourdieu’s theories on 
practice - the Habitus which hints at the unconscious reproductions. Moreover, he 
openly claims: “a habitus-based notion of disposition formation such as 
Bourdieu's…cannot account for the kinds of disciplinary programs outlined here” 
(Silverstein, 2008, p. 128).  
Even though I agree with Silverstein on his remarks, and see these practices 
within the Foucauldian “technologies of the self”, which are autonomous and 
conscious efforts to construct a subject, I also believe that Bourdieu’s 
conceptualization of the practices and the term habitus is still applicable for the 
disciplinary practices in the tekkes, we cannot just ignore it. It should be noted that 
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the informant of Silverstein also states in the same passage: “When one sees Hoja 
[hoca] Efendi, there is a real spiritual influence [manevi etkileşim]. When I see Hoja 
Efendi, for instance, when I go to ‘his side’ and listen to his lessons [ders], the effect... 
believe me, it's so powerful. One feels a certain atmosphere [bir hava hissediyor], it's 
really something felt, something lived, one really can't explain it.” (2008, p. 130). I 
think this resembles Bourdieu’s “the feel for the game” habitus a lot. Even though 
one is aware of the technologies he is getting himself into, thus even if he knows the 
rules of the game, he is still “learning bodily” within the presence of the mürşid and 
his companions (Pilario, 2005). Silverstein himself uses the words of a deputy he met 
in his fieldwork to exemplify the “contagion” aspect: “This is real stuff [bu gerçek bir 
şey]. For instance, the hand holds a pomegranate, the mouth starts to water" (2008, 
p. 130). Therefore, even though I believe that these practices in the tekkes like sohbet, 
companionship and “disciplines of presence”, as Silverstein puts it, are consciously 
undertaken “technologies of the self”, when they are in effect, it is not in the realm 
of consciousness anymore at least all the time, dispositions just gets embodied. 
Coming back to the question of how hayâ (modesty) can be learned, in theory, 
though in a very reductionist way, one should consider his mürşid so highly that he 
should feel modest in the presence of him. This is easier done in an environment 
where everybody (the companions) acts the same toward the mürşid. That is the 
general way of behavior in tekke. When everybody is silent in the sohbet, it is hard to 
talk, when no one is asking questions to the mürşid, one cannot have the courage to 
ask, and when everybody is bowing their heads down in the presence of a mürşid, 
running after him for hizmet (service), opening his doors, bringing him tea or water 
etc. and also talks very highly of him with a very conscious and careful attitude, one 
automatically feels the urge to mimic these behaviors and code of contact. It is the 
same with submission, when everyone is totally submitted to the mürşid, and ready 
to hump off the roof with a sign from him, it is probably easier to go with the flow in 
a group psychology. Then the mürid sees how the mürşid behaves towards Allah in 
his prayers, when he talks about Him, and in general in his relationship with Him, and 
how modest and submitted he is; therefore, while the mürid is rejecting the self, at 
the same time he has a role-model present to look up to, to restructure the self 
through imitating the mürşid as well. Hence, when this form of acting gets 
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internalized through repetitive practice, one is hoped to transfer these newly 
acquired skills into his relationship with Allah. Thus, step by step, through this 
atmosphere of reinforcing companionship and repetitive practice of code of conduct, 
moral dispositions slowly becomes the new natural practice of the mürid as well.  
To understand the relation between the practice and internalization, the 
Althusserian theory of ideology and interpellation, no matter how distant they may 
seem from the topic – comes in handy. However, they should be detached from the 
understanding of the state itself. Thus I will use his theories from a slightly different 
perspective. Althusser asserts that ideology, which he claims to represent “the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser, 
2001, p. 109), manifests itself through actions, which are "inserted into practices" 
(Althusser, 2001, p. 114). In other words, to put it simply, Althusser claims that we 
represent ourselves as subjects by acting out the relations that we have. For example, 
a mother is interpellated (brought into being or given identity) as a caretaker when 
her child falls down and starts to cry “Mom!” in search of her help, and she responds 
back and helps the kid. Similarly, when the müezzin (caller of the prayer) calls the 
prayer (ezan), performs this act, he is identified as the müezzin, and a devote Muslim 
who starts to walk towards the cami (mescid), answering the call, to pray is pointed 
at as such as well. While explaining his theory, Althusser also touches on Pascal's 
formula for belief: "Pascal says more or less: 'Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, 
and you will believe'" (Althusser, 2001, p. 114). At this point Althusser realizes a 
connection between performance, a practice, which can be any kind of act, ritual, or 
conventional behavior, and a feeling, at this occasion belief. Using this connection, 
gives us a chance to understand how one can learn to be modest as well. 
According to Žižek, “when Althusser repeats, after Pascal, ‘Act as if you 
believe, pray, kneel down, and you shall believe, faith will arrive by itself’, he 
delineates an intricate reflexive mechanism of retroactive ‘autopoetic’ foundation 
that far exceeds the reductionist assertion of inner belief’s dependence on external 
behavior. That is to say, the implicit logic of his argument is: kneel down and you shall 
believe that you kneelt down because of your belief – that is, that your following the 
ritual is an expression/effect of your inner belief. In short, the ‘external’ ritual 
performatively generates its own ideological foundation. Herein resides the 
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interconnection of the ritual that pertains to ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ and of 
the act of interpellation: when I believe that I knelt down because of my belief, I 
simultaneously ‘recognize’ myself in the call of the Other-God who dictated that I 
kneel down” (Žižek, 2005, p. 59). 
When Allah reveals Himself and His Kur’an to Prophet Muhammed via Cebrâil 
(angel Gabriel), He calls out to Muhammed and orders him to read/recite as the first 
ever revelation, which is basically an act. Instead, if He were to order “Believe in Me”, 
how could he believe, or make sure that he believed. However, because he is ordered 
to read/recite, when he reads/recites the Kur’an, he is reading/reciting it because he 
believes in Allah. When he reads/recites, he interpellates himself as a subject. 
Similarly in the current Turkish culture, many Muslim people recite the Kur’an 
regularly, prays the namaz, and observe the fast etc., and keep constituting 
themselves as believers, and Muslims. However, how could they humble (fear) 
themselves in front Allah? Actually sahabe also asks this question directly to the 
Prophet Muhammed. 
‘Have Haya' for Allah as is His due.’ [Prophet said:] We said: ‘O Prophet of Allah! We have Haya', and all praise is due to Allah.’ He said: ‘Not that, but having the Haya' for Allah which He is due is to protect the head and what it contains and to protect the insides and what it includes, and to remember death and the trial, and whoever intends the Hereafter, he leaves the adornments of the world. So whoever does that, then he has indeed fulfilled Haya', meaning the Haya' which Allah is due.’ (Jami` at-Tirmidhi, Vol. 4, Book 11, Hadis 2458). 
As seen in the Hadis, it is not enough to say that one fears Allah, he has to act 
accordingly, preventing himself from any kind of sin, leaving all the flamboyant 
material attractions of the world. From a different perspective, if one first does all 
these practices, then he will come to fear Allah. Thus a Sûfî’s disciplining himself by 
leaving the earthly desires behind interpellates him as a devotee who is a 
manifestation of hayâ. Similar to the sahabe, a member of the Nakşibendi tarikat 
(order) in Sivas also raises a similar question, then he tries to explain it to Brian 
Silverstein: 
God loves the one who loves His servant, and we should do things for the love of God. He who does so, they say, will surely taste faith [iman]. ... But how should one love? What does one do to the object one loves? For example, I love you for the praise of Allah. Let's say you're my brother. Now, what is the sign [alamet] of my loving you? I will do the things you do, won't do things you don't do, don't like, right, Ibrahim abi? Or I will enjoy [hoşuma gitmek] the things you enjoy etc. You enjoy 
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being with such people, and without realizing it your conduct starts to resemble theirs, because you want them to approve of you and you respect them. (2008, p. 129) 
The question above probably originates from the following Hadis: "Whoever 
possesses the following three qualities will have the sweetness (delight) of faith: The 
one to whom Allah and His Apostle becomes dearer than anything else. Who loves a 
person and he loves him only for Allah's sake. Who hates to revert to Atheism 
(disbelief) as he hates to be thrown into the fire." (Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 1, Book 2, 
Hadis 16). These conditions are also stated in other Hadis as the criteria to become a 
kâmil (perfect, mature) believer. Therefore, it is only natural that the question would 
arise within the believers as a common one. 
Kur’an’s answer to this question can be found in the following verse: “Say, [O 
Muhammad], "If you should love Allah, then follow me, [so] Allah will love you and 
forgive you your sins. And Allah is Forgiving and Merciful" (Kur’an 3:31). According to 
Kur’an, if one loves Allah, he should follow Prophet Muhammed, which means to 
both walk the path he walks and walk the path as the way he walks it. Interestingly, 
Allah states this starting with an order: “say!” Thus He commands people the 
condition of performing their love, while commanding the Prophet (and whoever 
reads this verse) to say it at the same time as well. When the Prophet tells this verse 
the first time to his disciples, then, he quotes the verse and starts with “say!” as well, 
and people obey the command and follow the prophet, not just because Muhammed 
told them to, but because they believe that Allah told Muhammed to tell them to. 
Hence as Žižek explains, the believers recognizes themselves in the call of Allah, who 
told them to obey Muhammed to be able to show their love of Allah. As a result, 
linguistic constructions create the “reality” through the speech acts we participate in 
everyday life. In other words the “reality” of Islam and the ideology is being created 
as the Kur’an is being actively reveled to the Prophet when he is among the people. 
Moreover, as the Kur’an is read aloud, referenced, and the Hadis and Sünnet of 
Prophet are cited, the reality is enacted over and over again. 
The love of Allah is, then, like the relationship between a mother and a child 
again. When a mother tells one of her children: “Tell your brother to clean his room”, 
the child obeys the mother’s call to clean his room, not because his sibling has told 
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her to, but because he wants to show that he cares for her mother, listens to her, 
does not want to make her sad, or simply because he feels that has to obey her; or 
simply because he believes that he loves her. As he acts, and cleans the room, he 
believes that he is cleaning the room because he believes in his love of her mother. 
This is exactly what the member of the Nakşibendi order in Sivas unintentionally 
accepts in the quote above that he wants to be like the other members of the order, 
because he wants approval. However, the act is still, at best, a representation of the 
child’s love, or this member’s respect for the other members. It is an ideological act, 
a representation of “the imaginary relationship” between his mother and himself, or 
the member to the other members of the order itself, to their “real conditions of 
existence” (Althusser, 2001, p. 109). Therefore, even if it is self- constructed, it is still 
fictitious. 
 
Nazar & Râbıta: Unity with the Mürşid 
 
Then the question becomes if one can at all make sure that it is not simple 
imagination, but “The Real”? This is one of the main and critical difference of the 
understanding of knowledge or ‘ilm in Islam. True modesty (hayâ) within the realm 
of mârifet (hakka’l yakîn), which is the essence of modesty, is neither a thing that can 
be learned through books and studying (ilme’l yakîn) nor it can be seen and practiced 
to become internalized and acquired (ayne’l yakîn). Instead, one has to become 
united with the essence of modesty. At this point, since ontological further analysis 
concerning the essence is necessary, I believe these inquiries go beyond the scope of 
this thesis. According to Mark G. E. Kelly, Foucault associates subjectivity with “a 
reality ontologically distinct from the body”, which, however, “is a form, rather than 
a substance…constituted through practices” (Kelly, 2013, p. 513). This thesis is solely 
interested in subjectivity in a Foucauldian sense, in parallel to this former definition. 
However, I will still attempt to discuss the ontological subject for the sake of further 
studies and to suggest that tasavvuf may have the potential to add a different 
perspective to this kind of philosophical discussion. 
Similar to other dispositions that are discussed already, love, the great 
epiphany within Sûfî tradition, cannot really be learned. How can one study love? It 
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just happens. You can make one believe that he loves someone, or one can show and 
represent that he loves someone. However, you cannot make one simply fall in love; 
you cannot teach one from the books or in any other means to love. It is a feeling, it 
is just what it is. If we were to talk about the essence of it, the true reality of love 
under all these constructed ideologies is more than an act; it is an intuitive inclination 
that comes from the same source of Malevich’s “creative force”. It cannot be truly 
explained as the informant of Silverstein cannot explain his feelings towards his 
mürşid, but it may be experienced. It is described commonly like a “burning fire in the 
heart”, “butterflies in one’s stomach”, it is a sensation. Love is a strong feeling of 
affection; affection is a gentle feeling of liking; liking is to find something enjoyable; 
enjoying is taking delight or pleasure in activity or occasion; and pleasure is a feeling 
of happy satisfaction. According to biology, happiness is, on the other hand, is a very 
scientific thing that is triggered by the “happiness hormones” which are generally 
refer to endorphins, serotonin, dopamine, and oxytocin. Therefore, love can be 
understood as very bodily thing at the end of it, depended on the secretion of some 
hormones. The experience of love, therefore, comes from birth, even if the situations 
that makes one experience may be shaped according to ideologies.  
In tasavvuf this genuine, real feeling of love (hakiki aşk) is exemplified with 
many love stories, one of the most famous being the Leyla and Mecnun, also told by 
the famous poet of love Rumi: 
During Mecnun’s time, there were many beautiful women and they were more beautiful than Leyla. However, Mecnun did not take a liking to them saying that he does not love Leyla due to her outer beauty and appearances. She is not only her looks. She is like a goblet in his hand. He is drinking wine from that goblet and he is in love with that wine. Other people only see the goblet, but they do not know about the wine in it. The image of these people is like the goblets and these knowledge, ‘ilms, are like the pictures and embellishments on that goblet. When the goblet is broken, all these pictures and embellishments disappear. Thus, value is in the wine inside the goblet; and for those people who sees [ayne’l yakîn] and drinks [hakka’l yakîn] this wine, it is stated “everlasting [beka] good deeds (Rumi, 2009). 
Wine here is a thing that makes one drunk, and high. It is a thing that gives 
one a sensation, like love. Therefore, love in tasavvuf is more than what meets the 
eye, it is not “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence”, manifested in Leyla, the beloved, but it is a deeper sensational thing 
within. It should also be noted that Rumi says that whoever finds this wine and drinks 
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it, he has done an act (amel) which will end up in beka, which is, referencing from the 
previous sections, the state of the seventh makam (stage) in tarikat. The steps when 
one falls in love with Leyla is like the following. First, Mecnun (a Sûfî) hears about 
Leyla (the divine beloved), people say good things about her, that she is beautiful, the 
lover knows the beloved ilme’l yakîn, as an ideological manifestation and performs 
rituals to show her love within that realm. However, when he actually sees her, ayne’l 
yakîn as in the third stage in tarikat, then he starts to feel sensations in his body, his 
soul starts to get inspirations, he goes into an unstable state of mind and heart. He 
goes drunk as the veil of Leyla raises. There is none to be loved but Leyla at that point. 
However, this is not the absolute reality behind love as well. When finally, Mecnun 
actually unites (reunites) with Leyla, he reaches the realm of “unity in multiplicity and 
multiplicity in unity”, and the essence and manifestation becomes one in Mecnun, 
the seeker after Truth and Reality, mârifet. Therefore, from this analogy, it can be 
concluded that a mürid has to find a mürşid who will help him reach mârifet, and 
unity from ayne’l yakîn. 
Ömer Tuğrul İnançer, in one of his radio shows in Burç FM, states, in parallel 
to the discussion above, that love is performed as to be like the beloved; however, it 
is not a matter of will, but a matter of the heart; it has to originate from within. 
However, he adds that there are things to be done to attract love, knowing being the 
primary one. (Ehlibeyt-i Mustafa, 2008) He is saying that loving Allah is dependent on 
knowing Him because one can only love the things he knows. Thus, knowing, 
discipline and love all becomes entangled, intertwined in tasavvuf. 
It is already stated that Sûfîs believe that mürşid are the insan-ı kâmil, real 
subjects. They are the successors of the Prophet Muhammed, habîbullah (Allah’s 
beloved), within a silsile. In the following Kudsî Hadis (Hadis of the Prophet 
referencing Allah, but not a part of Kur’an) popular among the Sûfîs, it is announced 
that these have become the manifestations of Allah. 
Allah says: “I will declare war against him who shows hostility to a pious worshipper of Mine. And the most beloved things with which My slave comes nearer to Me, is what I have enjoined upon him; and My slave keeps on coming closer to Me through performing Nawafil (praying or doing extra deeds besides what is obligatory) till I love him, so I become his sense of hearing with which he hears, and his sense of sight with which he sees, and his hand with which he grips, and his leg with which he walks; and if he asks Me, I will give him, and if he asks My protection (Refuge), I will protect him; 
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(i.e. give him My Refuge) and I do not hesitate to do anything as I hesitate to take the soul of the believer, for he hates death, and I hate to disappoint him." (Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 8, Book 76, Hadis 509). 
As such, going through the extra discipline and extra care of the tarikat, it is 
believed that mürşids, who knows Allah hakka’l yakîn, and are united with Allah, are 
also the beloveds of Allah. Within this unity, they are considered the reflections or 
manifestations of Hakk. Therefore, whoever sees a mürşid it is like he sees the Hakk 
and in this encounter, with a nazar (look) of the mürşid, that is also the nazar of Allah, 
the mürid falls in love with him, this manifestation of Allah immediately. “Nazar, 
‘looking,’ becomes, then, one of the central topics of mystical love experience. The 
mystic who is completely absorbed in his love contemplates in the human beloved 
only the perfect manifestation of divine beauty, which is as distant from him as God 
Himself” (Schimmel, 1975, p. 290). The almost metaphysical (and in many contexts 
and stories definitely metaphysical) influences of mürşid has a very big part which is 
very much inscribed in the Sûfî tradition through stories and myths. In fact, books like 
“Ariflerin Menkıbeleri” and “Evliya Menkıbeleri”, or “Mesnevi” and “Mantık-ut Tayr” 
are all full of stories like that, Rumi’s love of Şems being probably the most famous.  
Here it should be added that Schimmel points out to a more of an 
individualistic kind of sohbet which is “the intimate conversation between master and 
disciple conducted on a very high spiritual level. The close relation between master 
and disciple reveals itself in tawajjuh [teveccüh], the concentration of the two 
partners upon each other that results in experiences of spiritual unity, faith healing, 
and many other phenomena” (Schimmel, 1975, p. 366). This very intimate and close 
relationship is reminiscent of love in which the two parts finds delight in looking 
(nazar) at the face (vech) of the other and they reach a spiritual unity, which is a 
desired attribute of mârifet. The teveccüh, concentration of the two partners upon 
each other, is an experience of the Sûfî that seemingly takes place in a metaphysical 
reality. In this relationship, when the mürşid faces (teveccüh) towards his mürid with 
his nazar, and the mürid gravitates towards his mürşid, or contemplates it with râbıta.  
Râbıta… in tasavvuf means for the sâlik to connect his heart to his mürşid, and contemplating (mediating) both the mürşid’s face and his morality and his behaviors… According to Sûfîs, râbıta is practiced to clean the heart from the earthly material thoughts, to get feyz [some sort of inspiration, nûr] and through his 
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mediation remembering Allah, in his “absence” establishing a spiritual unity and love [muhabbet]; the most important of all is the love. (Tosun, 2007).  
As stated above, reaching mârifet is about some kind of metaphysical unity, 
which is believed to reveal the true essence of the objects. However, it is dependent 
on one’s knowing oneself and to be able to reach that stage, one has to first pass the 
stage of nefs-i levvâme and continue his sülük in nefs-i mülhime and then in nefs-i 
mutmaine and so on. However, when the mürid transcends the intellect and starts to 
get inspirations, and also see the tecellis (manifestations, reflections) of Allah, it is 
already explained that a mürşid is needed. However, the role of the mürşid was not 
exactly stated in that stages except being a guide in the metaphysical realm. Actually, 
râbıta is a tool, a flashlight that enlightens the path in the metaphysical realm for the 
mürid. According to Şehâbeddin es-Sühreverdî, “It is better for a mürid to face (nazar) 
at his mürşid, to fully concentrate on him and to watch/contemplate the 
manifestations that reflects from his mürşid, than wandering in the semâ (skies) by 
himself (Tosun, 2007). That is to say, instead of getting lost in the countless 
manifestations of Allah in the stage of drunkenness, it is better for the sâlik to focus 
on the manifestations that becomes apparent on his mürşid. Foucault quoting 
Alcibiades’ words, which actually are quite similar to many other Sûfî sayings, gives 
the keys to understand this phenomenon as well: “The soul cannot know itself except 
by looking at itself in a similar element, a mirror. Thus, it must contemplate the divine 
element” (Foucault, 1988). That is how one finds what he is, how he looks like in the 
reality: through the mirror called mürşid. Through the practice of contemplation, one 
gets attracted to the manifestation of Hakk, which is at the same time the reflection 
of one’s self. Hence the boundaries between the self and the Hakk disappears and 
the self and the reflection becomes one, which is named in tasavvuf as fenâ fi’ş-şeyh 
(to perish in şeyh / mürşid). 
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CHAPTER 4 
MEDIATION IN THE TRANSMISSION OF ISLAMIC 
KNOWLEDGE IN CURRENT TURKEY 
     
4.1) Closing of Medrese and Tekke & Islamic Education after the 
Republic 
 
In previous chapters, the understanding of “knowledge” in the Sünnî-Islamic 
tradition, which has become intertwined with tasavvuf over the centuries, is 
discussed in detail and differentiated from both the Western and Westernized 
current Turkish perceptions and presuppositions. Besides, the difference in the 
understanding of knowledge between the ulemâ and the Sûfîs is made clear under 
the significations of ‘ilm and mârifet. Then, the effects of this dichotomy on the 
practices of the transmission of knowledge, respectively in the medreses and the 
tekkes is investigated and the intrinsic relation of mediation to learning practices 
within these traditional systems is pointed out. Now, in this chapter, I will investigate 
the changes in the notion of Islamic knowledge as well as the changes in the practices 
of learning and the forms of mediation in current Turkey, after the reform 
movements of the founders of the new Republic, which constituted a breaking point 
from the traditional.  
Traditionally, the transmission of knowledge in the Islamic societies, mostly 
occurred in medreses and tekkes as studied previously; that was also the case in the 
Ottoman Empire. As the empire prospered through the centuries, these institutions 
became more established and vastly spread over many of its territories. They have 
become the vibrant centers of the intellectual and communal life. 29  Before the 
collapse of the empire, towards the end of the 17th century, the count of the 
                                                          
29 Medrese and tekke have also become intertwined in many cases, with the involvement of the müderris in tarikats (Berkey, 1992). 
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medreses in Istanbul was about 125 and reached over 500 till 19th century (Kazıcı, 
1999, p. 162). At the beginning of the 1790s, 2947 students would be living in the 
medreses in Istanbul (Çelebi, 1999, p. 178). Right before the reformation movements 
in the new Republic, it is known that there were 479 medreses and 18.000 students 
registered in them, even though at that time it is known that about 12.000 of them 
had enrolled in a medrese to escape the military service, and they were not really 
attending these institutions; in each medrese, there was also a teacher (Özkan, 2006, 
pp. 86-87). 
On the other hand, Kreiser notes that “between 1820 and 1920 there were 
some two thousand to three thousand tekkes in the provinces of Anatolia and 
Rumelia, which together formed the nucleus of the Ottoman Empire; in Istanbul, 
during this period there were some three hundred tekkes (Kreiser, 1992, p. 49). Thus, 
when one considers the close to 18 million population in the Ottoman Empire before 
it collapsed, and the population of Istanbul then about 900 thousand including only 
560 thousand Muslims, it can be estimated that there was a tekke for each 3000 
people in Istanbul, and a tekke for each 1860 Muslims (Karpat, 1985, p. 190). Kreiser 
actually states that in 1870, there were 1826 registered residents of the tekkes in 
Istanbul, about 1% of all male population of the city (Kreiser, 1992, p. 49). This does 
not of course mean at all that people attending the rituals at the tekkes were limited 
to this number. While the residents of a tekke might be a few, hundreds would be 
drawn to the gatherings because tekke is not like a monastery where all the disciples 
live together, instead, people of the community would gather together at the tekke 
during ritualistic occasions. Kreiser’s claim also supports this, according to the 
estimates he uses, “one in four of the city’s male Muslim inhabitants was associated 
with a tekke (Kreiser, 1992, p. 49).  
In comparison, recently, in 2010 there were about 3028 mosques in Istanbul, 
2707 primary and high schools, and 29 universities (Karabacak, 2010). Given the 12.5 
million official population count at that time, it makes a school for about 4600 people, 
and a mosque for each 4100, just to put things in perspective (Karabacak, 2010). With 
this kind of data, it should not be wrong to assume that both the medreses, and the 
tekkes had a big potential to influence the social, political and economic life within 
the Ottoman society, especially towards the end of the empire.  
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While these institutions were very central in the social life and to the 
educational practices of the public during especially the last century of the Ottoman 
Empire, the empire was struggling in itself. There were many wars and uprisings 
during this period due to the effects of the nationalist movements triggered starting 
from France. Besides, the empire had not caught up to the technological 
advancements that bloomed after the renaissance and reformation period in the 
Western world; the industrial revolution had not taken place either. Consequently, 
the empire’s technologies of war, both technical and logistical, were behind the 
European counterparts as well (Sander, 2003, p. 291). Therefore, the rulers decided 
to improve their technological, economic and diplomatic power by establishing a new 
and Westernized army. This process of course required new military and government 
officials who are educated in the Western sense, thus the changes automatically 
triggered the foundation of new educational institutions. Since these academies were 
established in the hopes of “saving the empire”, they became very prestigious.  “This 
set in motion a long, incremental process whereby Islamic knowledge per se came to 
be differentiated from other knowledge and identified as ‘religious,’ while the 
distribution of prestige among knowledge also shifted (e.g., knowledge of Arabic-the 
language of classical Islamic scholarship-was not a condition of excellence in the new 
disciplines)” (Silverstein, 2008). 
This perspective towards the superiority of the Western education persisted 
in the academy-graduate, nationalist founders of the Turkish Republic as well and as 
Silverstein puts it: “eventually glossed as secularism, by both foreign observers and 
Turks themselves” (2008). Thus, on 3 March 1924, when the law to abolish the 
caliphate system was passed, there were two other major proposals for social reform 
that followed it: First was the abolishing of the Şer'iye ve Evkaf Vekâleti (Ministry of 
Shari’a and Charitable Foundations) and establishment of the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs under the office of the prime minister, and the second was the consolidation 
of all the educational institutions under the new Ministry of Education. The prior (Law 
Number 429, Article 5), stipulated, that within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic 
the management of all cami (mosques), mescid, tekke and zâviye, and all 
appointments and dismissals of imams, hatips (people who delivers the sermon), vâiz 
(preachers), şeyhs (mürşids), müezzins (reciter of the call to worship), and other 
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personnel will be undertaken by the Presidency of Religious Affairs” (Önkal & Bozkurt, 
p. 54).Therefore, any authority that is left from Şeyh’ül İslam was taken under the 
state control. And the latter (Law Number 430), paved the way of closing down the 
medreses and state’s taking control of the religious education – medreses were 
actually closed down after a decree issued a few months later by the Minister of 
Education, Hüseyin Vasfi Çınar, stating that having professional subjects in primary 
schools is contradictory to the very law (Özkan, 2006, p. 86).  
Even though the caliphate was abolished, all the religious authority was 
gathered in the state and the medreses were closed right after this law, the founders 
of the Republic did not close the tekkes. It was only after the Şeyh Said rebellion that 
they have passed a new law (Number 677), which abolished the orders and closed 
the tekkes. This law stated that  
The tekkes with mosques attached or that were also used as mosques would continue to be used solely as mosques; those not used as mosques would be used as schools, and those unable to be used would be sold, with the proceeds going to the education budget. Titles such as hoca, shakyh [şeyh], baba, and dede, given to the leaders of religious communities, were banned, as was wearing turban and robes for all but official (i.e. state) functionaries (e.g. imams and müftüs) while conducting their duties (Silverstein, 2007, p. 47).  
Consequently, by the end of 1925, both the medreses and the tekkes were 
officially closed at the very beginnings of the new republic. 
As all these abolitions taking place, the founders started replacing the 
institutions with new establishments. Thus, a faculty of theology (İlahiyat Fakültesi) 
is opened instead of Medrese-i Süleymaniye (Özkan, 2006, p. 86), and 29 imam-hatip 
schools were established in various places in Turkey to raise students for the prior 
faculty (Nevzatoğlu, 2006, p. 15). Afterwards, throughout the Republican years, these 
schools were closed due to lack of students, re-established in different forms as the 
governments changed, and they have become a very big part of the political and 
sociological discussions of modern Turkey. However, tekkes and tarikats have always 
been closed and thus the Sûfî life and their practices were pushed out of the public 
space into the underground. That means, the state let the Islamic education continue 
under its control through the medrese-like establishments, but never really openly 
allowed or approved the communal gatherings of the Sûfîs. Therefore, the practices 
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and the traditions of the Sûfî life, which used to be very dominant in the Ottoman 
Empire, were abandoned or at least interrupted with the new state. 
 
4.2) From Âlim and Mürşid to Din Görevlisi  
 
The rupture from the Islamic educational traditions at the beginning of the 
Turkish republic was a major one. The founders obviously aimed to incorporate the 
religion in the state system for political reasons, which mainly is to sustain the 
constructed national identity, and have the strings to this powerful tool of discipline 
in their hands. For this, first of all, the state has intentionally taken control over the 
religious practices as well as the religious discourse, by keeping the Presidency of 
Islamic Affairs under its umbrella even though it conflicts with its own secular 
foundations; by raising its own modern-religious elite and authority that is 
harmonious with the state; and by spreading the religious information in a distilled, 
state approved form in schools. Through this process, both the religious identities 
and the religious practices are reconstructed, in a more “secular” way; in other 
words, the traditional understanding of religion and the religious is altered and 
redefined in a way that it does not constitute a very different entity of its own 
compared to the state ideologies. Thus religion is not only separated from the state 
affairs and government but it is also detached from the social lives of the people. 
As a result of the reformation movements, with the alteration of the religious 
“production” models, the traditional religious titles like âlim, şeyh, mürşid mostly 
disappeared from the culture, and left their places to hoca, imam, müezzin, hatip, 
vâiz, müftü, or as Behçet Batur also noticed, din adamı (religious person) became din 
görevlisi (religious personnel) (Batur, 2015). That is to say, the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs lost its predecessor’s role of religious leadership and representation and 
became an organization of religious service which mostly caters to people’s needs in 
ibadet (religious rituals) and moral support (Batur, 2015). This juxtaposition also 
portrays the difference between the âlim, şeyh, or mürşid and the religious 
personnel. The difference occurs mainly from the source of authority. While as seen 
in the previous chapter, the şeyh or mürşid has total authority on his disciples, a 
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religious personnel does not have a true authority on people. Especially while the 
mürşid has the power to help alter one’s life, character and subjectivity through a 
disciplining process, religious personnel only leads the prayers, reiterates what the 
books and his education dictates and at best preach the people on what the Ministry 
decides for that week’s hutbe during Friday Prayers. Therefore, while mürşid’s 
authority lies in himself, his knowledge and his moral being, reinforced by the silsile 
that leads to the Prophet Muhammed, din görevlisi is an appointed person who gets 
his authority from the government and his formal education. Therefore, he lacks the 
charisma. The shift of the authority is from the enlightened man not even to a 
“knowledgeable” man, but to a representative. Therefore, the questions he can 
answer are limited merely to the rituals, rules and “regulations” as well. In other 
words, he can give a textbook answer, pre-ordered from the Presidency, about how 
one can be modest, but he cannot really be a role model for these kind of moral 
qualities. He can tell but he does not have an outlet to show how he lives; his duty 
usually is confined between the prayers. 
When the authority of the imam or hoca is referred to his state-approved and 
certified formal education, the underlying power that he holds originates from his 
knowledge of the Arabic language, which is almost exclusively taught in the theology 
faculties as an extension of Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatus. In other words, 
the educational institutions like imam-hatips and the theology (ilahiyat) faculties 
“teaches ‘know-how’, but in forms which ensure subjection to the ruling ideology or 
the mastery of its practice” (Althusser, 2001, p. 133). This way the state can exercise 
its control over the transmission of Islamic knowledge, and grant the authority to only 
those who subjugates to the established order. Since the Kur’an is revealed in Arabic, 
a common Turkish person does not have a chance to directly interact with it, he has 
to either rely on the translations which differ from one other, therefore they are not 
absolute at all, or read the exegesis, which is also abundant and a lot more lengthy in 
size. Thus, by learning the Arabic language, the imam, hoca or a theology professor, 
constructs himself as a religious authoritative elite. 
This power he gains from knowledge, manifests itself best in the hutbes 
“preached” during the Friday prayer: all the hutbes start with a verse from the Kur’an. 
Therefore, while the imam starts talking in Arabic, with all its guttural sounds, he 
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elevates to a higher status, gathering his authority from his command on the Arabic 
language, and in a way tells people that he is the one who can understand Kur’an, 
and mediate that knowledge to them. The hutbe preached on the 22nd of 2016, 
similar to all others, which is distributed online from the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs and preached in the mosques in Turkey is a good example of both this power 
relationships and the “secularism” of the religious practice. 
This hutbe starts with the Arabic recitation of a Hadis about being truthful (not 
even a Kur’anic verse), then the imam addresses the crowd with one of the already 
written out opening words like “beloved Muslims”, “my brothers”, “my valuable 
brothers” etc. as if he is not reading the pre-written text, but preaching to them. Only 
after these, imam gives the Turkish translation of the verses. As he continues to talk 
about honesty, he reads: “In speech, morality is important. Words has a morality, an 
etiquette. A mümin (believer) should reflect his grace and politeness. His words 
should be gentle and beautiful, that touches the hearts. For this, the words should 
come from one’s heart as well.” The preaching continues, and usually ends with the 
imam saying: “I want to finish my words with a prayer, or a verse, or a Hadis etc. (Din 
Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2016). As it is clear from the above, hutbe is a sole 
performance. It is a tool to create social stratification and reinforce the authority of 
the imam. Besides, the short performance in this case, like most, is about morality. 
Ironically, while the imam is talking about the etiquette of talking, he is actually not 
talking, or not preaching at all, he is just reading a pre-written text, he is performing 
and thus he himself is not true to what he “claims”. This alone shows how detached 
the hutbe is from an actual sohbet. This performance start in the middle of the Friday 
prayer, as the imam walks up the minber and ends as he descends from it to continue 
his job as to lead the prayer. Therefore, he is there as a personnel of the Presidency; 
he is performing his duties, nothing less, nothing more. He is detached from the 
community at that point as well. He is there not because of his character, his morals, 
or that he deserve to be there due to his knowledge, but simply because he has to be 
there as an official who gets paid by the government. 
On the other hand, these hutbes can also be quite openly as political as it can. 
The hutbe on 18 March 2016 is another great example which is about the Dardanelle 
Wars. In the text it says: “Today, we are going through tough times in our region. 
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Those who would like to agitate us against each other and weaken us are trying to 
throw us into the fire… [They] should know that we are a nation whose colors, 
tongues, voices, and hearts have blended into each other… Brothers… We should not 
forget that terrorism and those who uses terror intents to harm our state, our nation, 
and our sacred” (Din Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2016). It is clear that the “voice” 
of the state is disseminating from imam’s recitation. The authority behind him is clear 
as the state, which is trying to install its own moral dispositions, its own ideology to 
the believers that crowd the mosques.  
In the hutbes, as also seen, usually the imam talks about practices about 
religious rituals, and how to behave like a “good Muslim”. All the hutbes are the same 
in Turkey, which are published online at the website of the Presidency. These hutbes 
are written in a way that when recited, it feels like the imam is addressing the people 
in the mosque directly, written in the first person. However, people are aware of the 
fact that this is a stage performance. The difference from the sohbet is clear, it is not 
improvised, and it does not come from the imam himself, not from his heart, soul or 
morality. It is the state talking to them. Therefore, it lacks discipline and the power 
to trigger self-discipline in the listeners and help them internalize moral dispositions. 
People do not really associate with the imam, they cannot see him as a role-model. 
On the other hand, people are not self-conscious about their behaviors while 
listening to the hutbe, there is not an environment where they would be aspired to 
behave like the imam or the other people, because there is not a real presence of 
interaction. It is just a performance, a ritual on both sides – the imam and the 
believer. Hence, these gatherings for the Cuma Prayer and the Hutbe may not be too 
effective at creating moral dispositions in people. 
Currently, a mosque is mostly a place to observe the prayers, and the funerals; 
it is a place for religious practice. In the law that ordered the tekkes to be closed, as 
already stated, it is legislated that “the tekkes with mosques attached or that were 
also used as mosques would continue to be used solely as mosques”; therefore, it 
can be stated that the transformation was actually targeting social aspects, namely 
the education and the discipline systems in the tekkes. In other words, the state did 
not have a problem with the rituals that could be used to reinforce the constructed 
national identity, thus it is no surprise that Sema “shows” were the first to be revived 
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from the Sûfî traditions in the recent years, but it did not want the practices of 
subjectification (in French, subjectivation), which according to Foucault is a process 
that the subject constitutes itself using the techniques available to it historically, and 
doubtless under the inﬂuence of myriad factors outside its control  (Kelly, 2013, p. 
513), and the close-knit religious communities that help installing moral dispositions 
to continue on. We can claim that the founders of republic wanted to hold on to the 
Muslim identity, thus to the rituals of the religion, may be as a unifier of the construct 
of the “millet” (nation); however, they did not wish the self-disciplinary path of 
tasavvuf which offers people “technologies of the self” to persist. In other words, 
they intended to keep the tools that would enable the subjection of the people within 
the state system, but forbid the ones that would help people for their subjectification, 
that is to autonomously establishing themselves as subjects. Thus the education in 
medreses were transformed and the legacy of the tekkes were forbidden. What that 
left for the people of the state is, therefore, merely the knowledge and the 
observance of the rituals.  
The importance of the presence and the disciplinary practices in tekkes is 
already explained in the previous chapter. Some people back then, before the 
Republic, used put utmost care about their religious practices as well, but it was to 
reform their subjectivity, to discipline themselves to transform their selves. The goal 
was to purify the soul and to know more about oneself; tekke was a place of spiritual 
development where people gathered, shared, and developed together instead of a 
bare ritual place. With the authority of the mürşid and with his charisma, one would 
be inclined to internalize the moral dispositions, whether it is due to the effect of 
acting together as a community, or whether it is due to the love that is generated 
between the disciple and the mürşid, which in turn leads the disciple to aspire to 
assume the character of his mürşid and to imitate him. From the Medieval to Modern, 
there is a big gap formed between the practices of the tekke and today’s mosques, 
which manifests itself in the announcement in the mosques: “Turn off your 
cellphones!” “Make room for the people outside!” “Do not step on the rug with wet 
feet!” Compared to the ethics, etiquette and care for each other that is silently 
cultured and nurtured within the desired and influential habitus found in the tekkes, 
which helped internalizing the moral dispositions, in the mosques, even the good and 
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common-sense practices that are related to the care of each other needs to be 
voiced, literally quite loudly. As a matter of fact, in many mosques, we cannot find a 
true community inside anymore, which works as a catalyzer for self-control and safe-
care techniques. Instead now, one prays and leaves, without even meeting the other 
Muslims he is sitting next to. After the performance is acted, and the imposed identity 
is reinforced through practice, he goes back to his daily, secularized daily life.  
 
4.3) From Tarikat to Cemaat: De Certeau’s Tactics in Action 
 
While the founders of the Turkish state aimed to incorporate the religion into 
the state system to help construct the national identity, and tried to take control over 
the religious practices and the religious discourse through creating its own modern-
religious elite and educational institutions, they could not simply erase or control the 
past traditions and everyday practices of religion all at once. The state, as seen in the 
Şeyh Said uprisings, has seen some resistance to the reformations since the very 
beginnings of the Republic, and due to the conflicts tarikats went underground and 
found new forms of existence, which Ünver Günay calls “parallel religion” (2012, p. 
599). 
After the rupture from the old traditions with the closing of the medreses and 
tekkes, the social dynamics revolving around the transmission of Islamic knowledge, 
the intrinsic mediation forms and construction of a religious subject within the 
Republic can be seen through the influential perspective Michel de Certeau offers in 
his book “The Practice of Everyday Life” (1984). There, de Certeau separates practice 
into two different forms: strategy and tactic. According to him,  
A ‘strategy’ the calculus of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from an ‘environment.’ A strategy assumes a place that can be circumscribed as proper (propre) and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, ‘clienteles,’ ‘targets,’ or ‘objects’ of research). Political, economic, and scientific rationality has been constructed on this strategic model (1984, p. XIX). 
With this definition, we can identify the reformations of the Republic as 
strategic. The new state, “subject of will and power”, isolated the Presidency of 
Religious affairs from other religious institutions, singling it out as the official 
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authority on religion. Thus, the state strategically dictated the understanding of 
religion and religious of the Presidency, which is in concordance with the desired 
national identity, as the “proper”. This circumscription left out the disciplinary 
practices of tarikats from the accepted boundary of Sünnî and nationalistic religion. 
On the other hand, de Certeau differentiates a tactic from the strategy as “a 
calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus.” (1984, p. 37). 
According to him, tactic is “a calculus which cannot count on a ‘proper’ (a spatial or 
institutional localization), nor thus on a border-line distinguishing the other as a 
visible totality” (de Certeau, 1984, p. XIX). Instead, he claims, “The place of a tactic 
belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the other's place, fragmentarily, 
without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance.” (de 
Certeau, 1984, p. XIX). After tekkes were closed down, or converted into state 
controlled mosques, “absence of a proper locus” is exactly how the Sûfîs were left 
with. They did not have a place or a locus to continue their traditional practices. 
Therefore, as de Certeau asserts, the Sûfîs had to “play on and with a terrain imposed 
on [them] and organized by the law of a foreign power” (1984, p. 37), which was the 
new state. They had to manipulate the situation at hand and seize any opportunities 
of existence. According to de Certeau, a tactic “must vigilantly make use of the cracks 
that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers. It 
poaches in them. It creates surprises in them. It can be where it is least expected. It 
is a guileful ruse.” (1984, p. 37). Hence, the tarikats, excluded from the public space, 
came to existence again, where it is least expected, in the mosques, and in the 
educational institutions.  
According to Hakan Yavuz, the people from the tarikat of Nakşibendî, took 
official government posts at the Presidency of Religious Affairs, in the mosques as a 
form of Sûfî activism (2005, p. 190). In other words, this new formation of Sûfîs 
started to exercise their practices within the domain of the state, within the rules 
they have set, legally. Thus the Sûfî communities in the tekkes called tarikats have 
started to be identified as cemaats of mosques, which turned into new public spheres. 
According to Bayram Sevinç, it was actually Mehmed Zahit Kotku, the leader of the 
tarikat, who had been preaching as an imam-hatip in various mosques, transformed 
the cemaat of the İskenderpaşa mosque into a new form of tarikat, and the mosque 
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itself into a new form of tekke (2012). He further claims that using his official title, 
and duty, Kotku was able to continue/revive the tradition of sohbet in a new form as 
he prolonged his official vaazs (preaching) into the garden of the mosque or to its 
annex – which was his home – reading and explaining Hadis from Gümüşhânevî’s 
book called Râmûz (2012). It is true that tekkes and mosques had been mostly 
intertwined in the Ottoman Empire, and it was hard to separate the two institutions. 
However, the Republic tore them apart sharply and abandoned the tekkes as a 
symbol of backwardness. Therefore, re-utilization of the mosques in these new forms 
to serve the Sûfî aspirations, was a very deceitful tactic indeed. Moreover, his tactic 
seems to hold very effective. Ünver Günay, referencing Thierry Zarcone’s work in 
1993, “Nakşibendiler ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti”, claims that tarikats in Turkey like 
Nakşibendîlik, Kadirîlik, Rufaîlik continued their existence through the mosques, but 
others like Bektaşilik and Mevlevîlik could not keep their traditions as much (2012, p. 
600). 
It should be noted that the transformation of the tarikats into cemaats, or in 
other words the relocation of the tekke culture in the mosque brought along changes 
within the Sûfî practices and forms as well. As seen in the third chapter, tarikat used 
to be a form of mediation to reach mârifet, to establish one’s subjectivity through 
disciplining practices. In other words, it was dominantly an individual effort for self-
establishment and personal perfection. With the exclusion of these practices from 
the public space in the new state, the efforts within these mosques shifted from 
transforming one’s existence to actually existing within the general public space. The 
main problem for these new forms of tarikat was more of an identity issue. Thus, it 
turned into a resistance against the state, it became politicized. “Kotku converted the 
mosque-centered cemaat structure into a semi-political movement. İskenderpaşa 
Camii became not a place where the old sit and prayed; but a center that directs the 
young (Yavuz H. , 2005, p. 192). The idea of the political Milli Selamet Party is also 
originated from this movement, and from Kotku himself (Yavuz H. , 2005, p. 279). In 
a broader sense, the tarikat, or in its new form cemaat, slowly became an 
organization that aims for the political and economic freedom of the pious Muslims. 
The course of the transformation is very similar in the Gülen movement as 
well. Even though, Fettullah Gülen, the leader of this movement, has not been a 
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disciple of any specific Sûfî order but he is well-versed in their books (Topal, 2012, p. 
194). When he is offered an official duty in Edirne as an imam, he starts to utilize vaaz 
outside the formal norms, similar to Korkut. He gathers about thirty people from the 
cemaat in the mosque that joins him in the sohbets (Sevinç, 2012, p. 137). Then when 
he is appointed as the central vâiz in İzmir, he attains a change to address big crowds; 
there, he also volunteers at the Kestanepazarı Derneği Kur’an course, where he 
educates the future key players of his movement (Sevinç, 2012, p. 138).  
Topal claims that the practices of the Gülen movement is similar to the 
movements Saba Mahmood describes in her work “The Politics of Piety” published in 
2005, and as such, “are provoked by a specific problem,  namely,  the  concern  for  
learning  to  organize  one’s  daily  life according to Islamic standards of virtuous 
conduct in a world increasingly ordered by a logic of secular rationality that is inimical 
to the sustenance of these virtues.” (2005, p. 56). Therefore, in contrast to the direct 
political goals of the cemaat of İskenderpaşa, the Gülen movement focuses more on 
the cultural aspects of Islam and try to make them visible in the public space. They 
have tactically opened up dersanes (cram schools), private schools, dorms, student 
housing, camps etc. all acting through secular educational institutions but catering 
for their own agenda. Then they also took part in the economy, media and public 
service and with the power they have gained, they started to organize national and 
international conferences and cultural events. Moreover, they became established 
as NGOs as a manifestation of their motto: hizmet, altruistic service, which helped 
spreading the movement even to greater crowds. 
The concept of hizmet comes out as the essence of Gülen’s ethic,  urging  the  believer  to  take  up  a  role,  a  “vocation”  in  the  public space, and do it as best as he/she can in order to show others that one can be a good Muslim and a good teacher, engineer, businessman, etc. at the same  time. (Sevinç, 2012, p. 195). 
This ethical and altruistic participation in the public space was the presented 
essence of the movement. Gülen was trying to cultivate a “Golden Generation” based 
on the characteristics of the sahabe (Sevinç, 2012, p. 140), and the goal of the system 
he created was the construction of a new Muslim identity who has earned his/her 
space in the public space, which had been used by the nation-state to create its own 
generation (Sevinç, 2012, p. 195). 
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Almost in every society and in every period of the history, rapid changes in 
the society, whether it is due to wars, immigration, globalization, changes in 
educational and communication systems and transition from the traditional to 
modern hasten the process of seeking religious based identities and the tendency to 
join religious and mystic communities (Günay, 2012, p. 421). When the 
modernization and secularization process of Turkey is taken into account from this 
general perspective as a very sudden transformation, with the alteration in the 
educational institutions and practices, it can be claimed that the emergent religious 
communities of the Republic with the name of cemaat, became a new destination for 
people who have been seeking a religious identity.   
 With the driving force, which the seek for an religious identity created, as seen 
from the discussions above, both İskenderpaşa and Gülen cemaats were able to exert 
various tactics, which de Certeau considers “an art of the weak” (1984, p. 37), through 
taking advantage of opportunities that present themselves within the normative 
system of the state. They were trying to take part in the public space with their 
identities; they were trying to exist and be visible again within the system where the 
traditional no longer belonged. Hence, with this process, the traditional overarching 
disciplining strategies found in the tekkes to transform the individual into insan-ı 
kâmil, and to give a disciple the chance of attaining subjectivity, had to give way to 
the new tactics, and diminished slowly from people’s daily practices.  
 
4.4) New Forms of Mediation: Example of Religious TV Programs 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, the authority gap within the 
transmission of Islamic knowledge, which occurred after the closing of the medreses 
and the tekkes is not only filled intentionally by the state with new educational and 
religious institutions to create a Islamic-national identity, but due to these alterations 
new forms of knowledge transmission have also emerged as a form of resistance. As 
the state continued to impose the constructed national identity, Muslims, especially 
the Sûfîs, tried many tactics to exist within the state with their own identities. Some 
of the tarikats that were present before the republic went underground, and kept 
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their practices in a secret fashion; but continued to reach out to the public through 
utilizing and taking advantage of the modern mediums accepted as legal by the state, 
like mosques and vaaz, or like the educational institutions like schools, universities, 
dorms, dersanes, seminars, and conferences, or even the media, TVs, newspapers 
and magazines. However, with the transformation of the medium, the practices like 
sohbet in which people come together and form moral dispositions have also 
changed.  
For example, Gülen himself remarks that he has realized that there is a 
difference between the cemaat who comes and listens to him regularly, and the 
people who attended his vaaz on an eid holiday (Sevinç, 2012, p. 138). Thus it makes 
a difference that in the mosques, since they are considered public space, there may 
be other people who do not have any connection to the community which is tried to 
be built. Gülen states in an interview that he cannot know what kind of a cemaat that 
is when thousands of people are listening to him; “the vaaz is open to the state 
officials, to military personnel, to the governor, to the judge.” (Açan, 1999). It is the 
same for the conferences, TV programs, and any other events that utilizes the pre-
existing public space. Thus the space that they try to exist limits the connection 
among the participants with the inclusion of outsiders. The autonomy of the 
subculture is lost, and thus the intimate, personalized, and authoritative interaction 
has become deteriorated. As a result, the transformative effect of the practices 
becomes questionable. Gülen himself states that “while he was delivering vaaz in 
mosques, there were people who do not observe the prayers but still listening to the 
sohbet without abdest [ablution]” (Açan, 1999).  
Studying the practice of vaaz in the İskenderpaşa and Gülen cemaats within 
the same framework, Sevinç argues that this practice is a tool of transmitting the 
collective memory onto the new generations (2012). Besides, he adds that the texts 
that are converted from this oral practice and cassettes created a new system in 
which people at their homes and students in the houses owned by the Gülen 
movement would learn about the collective memory, created it, and recreate it again. 
(Sevinç, 2012, p. 140). While creating a “chain of memory”, as Sevinç calls it, through 
the given forms may be important in the construction of identity, it should be noted 
that the new forms of knowledge transmission may not automatically lead to the 
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embodiment of moral dispositions or to the establishment of subjectivity. The aim of 
both the vaaz and the cemaats seems to be more about forming religious identities 
then offering a platform for the people as, tarikats do, to discipline and transform 
themselves into a real subject. It is not a self-reflective effort, but mostly an endeavor 
to change the society. 
In a similar manner, Silverstein compares two different forms of sohbet during 
the transmission of Islamic knowledge in his field study, one with the presence of the 
mürşid, and the other through the radio. He observed that while the listeners of Esad 
Hoca, the [mürşid] of the Nakşibendi order following Mehmed Zahid Kotku, used to 
“sat on the floor, upright, careful not to let their bodies go limp or display lack of 
attention,” during his sohbets on the TV, the listeners “did not display the same care, 
tea was often served, and one might even scan the headlines of a newspaper while 
listening” (Silverstein, 2008). Even though the difference between the two may seem 
subtle, it actually represents a big gap between the religious understandings between 
the two forms. In addition to the problems discussed about vaaz, with the 
transformations that occurred with the invention of new mediums like radio and TV, 
the authority of the presenter is undermined since it is not a direct presence, and 
secondly, this lack of presence obstruct the wish of changing one’s self to a higher 
moral being. Like the imam in an ordinary mosque, there is neither a consistent and 
observable morality nor a group of people that act to foster each other’s personal 
development. Subject is detached and distanced from the reflection of his ideal self, 
the mürşid, the guide, role model and the absolute authority over one’s life. 
According to Fore, religions role of informing is replaced by the TV. While preaching used to be delivered both from the pulpit and the media, today the monopoly of religious institution over the knowledge has been slowly seized by the mass media, especially the TV. The challenge is solid: TV through various means is taking over the rituals and customs that are perceived as “religious” (Gülerarslan, 2010, p. 225).  
In parallel, the “sohbet” programs on the TV, as a form of transmission of 
Islamic knowledge, in which mostly some infamous professors of theology take part 
in have actually become very popular. According to a survey, 77.1% of the people 
who joined the research in Turkey accepted to take interest in religious programs; 
from those 62.6% stated that they improved their common ideas about religion, and 
48.3% stated that these programs strengthened their beliefs; however, interestingly, 
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only 11.95% of the people claimed to have changed their attitudes with the influence 
of these TV programs (Biçer, 2011). From these statistics, it can be deduced that the 
rise in the interest of people towards religion in the form of religious programs does 
not amount to a more “religious” life; that is to say, because people are taking 
interest in the religious TV programs, they will not necessarily undergo a self-
transformation a formative process. 
Neil Postman, who states that not everything can be shown on the TV, also claims that the TV and the medium that it creates has characteristics that would make it impossible for a true religious experience. According to Postman, first of all, it is not possible to sanctify the location, in which the screenings of religious content is experienced. In all religious rituals, there is a need to decorate the space with sanctity, and rules that are harmonious with the transcendental like not to eat, not to talk, to be quiet etc. However, since the individuals can continue their daily activities while watching the TV, they cannot reach the spiritual realm necessary for the true religious experience (Gülerarslan, 2010).  
Hence, the environment that the TVs, Radios, seminars in the form of sohbet 
create, or even the atmosphere in the mosques to a certain extent when compared 
to the tekkes, does not allow a true religious experience. They lack the sacred, the 
presence, and the interaction between the parties like it was in between the mürşid 
and mürid.  
The transmission of religious knowledge differs, as it can be inferred from the 
examples above, between a local environment surrounded with interconnected 
personalities and a TV show as an example. The face-to-face value of the 
communication, the discipline of presence, and its authority and persuasiveness, 
which can lead to the embodiment of moral dispositions, is different than the remote 
interaction via the TV. Thus the hocas on TV, compelled to utilize mimics, gestures 
and words to “make people believe”, as de Certeau puts it, in their spectacular staged 
acts. Right before their act, just like the imams in the mosques, they start their talk 
with an Arabic sentence, whether it is a Kur’anic verse or a Hadis, even though most 
of the mass that listens to them has no clue what they are saying, present it as a 
testament, as evidence and then explains its meaning in Turkish, having already 
established the authority. De Certeau’s outlook on this issue, “making people 
believe”, is striking:  
’Be quite’ says the TV anchorman or the political representative, ‘these are the facts, here are the data, the circumstances, etc…Therefore you must……’ Narrated reality constantly tells us what must be believed and what must be done. What can you 
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oppose to the facts? You can only give in, and obey what they ‘signify,’ like an oracle, like the oracle of Delphi. The fabrication of simulacra thus provides the means of producing believers and hence people practicing their faiths. This establishment of the real is the most visible form of our contemporary dogmas (de Certeau, 1984, p. 186). 
The current situation in any form of Islamic knowledge transmission is at best 
a theoretical lesson, where the listeners use their intellect to conceptualize the given 
information, or basically believe in the “real” that is presented to them. The 
educational forms have lost their appeal to form any “technology of the self.” Even if 
the lesson is about action, it does not really offer a place to practice that action. The 
imam in the mosque, or the hoca on the TV, with their lives and practices detached 
from the audience, and distanced from an observational, imitative education process, 
cannot catalyze the internalization of moral dispositions. That is why most people 
learn most of their religious knowledge till the age of sixteen as observed from the 
TÜİK statistics given previously in this thesis. Since as Berkey puts it, Islam is 
“something more than a ‘religion’ in the Western sense, but rather an ‘all-embracing 
way of life’” (Berkey, 2003, p. 143), the daily practices, gestures, and attitudes needs 
to be inherited by the youth through the power of influence. Thus, children and 
teenagers can only internalize the moral dispositions that are in place in their 
households and those that are embodied by their parents.  
On the other hand, Postman states: “TV has made entertainment the ‘natural 
format for the representation of all experience’ and ‘the supra-ideology of all 
discourse on television” (Gannaway, 1994). Thus, Gülerarslan claims that it is no 
different for the “religion” and religious discourse on TV based on Postman’s 
assertion; then she adds: “Religious content is often becomes a topic of debate 
programs, but due to the entertainment ideology of the medium, the religious issues 
are stuck in between hedonic presentations that would rivet the viewer to the 
screen.” (Gülerarslan, 2010). “Teke Tek Özel” program in Habertürk on August 2nd, 
2009, which hosted Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca, the leader of the İsmailağa cemaat 
(religious group), quite a few times that he actually became a regular now, can be 
shown as an example to these discussion programs with his sensational humor. He 
says in that program:  
A normal person breathes 24000 times a day… nobody gets tired of… nobody says I’m dead tired breathing, but it is not like that in the zikir, we tell him to repeat ‘Allah’ 
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300 times he starts to get sleepy… that is my advice to people who cannot sleep: they should repeat ‘Allah’ 1000 times and they will surely sleep!.. Because the devil sees that it is worse for the person to stay awake, so it puts him to sleep… I say hell is too expensive, heaven is free but nobody is coming along! Alcohol costs, gambling costs, adultery costs, this costs, that costs. How much does a prayer cost? (Cübbeli Ahmet Hoca, 2015). 
The satirical tone of the Hoca is so overwhelming that the hosts cannot stop 
laughing throughout the “show”. 
The entertainment value in the sohbet programs are also apparent, but in 
different ways. For example, there are touching recitations of poems, naturally 
beautiful scenery at the background appealing to people’s aesthetic senses, and 
surely moving stories of the Prophet and the sahabe (Ergeç, 2006). The voice of the 
speakers take an almost crying tone while telling these stories or reciting the poems, 
with a stirring music in the background. Nihat Hatipoğlu is probably the most famous 
of these type of religious personalities, who is also a famous theology professor and 
an opinion leader. He has crucial impact in terms of religious learning via media tools 
and great potential to reach out to masses. Especially in Ramadan days, his TV 
programs staged in Sultanahmet are followed by many. In a research about religious 
life conducted in Turkey, an interviewee is asked the following question: “Who do 
you seek advice from for religious issues?” and his reply was: “I listen Nihat Hatipoğlu 
on TV. The other hocas on TV, I mean I do not consult any hoca but I wish to ask if 
something is sin or not…” (Akşit, Şentürk, Küçükural, & Cengiz, 2012, p. 418). It is 
obvious that watching religious TV programs provide the spectators with religious 
knowledge but not really in an intellectual or spiritual sense; instead, in between the 
entertaining presentations, it gives some quick ‘recipes’ for the believers the do’s and 
don’ts of Islam. 
Once the images broadcast by television and the time spent in front of the TV set have been analyzed, it remains to be asked what the consumer makes of these images and during these hours. The thousands of people who buy a health magazine, the customers in a supermarket, the practitioners of urban space, the consumers of newspaper stories and legends —what do they make of what they "absorb," receive, and pay for? (de Certeau, 1984, p. 31).  
While de Certeau asking these questions, he means that consuming the given 
knowledge or images by dominant structure, such as media, state or simply power 
source, is not just a consuming activity. He asserts that “the way of using “or 
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“consuming” a product can be different from the imposed one; thus he defines 
consumption as a way of “production” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 11). For the very reason, 
similar to religious TV programs, Esad Coşan’s sohbet’s on the radio, and Gülen’s 
cassettes – the new forms of mediation in the transmission of Islamic knowledge – 
which basically tries to impose a certain kind of knowledge and form certain kind of 
identities, are subject to consumption of the believers. Thus as they consume these 
products (religious knowledge, images and forms) in different, unexpected ways, 
their consumption actually becomes a new ‘production’. As a result, believers create 
their own and altered forms of religion and religious identities, while “consuming” 
religious knowledge from the new forms of mediations. 
These new forms of knowledge transmission and mediation has been deeply 
altering the religious practices of the Turkish people, their understanding of Islam and 
the ways they construct their subjectivity.  
The mass media is attacking the individual… [They] present constructed simulacrum and this, above all, is the loss of the subject. The shattered display of knowledge and the hard-to-understand manipulation of fiction obstruct the true and real communication, creating a ‘biased reality’. This is the craftiest way of mental restraint and a significant amount of people have been deprived of their faculty of communication; they are just imitating (Gülerarslan, 2010, p. 224). 
This imitation is far from emulating the readily present role-models of the past. 
Today, believers keep consuming the dogmas that are created either by the state 
dominated agencies, or the cemaats that tries to find their place in the public space. 
However, just as the books, rules and political ideologies are operationalized in 
different ways as they are interpreted by people (Göle, 2011, p. 119), religion is also 
put to practice in different forms. Thus people in Turkey mostly discuss only the 
ritualistic parts of Islam, and collectively reproduce a “biased”, question-answer 
based, utilitarian religion, which may cater to nobodies interest, except their own. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
  According to research mediation has a quite substantial effect in the 
transmission of Islamic knowledge in current Turkey as inferred from the TÜİK 
statistics in the first chapter. There are various traditional reasons behind this 
abundance and dominance of mediators as the main resources of religious education.  
First, the nature and perception of knowledge within this cultural background 
suggests that mediation and the necessity of an endeavor to attain it are intrinsic to 
the concept itself since the beginning of the religion with the very first revelations. 
From that time on, it became obvious that the understanding of knowledge is 
differentiated from the Westernized and “modern” understanding in Turkey, and 
thus from episteme and gnosis both. Islamic knowledge is a knowledge beyond the 
sphere of the intellect, which encapsulates moral dispositions and aims for a unity of 
the knowledge and the knower. Besides, there are different understandings of 
knowledge within the Islamic culture as well, one being ‘ilm, the other being mârifet, 
a transcendental and absolute form of knowledge, which the Sûfîs put forth. The 
investigation of both these understandings shows that mediation is necessary in the 
transmission of knowledge no matter what. However, the latter kind of knowledge, 
mârifet also makes it obvious that there is an intertwined relation between 
knowledge, mediation and practice, since it can only be attained through the acts of 
self-purification.  
The historical practices of Islamic education occurred mainly in two different 
institutions, namely the medrese and tekke. In the medreses, students mostly 
concentrated on studying and memorizing under the close supervision and authority 
of a müderris. Here we saw that authority is a way of ensuring the continuity of the 
correct knowledge as well as the continuity of the authority itself. This is useful to 
understand some of the current practices which are very similar to today, like the 
constant recitation of the Kur’an, without understanding what it means. However, 
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the learning practices in tekkes are quite different, heavily invested in practice and 
discipline. In tekkes, the aim, as discussed, is to reach a form of enlightenment and 
absolute knowledge, and to be able to do that Sûfîs in the tekkes, believed that they 
should purify the soul with disciplining practices. By doing these activities, which is 
basically stripping the ego from its desires, and all its attachments, the person rejects 
his subjectivity. In other words, a Sûfî, consciously enters this path of purification, and 
uses various “technologies of the self” to break out his identity constructed through 
Foucauldian “technologies of power”. Therefore, he wishes to become a subject. This 
form of life actually holds for an “art of existence” that Foucault hoped for the 
humanity. Sûfîs had been turning their lives and bodies into texts, into an art form 
that resembles the beauty and attributes of Allah. Throughout these disciplining 
processes, due to the intrinsic need of mediation in the understanding of Islamic 
knowledge learning, role of the mürşid, becomes both a guide for the metaphysical 
realm in the path of enlightenment, and an authority and a role-model to reinforce 
the subjectivation process of the mürid.  
While the two forms of learning, one in medreses and the other in tekkes, 
were very dominant and influential in the Ottoman Empire, with the establishment 
of the Turkish Republic, and the new reforms that took place around that time, which 
abolished all these traditional practices, the transmission of knowledge and the 
mediation with it went through serious change. The government preferred to keep 
the medrese type of education to control the public and to use it as a tool to 
strengthen the national identity. Thus they have turned these institutions to theology 
faculties and imam-hatips. With this change, the mediators also changed within the 
system. It can be claimed that even though the tradition of seeking knowledge from 
a mediator persisted in the society, the mediators became a part of the state 
ideology. In other words, the religious leaders became religious personnel of the 
government, thus the source of authority also changed within Islamic knowledge. 
Hence, the lack of the disciplinary practices that are dependent on the authority of 
the mürşid, found predominantly in tasavvuf, which includes subjugating, discarding 
desires, imitating role-models, and being in the presence of companions etc., within 
current Turkish society, reduced Islamic knowledge into the bare knowledge of the 
religious forms. Therefore, while Islamic knowledge used to encapsulate moral 
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dispositions, and the endeavor to attain it was a transformational experience for the 
believer, after the Republican reformations, it started to emanate from state 
ideologies, became mostly focused on the details of religious rituals, and the 
acquisition of it has become a normative process instead of a transformative one for 
the believer and practitioner. 
Due to the rupture from the tradition for the “modern”, the public space is 
altered, excluding many Muslim and Sûfî identities. Therefore, the groups left outside 
this new public space started to struggle and resist the state to be able to re-exist and 
become visible. They have started using tactics within the state controlled systems, 
to assert their existence. Thus, they have formed cemaats around the mosques and 
new religious leaders, and utilized the secular educational, economic, cultural and 
political institutions as a legal tools to exert their tactics. However, the struggle was 
mostly about identity. Thus, religious practices became politicized. Consequently, the 
subjectivity of the citizen became surrendered either to the state or to the cemaats 
as the citizens kept going after mediation while trying to identify himself/herself as 
an individual. That is to say, while previous practices of learning aimed to establish 
the self as a subject, current ones have been leading people more towards a 
constructed identity. It can also be suggested that due to this turn from 
subjectification to subjection, the scope of mediation is extended to any form of act, 
personal or politic, that an individual could try to identify his/her place in the broader 
public space.  
After the formation of the republic, new forms of mediation, new mediums 
and new ways of transmission of Islamic knowledge came to place in Turkey. 
Preaching in the mosques was one of the older ones, and then the discussion 
programs on radios and talks on the TV came forth. Slowly, Islamic learning habits 
and the mediation within that started to change radically in the current society. The 
knowledge was separated from practice and thus the daily lives of the citizens 
became secularized, not just the governmental institutions. Due to the alteration of 
mediation forms, the embodiment of Islamic knowledge became harder, and mostly 
detached from current religious practices. Hence, religious knowledge has been 
turned into practical information. The believers started to reproduce what they 
consume from these mediums as new forms and understandings of religion. The 
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knowledge about religion turned into a question-answer practice, mostly about the 
minute details of the practices since performing them well to present one’s identity. 
Moreover, religion became a spectacle, originating from the TV and extended into 
the daily practices through ostentatious acts to show oneself to be more visible in the 
public spaces.  
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